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This interim report is based on final reports relating to Germany, France,  Italy and the 
Netherlands and interim reports relating to Belgium and the United Kingdom. In due course 
it will have to be revised on the strength of further material on  the economie law of the 
Member  States  of  the  enlarged  Community.  The first  four  reports  were  concluded 
in mid 1971.  Since then the tendency noted in  the  interim  report  towards  increasing 
convergence of the economie law of the Member States has been continuing. Thus in France 
the role of five-year plans and 'dirigiste' measures has been further reduced,  whereas in 
Germany the arsenal of possibilities of intervention  has  been  extended  precisely  in  the 
direction of the Comunity average. 
As a  rule the national reports are cited with the name of the author and the subdivision 
followed. To prevent confusion only the Dutch report is cited as 'Dutch report'. 
In view of its different character, the following report has been given a somewhat different 
lay-out from the national reports. The aim of this report is to e~amine the place of the econ-
omie law of the Member States in an economie and monetary union. In connection with 
this, an explanation is first given of the aim and method of the study in Chapter I. Chap-
ter II is mainly based on the first part of the national reports. Chapter III follows on the 
subdivision of the second part of the national reports. As  two sections have first been in-
cluded on the overall objectives of economie policy  and  the  overall  institutional  aspects, 
the numbering of the following sections moves up two numbers in respect of that of the 
national reports. In addition to a summary of national law, each section contains conclusions 
with regard to harmonization or coordination. After a  summary of the preceding chapters, 
Chapter IV contains the principal recommendations  arising  from  the study.  The  recom-
mendations in the report are of a  minimal nature, as they  ~elate in fact to only the first 
two stages of the economie and monetary union.  This is  connected with the fact that the 
relevant Council resolutions have established that amendments will have to be made to the 
Treaty of Rome, but not which amendments. Consequently, the recommendations must be 
based not only on the existing national law but also on the existing text of the Treaty. The 
latter text makes it for instance possible to harmonize the powers of the central banks as 
a minimum condition for effective coordination,  but not to  establish  a  European central 
bank with its own powers. This instance at the same time makes it clear that the report 
can contribute to insight into the points on which,  to avoid superfluous work, a  quick de  .. 
cision is desirable on the choice between harmonization of national law and further exten-
sion of Community law. 
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5 CHAPTERI 
Introduction 
1.  Purpose of the study 
Means and end of the European Economie Communlty 
Under Article 2 of the Treaty of Rome the Commun-
ity  has  the  task  of  promoting  the  harmonious 
'development of economie activiUes throughout the 
Community, a  continuous and balanced expansion, 
an increase in stability,  an  accelerated raising of 
the standard of living and closer relations between 
the  states  belonging  to  the  Community.  In the 
Treaty itself and in various  other documents this 
task is elaborated. Of these other documents, spe-
cial  mention  should be  made of  the various  me-
dium-term  economie  policy  programmes  and  the 
resolutions of March 1971  and March 1972 concern-
ing the realization of an economie  and monetary 
union. 
Likewise under Article 2 of the Treaty of Rome, the 
Community should perform its task by establishing 
a common market and by progressively approxima  t-
ing  the  economie  policies  of  the  Member  States. 
Both means have an influence on the economie law 
of  the Member States,  and in the  present report 
the legal aspects  of this influence will be exam-
ined. 
The principal  economie  aspects  of  the  above  in-
fluence  have  already  been  analysed  before in  a 
report by Professor J. Zijlstra with the assistance 
of  Professor  B.  Goudzwaard  entitled  'Economie 
policy and problems of competition in the EEC and 
the Member States' (EEC  studies,  competition se-
ries No 2, Brussels 1966, cited hereafter as the Zijl-
stra report). The present study forms a  legal com-
plement  to that report. As  will  appear,  however, 
it deals with a  somewhat more extensive subject-
matter. 
The establishment of a common market 
In  brief,  the establishment  of  a  common  market 
means crea  ting ·effective competition in which estab-
lishment,  production,  financing  and  transactions 
in goods and services can take place where the eco-
nomie conditions are the most favourable, without 
regulations of private or public law distorting the 
free  play of  the market  to  any great  extent (cf. 
Zijlstra report, p.  39).  Means of achieving a  corn-
mon market within the whole territory of the Euro-
pean Communities include the customs union, the 
free movement of persons, services and capital and 
the  rules  on  competition  (Articles  85-94) of  the 
Treaty.  Like  the  common  policies  for  agriculture 
and  transport,  the  me  ans  men  tioned  are  largely 
characterized from the legal point of view by the 
existence or the ci'Ieation of lasting, legally binding 
standards of Community law. 
However,  experienc·e  has  shown that the  lasting 
binding standards of the Treaty with regard to the 
establishment of  a  common market must be sup-
plemented by  numerous - also lasting-measures 
of coordination or harmonization of national law. 
Neither the liberalization obligations arising direct-
ly out of the Treaty nor the directives and regula-
tions for implementation of those obligations prov-
ed  adequate  to  arrive  at  the  establishment  of a 
common market. As examples of necessary supple-
mentation by harmonization of legislation mention 
may be made from current harmonization practice 
of the coordination, harmonization or unification of 
customs legislation (ArUcl>es  27,  100  and 235),  corn  .. 
pany law (Article 54,3g),  the legislation regarding 
the taking up and pursuit of activities as self-em-
ployed  persons  (Article  57,  paragraph  2),  large 
areas of  tax legislation (Articles  99  and  100),  the 
legislation on public  order covered by Article  36 
which  causes  the so-called technical  and  admini-
strative obstacles to trade (Articles 43 and 100), and 
7 the regulation of supply and demand in the field 
of  public  procurement  (Articles  57,  66  and  100). 
Part of this legislation does not come under econom-
ie  law within the meaning given to the latter by 
this report. To  that extent this legislation will be 
dealt with briefly, if at ali. Considerations of expe-
diency have also played a part here. The Commis-
sion is already very weil documented in these fields 
of law and in them has moreover already largely 
laid down the objectives sought by harmonization. 
However, economie law in the narrower sense still 
displays a  more or less strong cohesion. Moreover, 
it forms the legal basis of economie policy,  which 
displays a  clear unity above  ali in sorne  Member 
states.  Economie  law  in  the  narrower  sense  has 
been fully examined in the national reports form-
ing  the  basis  of  this  report  on  account  of  that 
cohesion of its constituent elements. 
In this report the questions  examined first of  ali 
are th  ose  concerned wi  th the usually lasting har-
monization of Member States' economie law which 
relate to the establishment of the common market. 
In  particular the  matters  arise  here  which  have 
not yet found a  solution in Community legislation. 
This  aspect of the study  is  therefore particularly 
concerned with the extent to which the existence 
side by side of usually differing systems of national 
economie law leads to obstacles to or distortion of 
competition in intra-EEC trade. However,  the na-
ture of this study will allow of only broad conclu-
sions  on  this point with regard to the possibility, 
the utility, the legal basis and the legal methods of 
coordination or harmonization of the economie law 
of the Member States. The conclusions will be even 
broader concerning those parts of national economie 
law  that  have to  be  harmonized  in  the  frame-
work  of  common agricultural  policy and common 
transport policy, or under the ECSC Treaty or the 
Euratom Treaty. Here too it is mainly a question in 
principle of working out  lasting regulations required 
for  the  establishment  of  a  common  market  in 
these sectors. 
The  establishment  of  a  common  market  is  thus 
mainly brought about by means of lasting binding 
standards  which have either already been elabo-
rated in the Treaties or are being brought about by 
regulations or directives for implementation of the 
Treaties.  The  lasting  obligations  that  have  been 
laid down in the Treaties themselves for this pur-
pose,  or at least find  a  clear and specifie basis in 
them,  must  be  supplemented  by  likewise  lasting 
coordination or harmonization of national law. 
The need for coordination of economie policy 
With  respect to  the economie law of the Member 
States, the lasting Community standards mentioned 
above have two consequences. They have the legal 
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consequence  that standards  of  national  economie 
law at variance with Community regulations may 
no longer be applied or must be abolished or adapt-
ed.  Instances might be customs duties and quan-
titative  import  restrictions or  measures  having 
equivalent effect in intra-Community trade, discrim-
inatory  provisions  regarding  establishment,  cer-
tain agreements between firms and so  on. This re-
port does not further consider these consequences. 
However,  no  less important than the legal conse-
quence  are  the  economie  consequences that  crea-
tion of a common market has for the ,economie law 
of the Member States. The Zijlstra report summa-
rizes  these  consequences  on p.  41  by stating that 
the economie and geographical enlargement of the 
market and the greater mobility of the factors of 
production  'will  create  an  economie  situation  in 
which the national economies will display a  consi-
derably greater degree of openness and vulnerabili-
ty than at present and in which in principle  any 
national artificial intervention in the operation of 
the market will be reduced in effectiveness, irres-
pective of whether this intervention is  of  private 
origin - for instance by cartels - or of public ori-
gin (i.e.  by the national authorities)'. Acc;ording  to 
the further explanation of this statement (Zijlstra 
report, pp. 41-46), it relates both to overall short-
term and medium-term economie policy and to the 
direct control of for instance wages, priees, interest 
on capital, investments, competition, etc. The need 
for the second means mentioned in Article 2 of the 
EEC Treaty, the coordination of the economie pol-
icy of the Member States and thus of the approxi-
mation of national economie law,  arises above  ali 
from  the decreasing effectiveness of purely natio-
nal action. To attain the objectives set, an effecitve 
coordination or common policy at Community level 
or,  to put it another way, an economie and mone-
tary union must compensate the decreasing effecti-
veness of national economie policy. The legal impli-
cations of the necessity to supplement the common 
mark1et by an economie and monetary union will be 
examined  in  this  report  in  connection  wi  th  the 
problem  of  the  coordinàtion or harmonization  of 
the  economie  law  of the  Member States. It will 
become evident in this context that the method of 
lasting, legally binding standards which play such 
a  predominent  part  in  the  establishment of  the 
common market can only be used to a very limited 
extent in the coordination of economie policy. The 
latter will often call for short-term decisions which 
are also only in force for a  very limited period of 
time. As a r,esult, on often highly important points 
of policy, problems of institutional efficiency will 
arise similar to those on relatively secondary points 
of policy that had to be solved in the past in the 
day-to-day  implementation  of  the  common  agri-
cultural policy. In this context the German concepts 
'Dauerordnung'  and  'Prozesslenkung'  should  be compared.  While  the  'Dauerordnung'  from  the 
first phase of the EEC will definitely have to be 
main  tained  and  further  developed,  in  the  new 
phase of the economie and monetary union it will 
also have to be supplemented by 'Prozesslenkung'. 
Summary 
In sum this report therefore deals with the problem 
of the extent to which, for the ·establishment of a 
common market and the realization of an economie 
and monetary union, harmonization of the economie 
law of  the Member States is  necessary,  and  how 
this harmonization can be achieved. 
2.  Defining the subject of study 
This  report  deals wi  th the place of  the economie 
law of the Member States of the European Commu-
nities in an economie and monetary union. The eco-
nomie and monetary union presupposes the comple-
tion of the common market (cf.  the Resolution of 
the Council and of the representativ·es of the gov-
ernments of the Member States of 22  March 1971, 
Official Journal 1971, C 28). 
The report is of the nature of an interim report and 
draws provisional conclusions from the reports on 
the economie law of Germany (by Professor H.  F. 
Zacher),  of  France (by  Professor  M.  Fromont),  of 
Italy (by Professor G.  Sacchi Morsiani) and of the 
Netherlands  (by  Professor  P.  Verloren  van  The-
maat and Mr L. A. Geelhoel). 
At the same time it was  already possible  also  to 
take into  account' interim reports  on Belgium by 
Professor G.  Schrans and on the United Kingdom 
by Professor T.  C.  Daintith. The compilation of an 
interim report was considefled  desirable to stimu-
la  te the discussion on the national reports already 
completed. Upon completion of ali national reports 
a  final report or a  supplementation of the interim 
report can be drawn up. This will also be able to 
take into account the discussion stimulated by the 
interim report. 
The basic  concept for the whole study is  that of 
economie law. It was generally agreed between the 
rapporteurs that economie law should mean in ali 
reports the whole body of legal regulations promul-
gated to serve economie policy. At the same time 
attention  has  been  devoted  to  legal  regulations 
which may not be important to national economie 
policy but which, through the differences between 
them, are of particular significance to the economie 
policy  of  the  Community.  Instances  are  certain 
areas of tax legislation and the legislation contain-
ing standards that products must comply with in 
connection with the protection of the health of hu-
man  beings,  plants  and  animais.  However,  only 
brief attention is  paid to aspects of law on which 
there  is  already  ~extensive  documentation  and 
which are not of direct importance to national eco-
nomie po  licy. 
3.  Method of investigation 
To render the systems of economie law of the Mem-
ber States comparable, it was necessary to arrive at 
a  common systematic classification of this field of 
law. 
The  point of  departure  for  the classification was 
formed by the above mentioned Zijlstra report and 
in particular the  planning  typology  contained in 
that report (pp. 32-35). For this typology classifies 
the instruments of economie policy according to the 
- also  legally relevant - degree of commitment 
and the degree of differentiation by sectors or en-
terprises. However, a number of distinctions which 
at the  time  of compilation  of the  Zijlstra report 
seemed meaningful from the viewpoin  t of economie 
policy  proved  difficult  to  maintain  from  a  legal 
point  of  view  or  had  been  overtaken  by  events 
since  1964.  Mofleover,  from the angle of compara-
tive law it proved useful to work out more preci-
sely further subdivisions  .. In addition, the purpose of 
the present investigation made it necessary also to 
examine the mandatory regulations of national eco-
nomie law insofar as they are not directly connect-
ed with the general objectives of national economie 
policy or with general short-term or medium-term 
planning. 
As mentioned above, in this process, in view of the 
objectives of the economie policy of the European 
Communities, attention was also paid to a  number 
of fields  of law which,  viewed nationally,  do  not 
belong to economie law as  defined above, or with 
regard to which this is open to dispute. 
On  the  strength  of  the  abov;e  considerations  the 
rapporteurs  ultimately  accepted  a  subdivision  of 
economie law into the following five main groups: 
First group: the legal organization of economie 
forecasting (Zijlstra type 1) 
Otherwise  than  might  be  thought  at  first  sight, 
pure  forecasting  without  setting specifie  tasks  is 
quite definitely an instrument of economie  policy. 
Thus private  firms  will make allowance for such 
forecasts regarding the general economie develop-
ment  when  making  their  own  plans.  Moreover, 
for·ecasts will always start from certain- perhaps 
alternative  - assumptions  regarding  the  official 
policy  to  be  followed.  The varying  views  of  the 
9 different governments on the organization of such 
forecasts and their influence on this show that the 
governments already regard forcasts as an instru-
ment of economie policy. 
Second group: indicative short- and medium-term 
planning, supplemented by overall and indirect 
instruments for attainment of the objectives set 
(Zijlstra types II and III) 
This group includes the five-year plans in Belgium, 
France  and  Italy  and  budgetary  policy,  general 
taxation policy and monetary policy in all Member 
States.  The legal  standards of  this group are not 
binding on private enterpriS'e, but they are on the 
authorities  in  many cases.  Sometimes,  notably in 
Ital  y  and to a less exten  t  in France, they ave  also 
binding on  public  enterprises.  Their influence on 
the  behaviour  of  private  business  is characteris-
tically indirect. 
Especially in countries  where  medium-term  eco-
nomie policy is highly developed,  short-term eco-
nomie policy is regarded as a  method of adjusting 
the development of the economy to bring it in line 
with  the  current  aims  of  medium-term  policy. 
Consequently  short- and  medium-term  economie 
policy are considered as being interrelated in this 
part of the reports. To sorne extent too both forms 
use the same legal instruments. 
Third group: measures of assistance 
(Zijlstra types IV and V) 
On account of the purpose of the study stated under 
I. 1,  aids  are interpreted here in the same broad 
sense as in Article 92  of the Trea  ty of Rome. From 
a viewpoint of national law it did not prove feasible 
in an analysis of the economie law of the Member 
States to adopt the distinction that Zijlstra makes 
between  unconditional  and  conditional  aids.  In 
Community supervision  of national  aids  this  dis-
tinction plays a clearer role. 
It emerges from the national reports tha  t  the des-
cription of national aid policy is  simpler in coun-
tries where this  instrument  is  applied  systemat-
ically and in clear connection with medium-term 
economie policy  (Belgium,  France and Italy)  than 
in countries where there is no clear and systematic 
aid policy. 
Fourth group: programme contracts 
(dealt with in the Zijlstra report as a part of his 
planning type V) 
While legally speaking conditional aids cannot al-
ways be  clearly  distinguished  from  unconditional 
aids, programme contracts between the authorities 
10 
and business do forman obvious separate category. 
The part of business conoerned undertakes by such 
contracts  to  impl,ement  a  given  programme  (e.g. 
with regard to investments, exports, wage or priee 
policy). As a quid pro quo from the authorities pro-
gramme  contracts  sometimes  provide  for  aids  to 
the firms concerned, and sometimes grant relief or 
exemption from mandatory regulations.  In elabo-
rated form they exist above all in France and -
clearly on the French model - in Belgium. How-
ever,  in embryonic form they also  exist in other 
Member  States.  In  principle  not  only  firms  or 
groups of firms but also organizations of employers 
and employees can be partners in such programme 
contracts. The quid pro quo on the part of the au-
thorities may further in principle relate not only 
to the instruments of  groups 3  and  5 but also  to 
those of groups 1 and 2.  For the distinctive feature 
of this group of  measures lies in their quasi-con-
tractual  nature.  The  contracting  partners  - the 
authorities and business- ar~e within the limits of 
what  is  legaUy  permitted  free  in their choice  of 
objectives and implementary instruments. 
Fifth group: mandatory regulations 
(Extension of Zijlstra type VI to ali mandatory 
regulations of economie law, even if they are not bound 
up with a plan) 
In this category mandatory institutional provisions 
are also dealt with, for instance with regard to pro-
fessional organization. The following are dealt with 
as  measures  of substantive law:  mandatory  mea-
sures implementing short-term economie policy, re-
gulations for situations of crisis and shortage, regula-
tions on foreign ~economie  ~relations, general regula-
tions of structural policy such as cartel legislation, 
quantitative  and  qualitative  regulations  with  re-
gard  to access  to  a  market (including investment 
control  and  establishment  control from  the point 
of view of physical planning or en  vironmen  tai pro-
tection), regulations concerning separate aspects of 
market behaviour and regulations of public order. 
Certainly, the last subdivision is not a  part of na-
tional  economie  law.  But,  as  mentioned  above, 
these regulations may be of great importance to the 
economie law of the European Communities. 
Sixth group: sectorallegislation 
(Zijlstra type VI A) 
This group specially envisages sectors like agricul-
ture  and  transport,  where  all  the  organizational 
measures are dearly interrelated and the sectoral 
policy oontext of the measures weighs more heavi-
ly  than  the  general  policy  of  furthering  compe-
tition or the general planning or other objectives 
of the Member State not specifically related to the sector. However, in sorne national reports measures 
are also dealt with in this group which, because the 
obj·ectives  are general rather than sectoral,  affect 
the sectoral  behaviour  on only a  few  points,  for 
the rest giving free play to the general market and 
planning mechanism. 
Seventh and eighth group: enforcement of the law 
and legal protection 
In a  comparative study undertaken with a  view to 
the harmonization of national law, sorne attention 
must of course be paid in conclusion to the regula-
tion of enforcement of the  law (administrative, crim-
inal and other sanctions)  and of legal protection. 
For harmonization of economie law is pointless if 
the harmonized law cannot be enforced everywhere 
with ·equal effectiveness. In addition, a harmonized 
regulation of the judicial interpretation of harmo-
nized law may sometimes be of decisive importance. 
It  finally  emerges  from  the  regulation  on  legal 
protection to what extent economie law in the var-
ious Member States is regarded as a separate field 
of law. 
4.  Utility of the analysis scheme to 
Community policy 
The analysis scheme thus derived from the Zijlstra 
report also proves to be effective from the point of 
view of the harmonization  or coordination of the 
economie law of the Member States which is being 
sought. In Community law there are examples of 
all the groups  of economie policy instruments re-
ferred to in the analysis scheme. But in particular 
the instruments of coordination of Member States' 
economie law at the disposai  of the Communities 
display  a  differentiation  which  in  general fits  in 
well  with  the  analysis  scheme.  The  investigation 
in this respect is mainly confined to the EEC Trea-
ty. In the other Community treaties a  number of 
instruments  of  coordination  are  more  highly  de-
veloped. 
4.1.  FIRST AND SECOND GROUP 
Forecasts  and indicative  planning in the medium-
term, like overall and indirect interventions, can be 
coordinated in this connection on the basis of Arti-
cles  105  and 145  of the Treaty of Rome  and the 
organizational powers of the Commission and the 
Council. 
Short-term economie policy can be coordinated by 
the application of Article 103 and som·etimes by the 
application of Article 100,  of the EEC Treaty (e.g. 
in the fiscal field). 
Insofar as  public  enterprises  are used  as  instru-
ments of  economie  policy,  Article  90  of the EEC 
Treaty, in conjunction with Article 105, presents an 
effective instrument of coordination. 
Public  contracts  can  be  coordinated  by  applying 
Articles  30,  57/66  and  100  and  by  public  orders 
coordinated by the Community or placed with busi-
ness.  A  serious  gap  in  powers  of  coordination 
exists only  under Article  107  with regard  to  the 
exchange rate policy of the Member States. 
4.2.  THIRD GROUP 
Aids can be ,effectively coordinated with medium-
term economie policy by application of Articles 92 
and 93  of the EEC Treaty and Community finan-
cial incentives of varying kinds (Investment Bank, 
Social  Fund,  Agricultural  Fund  and  other  funds 
still to be created, and also special incentives under 
the ECSC and Euratom Treaties. 
4.3.  FOURTH GROUP 
Insofar as national programme contracts are tied to 
measures of assistance, they can likewise be coor-
dinated under Articles 92  and 93  of the EEC Trea-
ty, and in other cases perhaps under Articles 30, 90, 
101  or 105.  Finally,  programme contracts at Com-
munity leve! are possible to  the extent  to  which 
the Community can offer the prospect of a  finan-
cial or other quid pro quo. 
4.4.  FIFTH AND SIXTH GROUP 
Notwithstanding the common policies  for  agricul-
ture, transport, coal and steel, nuclear energy and 
foreign trade, mandatory regulations can be coor-
dinated or harmonized under Articles 57,  66,  99-
103,  220,  224 and 235  of the EEC Treaty ·and inter-
national conventions for  agreements on fields  not 
mentioned in Article 220. 
4.5.  SEVENTH AND EIGHTH GROUP: 
Article 100 or international conventions 
From this broad comparison of the analysis scheme 
with the coordinative instruments of the Commu-
nity  treaties,  two  important  conclusions  can  be 
drawn. In the first place, it becomes more or less 
11 apparent how the coordinative instruments in the 
Community treaties and notably in the EEC Treaty 
tie in with the differentiation of instruments of na-
tional economie policy forming the basis of the re-
ports. Secondly, a serious gap in the powers of the 
Community exists only with regard to sorne aspects 
of monetary policy,  notably exchange rate policy. 
However,  these  encouraging conclusions  are  of a 
rather formai nature. In particular with regard to 
the first and second group of measures great insti-
tutional problems of organization, decision-making 
ability and effectiv·eness will occur. These are pro-
blems of the transition from the method of lasting 
binding standards to an effective 'Prozesslenkung' 
that were already mentioned in the first section of 
of  this chapter. However,  problems will also arise 
in the field of harmonization of mandatory national 
standards of  economie law which in the past did 
not yet come clearly to the fore. This is the problem 
of outline laws forming the foundation  of  manda-
tory measures  relating for  instance  to  short-term 
economie policy. It has to be examined here to what 
extent coordination of the application of the outline 
laws is more important than harmonization of the 
outline laws themselves. Insofar as the application 
has to take place at short notice and results in mea-
sures of limited duration, similar institutional ques-
tions again arise as  with regard to the day-to-day 
adjustment of economie  processes in general.  The 
problem  becomes  even  more  complicated  to  the 
extent that the national measures in question are at 
variance  with  mandatory  regulations  of  primary 
or secondary Community law orto the extent that 
harmonization is  likewise required for completion 
of  the common market. Mandatory regulations of 
short-term ·economie policy may enter into conflict 
with free intra-EEC trade where competition is un-
distorted. Coordination by the Community of Mem-
ber States'  short-term  economie  policy  will  have 
to obviate such conflicts. 
The problem thus defined already played a part in 
the taking of Community measures for  intra-EEC 
trade in agricultural produce after the last French 
devaluation and the  German and  Dutch  revalua-
tions.  For  reasons  of  short-term  economie  policy 
measures were temporarily tak:en in application of 
Article 103  of the EEC Treaty which were at vari-
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ance with the principles of free movement of goods. 
But it is not certain that ali Member States already 
fully recognized the fundamental and more general 
significance of the problem at that time. 
5.  Lay-out of the report 
As  the first  part of  each  national report  already 
contains a summary of the system of economie law 
concerned, for these summaries per country refer-
ence may be made to the national reports. 
However,  in  the  second  chapter of  this  report  a 
number of bread conclusions in the field of compar-
ative law are drawn from the national summaries. 
It will be indicated in a manner similar to that on 
pp. 36  and 37  of the Zijlstra report, but then from 
the legal point of view,  what relevant differences 
of  emphasis  exist between the  Member  States in 
objectives, subjects regulated and use of the var-
ious  instruments  of the  analysis  scheme.  In  this 
bread comparison the economie law of each Member 
State is  ther·efore  regarded as  a  unit,  whether or 
not explicitly expressed as such. The concepts 'eco-
nomische  orde'  and  'Wirkschaftsv:erfassung'  or 
'constitution économique' also  come up for discus-
sion here. A number of general conclusions for the 
coordination or harmonization of the economie law 
of the Member States will be linked to the bread 
comparison. 
In the third and largest chapter the objectives of 
economie  policy  and  the institutional  mechanism 
for  achieving  those  ends  will  first  be  discussed. 
Then the various subjects of the uniform analysis 
scheme will be examined in the same arder as in 
the national reports. In the case of ali the subjects 
dealt with, the most important ways in which na-
tional systems correspond and differ are discussed 
first. 
Then it is  indicated  to what  extent coordination, 
harmonization or unification of the national regu-
lations is  necessary and how this can be achieved 
under the European Community treaties. 
The  fourth  chapter  will  summarize  the principal 
conclusions which may be drawn from the study. CHAPTERII 
The main characteristics of the national systems of economie law examined 
1.  The unity of each system of economie law 
From the various national  reports  or interim re-
ports, it clearly emerges that each national system 
of economie law displays unity, or at least cohesion. 
This must not be disregarded in the Community's 
coordinative activities in various fields of econom-
ie  law. The ·cohesion  has sometimes been  worked 
out thoroughly in accordance with a  rational plan 
(France,  and to a  less considerable  extent in Bel-
gium and Italy too). Sometimes little system can be 
discov·ered in the economie law of a country at first 
sight (Germany, the Netherlands, the United King-
dom). But in that case too a comparative study quite 
definitely  reveals  that  there  are  a  number  of 
general  characteristics  of  the  national  system  of 
economie law concerned that distinguish this sys-
tem from the economie law of other countries. As 
was said in the previous chapter, the present chap-
ter will indicate the principal relevant differences 
in emphasis in a similar way to that on pp. 36  and 
37  of the Zijlstra report, but from the legal point 
of view. 
2.  The historical strata in the national systems 
of economie law 
Between  the  national  systems  of  economie  law 
there are more differences in emphasis than essen-
tial differences. Even before the Community treaties 
came into being the economie law of the countries 
investigated displayed  greater points of similarity 
than of difference. A  more extensive investigation 
from  the viewpoint of legal history than  appears 
from most reports would show that economie law in 
all the countries concerned came into being above 
all in the critical prewar years, with often striking 
parallels- to the very date of their introduction-
in  the  organizational  measures  then  taken  per 
branch of industry. 
The  historical  experience  of  the  inflation  period 
during the 1920's in Germany,  the historical stra-
tum of the legal measures taken to deal with the 
crisis in all the countries investigated, sorne aspects 
of the historical stratum of the subsequent inter-
ventionist  legislation  and above  all the  period of 
recovery  and  expansion  in the first  two  postwar 
decades clearly set their stamp on the economie law 
now in force in all the countries investigated. 
N  otably in the reports relating to  France and the 
N  ether  lands, attention is explicitly devoted to these 
historical strata of  current economie  law.  So  im-
portant an instrument of Italian economie policy as 
the state  holding  companies  and  also  major  ele-
m·ents  of current Belgian economie law date from 
the critical prewar period. On the other hand, im-
portant elements of German economie law- not-
ably the emphasis on priee stability, the market eco-
nomy  and the  idea  of the  constitutional state -
were not so much derived from economie law of the 
Twenties and Thirties as reactions to it.  Elements 
of reactions to previous periods - this time struc-
turally connected with the two-party system and 
thus  periodically  returning  - may,  according  to 
the British interim report, also be noted in the eco-
nomie law of the United Kingdom. 
3.  The influence of the European Communities 
After the European Community treaties had been 
concluded  the  tendency  towards  convergence  of 
the systems of economie law of the Member States 
clear  ly grew. 
In part this is a  direct political, legal or economie 
consequence of the Community treaties. In the in-
troductory chapter it has already been pointed out 
that the  liberalization  of  the interstate  economie 
relations of the Member States considerably weak-
ened  the  effectiveness  of  national  meastmes  of 
13 economie policy,  even where these were not from 
a  strictly  legal  point  of  view  inconsistent  with 
Community  law.  The  liberalization  of  interstate 
trade thus compelled a certain degree of liberaliza-
tion of economie policy and thus of economie law in 
the most  'dirigiste' countries.  On the other hand, 
in  the  countries  relying  more  on  the  market 
mechanism it came increasingly to be seen that the 
operation of the market mechanism had to be ad-
justed at least by a number of overall and indirect 
measures, but also by a number of specifie indirect 
or even very directly acting measures. Presumably 
ail Member States, with only a few minor reserva-
tions,  can now accept what the Zijlstra report (p. 
17) quotes in summarized form from the orientation 
report for the French Fifth Plan. According to this 
quotation which is by way of summary 'market and 
plan  ar~e bath necessary si  de by si  de.  The market 
has the task (on  condition that sufficient informa-
tion  is  present and that monopoloid  elements  a~e 
absent)  of  adjusting  supply  and  demand  to  one 
another.  The  plan  has  the  task  "of  putting  for-
ward, beyond the powers and limi  ts of the market, 
a  common view of economie development explain-
ing  individual  behaviour".  For  the  market  has 
by nature the restriction that it cannat reflect the 
future needs and developments: consequently, the 
present market situation is not an adequate guide 
for decisions by firms'. 
The idea  that  'market'  and  'plan' perform  comp-
lemen  tary tasks and are bath necessary is  also,  as 
already  remarked,  contained  in  Article  2  of  the 
EEC Treaty. As  emerges from the successive pro-
grammes  for  medium-term  economie  policy,  the 
term  'coordination'  used  in the  article  mentioned 
does  not,  after  ail,  exclude  the  concept  'plan', 
but includes it. The fact that in the EEC the term 
'programme'  was  introduced  instead  of  'plan' 
was  connected  with  associations that  the concept 
'plan' aroused,  notably in Germany, with the con-
cepts  'dirigisme'  and  'planned  economy'.  The 
Zijlstra  report  (pp.  34-37), the  above  mentioned 
French orientation  report  for  the Fifth Plan and 
the legal terminology employed in the Netherlands 
ail make i  t  clear,  however, tha  t  planning need in 
now way be bound up with centralization of ail or 
the major 'economie decisions. 
4.  Decisive factors in the degree of convergence 
or divergence of systems of economie law 
The degree  of convergence and divergence of the 
systems of economie law of the Member States of 
the EEC is ultimately connected abov'e ail with the 
degree of community of fundamental cultural and 
political values in the Member States and with the 
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degree of comparability of their economie structure. 
Values  like  persona!  freedom  and  democracy 
cannat be realized without radical decentralization 
of the power of decision, in the economie field too. 
Values like equality and solidarity with economie-
ally  weaker groups cannat be attained any more 
than  the  economie  'magic  square'  of  Article  104 
of the EEC Treaty without a certain degree of coor-
dination of the decentralized decisions and without 
certain  legal  guarantees  of  equal  treatment.  The 
exact degree of coordination of economie decisions 
requir,ed depends,  according to a  ~emarkable pro-
position by Farjat (Droit économique, Presses uni-
versitaires de France 1971,  pp. 238 and 265  et seq.), 
directly on the degree of concentration of business. 
This proposition needs further empirical verifica-
tion.  However,  it  is  an  established  fact  that the 
structural  development  phase  of  an  economy, 
which finds partial expression in the Western coun-
tries in the degree of concentration, is of great in-
fluence  on  the  development  of  economie  law,  in 
addition to the cyclical phases and the dependence 
on foreign  trade. The ultimate explanation of the 
increasing convergence that may be noted in the 
development of the economie law of  the Member 
States must therefore presumably be sought in the 
large  degree  of  community  of  fundamental  cul-
tural and political values in the Member States, the 
increasing comparability of their enonomic  struc-
ture  and  the  in  terdependence  reinforced  by  the 
establishment of a common market. 
The national reports forming the basis of this re-
port  and  the  three  medium-term  economie  pro-
grammes published so  far notably display a  radi-
cal convergence with respect to the subjects regulat-
ed by economie law and to the objectives pursued. 
The economically or legally relevant differences in 
emphasis  relate  aboV'e  ail  to  the  methods  with 
which certain objectives are pursued or,  to put it 
the other way round, the manner of using instru-
ments of economie policy which, in themselves, are 
often available in all Member States. Incidentally, 
applicable  to  ail  national  reports  and  to  every 
study of ·comparatiV'e law is the warning pronoun-
ced  in  the  French  report:  'It is  evident  that  the 
range of instruments of economie law gives only an 
inexact pi  ct  ure of economie po  licy'. 
5.  Economie law in Germany 
According  to  the  Zijlstra  report,  in  1964  'soziale 
Marktwirtschaft' still prevailed to so great an ex-
tent in Germany that only with regard  to  direct 
government action did a  certain type of planning 
occur, the report's planning type II (op.  cit., p. 36). 
This  can  certainly  not  be  maintained  since  the enactment  of  the  Law  to  Promote  Stability  and 
Growth of the Economy in 1967.  On the contrary, 
it emerges from the German report that economie 
law in the Federal Republic now relates to ali six 
main groups and most of the subgroups of instru-
ments  laid down  in  the  comparative scheme and 
that to  a  certain extent one may even speak of a 
'planning euphoria' (Zacher,  Nos  22  and 44).  And 
yet in Germany the main emphasis still falls clear-
ly on promotion  of the proper functioning of the 
market economy. Legally speaking, this is reflected 
inter alia in the highly independent and powerful 
position of the Bundeskartellamt, and also  in the 
opposition still regularly put up in the recent past 
to 'dirigiste' measures in for instance the fields of 
foreign payments, capital and commercial transac-
tions and domestic wages and priees. In the third 
place mention may be made in this connection of 
the absence of generally valid legal principles for 
the  measures  of  assistance  that  are  now  widely 
applied in the Federal Republic too and the lack of 
development of the instrument of programme con-
tracts. Finally, the nature of German  economie  pol-
icy which is stilllittle directed towards planning is 
evidenced by the absence of a systematic summary 
of  the in  themselves  num·erous  mandatory  inter-
vention  regulations  and  their  consistent  employ-
ment for the realization of certain objectives defin-
ed by a  plan. It is further characteristic that sec-
tora!  economie  policy  is  unevenly  developed  and 
the fairly extensive public sector of the economy 
is  neither regarded nor used as  an instrument of 
economie  policy.  The planning now  applied  is  in 
other words mainly of the nature of Globalsteue-
rung,  or overall control (second  main group)  and, 
unlike the situation in France, does not aim at in-
troducing rational cohesion into the numerous in-
dividual measures or in the decisions of the firms. 
As  long as the individual measures taken  by the 
authorities  and the decisions  of the  firms  do  not 
lead to a major upset of the market mechanism, the 
effect of these measures and decisions can be coor-
dinated by the  market.  To sum up,  the economie 
law of the  Federal Republic  is  now economically 
characterized by the fa  ct th  at the demand si  de is 
broadly  and  systematically influenced  by overall 
control, especially in the interest of the stability of 
the economy (Zacher No 14),  while the supply side 
is  mainly coordinated by the mark·et.  The market 
economy itself is  also regarded as  a  central value 
of  the  ·economie  order  (Zacher  No  21).  However, 
the effect of competition is corrected by numerous 
though as a  rule not very drastic official measures 
of above all intervention groups 3 and 5 from the 
common analysis scheme (Zacher No 4). 
From a  legal point of view the following elements 
must be added above all to the characterization of 
German economie law. 
(a)  THE DIVISION OF COMPETENCE BETWEEN 
BUND AND LANDER 
Although the greater part of economie  l~gislation 
has been enacted at Bund leve!, in vi·ew of the fed-
eral nature  of the Republic  the economie  law of 
the Lander may not be overlooked (Zacher No 4). 
(b)  THE SIGNIFICANCE OF  THE  FUNDAMENTAL 
RIGHTS  (human dignity, equality, rights of liberty, 
principle of  the social state) AND  OF THE 
'ECONOMIC CONSTITUTION' for the elaboration 
of economie law (Zacher Nos  15  and 21  to 25) 
For the present study it is of particular importance 
that the view,  prevalent for a  long time, that the 
idea of the 'social market economy' was anchored 
in the Constitution· was la  ter expl'lessly rejected by 
the Federal Constitutional Court. 
According  to  the latter,  the Constitution 'has not 
opted explicitly for  one specifie  economie system' 
(Zacher No  22).  This means that the German Con-
stitution is not opposed to a more extensive conver-
gence  of  the  economie  systems  of  the  Member 
States in an EEC  context. However,  the rights of 
liberty laid clown in the Constitution may in particu-
lar have  a  hampering  ef:liect,  for  instance in  the 
event of coordination of sorne aspects of the righ  t 
of  establishment  in  the  direction  of  interven-
tionism. 
On the other hand an overall macro-economie equi-
librium policy and a  budgetary policy conforming 
to  the  cyclical  trend,  and  therefore  if  necessary 
anti-cyclical,  are now  expressly laid clown  in the 
German Constitution, along with the furtherance of 
a  balanced  regional  development  and  the  en-
couragement of economie growth (Articles 91a, 104a 
and 109).  This has definitely further facilitated co-
ordination  with the economie  policy  of the other 
Member  States,  while the disturbing  influence  of 
the independent economie policy of the Lander was 
weakened by stronger domestic  coordination  (Za-
cher No 25). 
(c)  The strong development of workers' 
CO-MANAGEMENT  AT  ENTERPRISE LEVEL 
AND  THE  ABSENCE  OF  A SOCIAL ECONOMIC 
COUNCIL and of other highly developed 
institutional bases for  cooperation between the 
authorities and business at national and industry 
lev  el 
The  'concerted  action'  laid  down  in the Stability 
and Growth Act is in fact quite r·emote  from the 
institutionalized  forms  of  collaboration  between 
business (employers and workers) and the authori-
ties existing in the other Member States. At first 
sight this heavy stress on company co-management 
(by employees) and the lack of development of 'co-
15 management'  of  the  national  economie  policy  by 
management and labour seems to be an institution-
al parallel of the  original relation  between  'mar-
ket' and 'plan' as the main instruments of econo-
mie policy. It remains to be seen whether the shift 
in emphasis  from  'market economy'  to  'planning' 
will also be accompanied in the long run by a shift 
in  emphasis  on  the  institutional  plane.  It seems 
certain that the present German forms of institution-
alization of co-management at enterprise level and 
beyond will not make European harmonization of 
company law and European institutionalization of 
consultation  with  management  and  labour  any 
simpler in the short-term. 
(d)  THE !DEA OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE 
The German idea of the constitutional state is char-
acterized not only by the fundamental rights and 
the 'economie constitution' but also by a  relatively 
strong and still increasing developmen  t  of wri  tten 
economie law (Zacher 5/6),  by increasing publicity 
of proposais and measures of economie policy and a 
considerable and  institutionalized influence  of in-
dependent experts on the public discussion of this 
(ibid.),  and  finally by  a  very strong development 
of legal protection (Zacher 32). The latter is also re-
flected in the relatively voluminous German juris-
prudence on Community law. 
6.  Economie law in France 
According to  the Zijlstra report, French economie 
policy in 1964  was characterized above a:ll  by the 
framing  of concrete objectives in five-year  plans, 
not only with respect to the development of the na-
tional  economy  but also  with  regard  to  separate 
branches of activity and sectors. The attainment of 
the objectives sought is  pursued both directly and 
indir·ectly. Especially characteristic were the objec-
tives  for  separate  sectors  fostered  by conditional 
incentives  and  programme  contracts,  and  sorne-
times  also  by  direct  regulations  (Zijlstra,  p.  36). 
Today too the main stress of planning in France, as 
opposed to Germany, stilllies on the furtherance of 
growth. Short-term economie policy (stability pol-
icy)  has  a  subordinate function  to  growth  policy 
(Fromont, III). In addition to the main aim of a bal-
anced ·economie  growth French planning now has 
the aim of a balanced distribution of economie activ-
ity over the whole territory and socia'l progress in 
the broad sense (ibid.). The tendency already refer-
red to in the Zijlstra report (p.  35)  to make plan-
ning rless of a system for setting quantitative sectoŒ"-
al tasks has been continued in the Sixth Plan un-
der the influence of the steadily growing openness 
of  the French economy to  foreign  influences  and 
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the more neoliberal attitude of the most recent gov-
ernments. While, as we have seen, German econom-
ie  policy  is  thus  evolving  to  sorne  extent  in  a 
French direction, French economie policy is evolv-
ing  to  som·e  exten  t  in  a  German  direction.  This 
will  certainly facilitate  coordination  of  economie 
policy in an EEC context. France has also already 
reinforced the statutory basis of its policy on com-
petition severa! times independently and thus caus-
ed the convergence with the German views to in-
crease  further.  However,  unlike  developments  in 
Germany, French planning relates to practically ali 
parts of economie law, which in addition is inter-
preted very liberally (Fromont, Ha). As a  result of 
this French economie law - in a  legal respect too 
- displays a much clearer system and for that rea-
son  does  not  require  such  a  detailed  description 
as German economie law. 
From a  legal point of view the following should be 
added about French economie law. 
(a)  LIMITED PARTICIPATION OF PARLIAMENT 
Unlike  most  other  Member  States,  in  France 
right from  the beginning very important substan-
tive economie laws have been enacted not by the 
legislator in the formai sense but by the govern-
ment. This applies for instance to the founding of a 
National  Economie  Council  in  1925,  to  the  1934 
transport  legislation,  the priee  and cartel legisla-
tion of 1945 and 1953 respectively, the economie pe-
nal legislation of 1945, the agricultural market leg-
islation of 1953,  the credit legis·lation,  the regula-
tion  of the  capital market, the structural adapta-
tion  of  enterprises,  regional  policy,  agricultural 
structural policy  etc.  (Fromont,  I).  It seems  clear 
that for this reason the French Parliament may be 
expected to exert less pressure than other national 
parliaments for a greater participation of the Euro-
pean Parliam·ent in substantive European econom-
ie  legislation.  Under  the  French constitution  the 
French legislator in the formai sense need partici-
pate only in the promulgation of new and impor-
tant  regulations.  The  elaboration  and  application 
are reserved for the government, provided that the 
principles laid down by the legislator are not modi-
fied as a  result (Fromont, I  and IV).  However, the 
legislator is  consulted in the preparation and ulti-
mate ·establishment of the five-year plans. Having 
regard  to  the  fundamental  importance  that  the 
French five-year plans have both for economie pol-
icy  and for  the  development  of law,  this  is  self-
evident. 
(b)  FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
U  nlike German economie law, the French version 
does not have a coherent system of fundamentalle-gal principles binding both legislator and adminis-
trator (Fromont, V).  However, as  regards the eco-
nomie order or the 'Wirtschaftsvedas·sung', it may 
be said, according to Fromont, that French law has 
endeavoured to reconcile the capitalist bases of so-
ciety with socialist  preoccupations.  Thus the  pre-
ambl'e to the Constitution of 1958  confirms the sa-
cr·ed nature of the right of property by an explicit 
reference to the Declaration of the Rights of Man of 
1789,  whi,le the preambl'e to the 1946  Constitution, 
to which the preamble of the present constitution 
likewise refers, posits the principle of nationaliza-
tion of certain enterprises. French economie law is 
therefore led in ·essence by two opposite guidelines, 
respecting on the one hand the freedom of economie 
entiti:es  and  on  the  other  the  duty  of  the  state 
to contribute to  economie and social development. 
Howev,er, fundamental new restrictions of the eco-
nomie  freedoms  laid  down  in  Article  34  of  the 
Constitution may only be introduced by law (Fro-
mont, loc. cit.). 
In principle the two opposite guidelines mentioned 
run parallel, in our opinion,  to the likewise con-
trary  principles  of  'market'  and  'plan'  which  we 
have already encountered in Article 2  of the EEC 
Treaty and in the development of German law and 
in fact can encounter in all Member States. They 
therefore  need  not lead  to  serious  difficulties  in 
Community coordination of the economie law of the 
Member States. 
Interesting  from  a  viewpoint of  comparative law 
and for the  application  of  Article  90  of  the EEC 
Treaty is the constitutional statement of principle 
dating from 1946, which demands nationalization of 
every  good and every enterprise operation which 
has or aquires the nature of a  public service or of 
an  actual  monopoly.  The coexistence  of  a  public 
and  a  private  sector (the latter predominating in 
importance) of the economy thu:s has a constitution-
ail  basis in Fr·ance (Fromont, IV, a).  However, there 
is  a  tendency forr  the state to  ~espect the admin-
istrative  autonomy  of  public  enterprises  on  the 
same basis as that of private firms (ibid.).  On this 
point too  an  approach to  the German views  may 
be noted. 
The fDeedom  of  production and trade is  not  laid 
down in the Constitution but in Article 544  of the 
Code Civile, though it has formed the subject of nu-
merous  restrictions  (ibid.).  As  already mentioned, 
new r·estrictions equivalent to old ones m·ay, accord-
ing to the Cons  ti  tu  tional Council,  also be imposed 
by the government without consulting the legisla-
tor. The freedom of the workers has been much less 
restricted by the legislator or the government. On 
the contrary, the Social Security Act of July 1968 
prescribes  that  those  covered  by social  insurance 
must partake of the fruits of economie growth (Fro-
mont, IV,  2·c),  whi1e  the same principle was estab-
lished by the Law of 2. July 1970 for the increase in 
minimum wages (SMIC) (ibid.). 
(c)  INSTITUTIONALIZED PARTICIPATION 
OF BUSINESS 
In comparison to Germany, the assistance of busi-
ness  (employers  and  workers)  in  the preparation 
and implementation of economie policy in France is 
insti  tu  tionalized to a  rel  a ti  v ely strong and highly 
differ·entiated  extent.  The  Economie  and  Social 
Council plays inter alia a certain role in establish-
ing the a·lternativ·e  options for the five-year plans 
(Fromont, II-5-1). On the other hand, the institu-
tionalized  influence  of  the  workers  at  enterprise 
level is much less strongly developed than in Ger-
many.  The  institutional  participation  of  business 
will  be  further  discussed  in the  next cha  pter  of 
this report. 
(d)  THE IDEA OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE 
Whereas in Germany a  de.tailed and still increas-
ing definition of economie policy written law may 
be noted,  in  the literature for  France a  contrary 
development  is  reported  (cf.  Farjat,  Droit  écono-
mique, pp. 392-398). In particular the far-reaching 
delegation of regulating power to the government 
and the furtherance of growth by means of subsi-
dies, tax reliefs, credit policy and programme con-
tracts encourage a  'delegalization' of economie law 
and the  erosion of  fundamental  principles of law 
such as the principle of equality. 
.A!lthough formaHy speaking legal protection is very 
fully regulated, the delegalization of economie law 
in its turn erodes the practical importance of legal 
protection (Fromont,  CHAP.  8,  Farjat, op.  cit.,  pp. 
395-396). However,  it seems  conceivable that the 
absence of speciaHzed administrative jurisprudence 
in  the  ·economie  field  or  other  parttcular  caus·es 
have contributed to an unsatisfactory degree of le-
gal protection in practice. It is  otherwise difficult 
to explain why French jurisprudence on the law of 
the European Communities, which is precisely very 
greatly elaborated on the juridical plane, is also so 
much less extensive than that in Germany or the 
Netherlands  (cf.  reports  for  the  FIDE  Cong:ress, 
1973).  Meanwhile the recent French [iterature sees 
in a decision of the Council of State of 11  December 
1970  (Crédit Foncier de France) a  sign of a  funda-
mental change of course in the direction of greater 
legal  protection,  since  this  decision  regards  the 
lauthorities  as  bound  by  simple  administrative 
guidelines  (V:edel,  Droit  administratif, Paris 1973, 
Savy,  Droit  public  économique,  Paris  1972,  De 
Laubadère,  L'administration  de  l'économie,  Paris 
1971). 
17 7.  Economie law in Italy 
The Zijlstra report already mentions that the !ta-
lian government tries  in particular to  achieve its 
programmed objectives by the use of government-
run firms  as  instruments  of  economie  policy  and 
that the objectives for certain branches of industry 
(and for the less developed regions) are in addition 
pursued by means of measures of  assistance (Zijl-
stra, pp. 18,  19,  21  and 36).  There is no question of 
an  active  policy  to  encourage  competition,  since 
none of the attempts to lay a legal basis for this has 
had any result (Zijlstra, pp. 19-21). 
This economie  characteriza  ti  on of Italian planning 
policy still proves largely correct according to the 
Italian legal report. But in addition Italy, like Ger-
many and the Netherlands, appears to have a large 
number of laws  with  mandatory  prescriptions  of 
economie  law  that  are  not  systematically coordi-
nated. Finally, in Italy a far-reaching adaptation of 
the very  different taxation system to that of the 
other EEC M·ember States is in preparation, laTgely 
autonomously and largely for economie reasons. 
From a legal point of view the following points de-
serve particular a tt  en  ti  on. 
(a)  THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS AND THE MAIN 
STATUTORY OUTLINES OF ECONOMIC POLICY 
The Italian Constitution, like the German one, con-
tains a number of major principles of economie pol-
icy against which economie law can be appraised 
by the Constitutional Court. 
First of all Artides 41  and 43  establish the princi-
ples of freedom of private economk enterprise and 
the  principles  of  the  right  of  property,  together 
with the existing or possible  restrictions.  The re-
strictions laid down for private enterprise include 
not only the princip1e  that the well-being or the 
safety of the ~community may not be impah'ed, but 
al:so  the princip,le  that liberty and human dignity 
may not suffer. It is added that the law lays down 
the programmes and checks required in order that 
public and private economie activity can be orient-
ed and coordinated for social  ends.  An important 
requirement  of  definition  has thus been  constitu-
tionally established. The possibility of eXJpropriation 
in the public interest is less imperatively laid down 
in Article 43 than in the French Constitution, but in 
accordance  with  similar  criteria  (firms  operating 
essential  public services or sources of  ~energy and 
actual monopolies of primary public interest) (Sac-
chi Morsiani, III). 
The plan or programme of Italian economie policy 
thus finds its basis in Article 41  of the Constitution 
and in accordance with that article must be of the 
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nature of a  law in the formai sense. According to 
the same article of the constitution, the objectives 
of the plan are of a  social nature and relate nota-
bly to the elimination of the difference between the 
underdev.eloped and the developed regions, bringing 
incomes  in agriculture and those  in other  sectors 
closer together and finally working out a system of 
social security and graduai realization of full em-
ployment  (Sacchi  Morsiani,  III).  The  intervention 
types of  the plan belong to intervention groups I 
to  VI incl. of the common analysis scheme (ibid.). 
However,  as mentioned  above,  a  special  emphasis 
falls on the role of the firms in which the state par-
ticipates and on the public investment programme 
and  aïd-programme  in  the  Mezzogiorno  (op.  cit., 
III). 
Implementation  of  the multiyear  plans is  largely 
decentralized  (institution  of  autonomous  regions, 
Cassa di Mezzogiorno, state holding companies, eco-
nomie and social development fund as the aid-im-
plementing  agency,  Istituto  Mobiliare  Italiano  as 
the highly autonomous nucleus of the Italian sys-
tem for providing credit to  industry).  As regards, 
the state holding ·companies,  an equHibrium must 
be carefully sought between the autonomy princi-
ple,  which also  applies  to  public enterprises,  and 
their responsibility for  the implementation of the 
plan (ibid.). 
According  to  the Italian report, the  choice  of  an 
open economy  made upon  accession  to  the  Euro-
pean Communities has led in Italy, unlike France, 
not so  much to a  liberalization of Italian economie 
policy  as  to  a  flexible  adjustment  to  foreign  de-
velopments and to a pursuit of European program-
ming. For the European Communities this orienta-
tion entails both dangers (of national measures irre-
conci:lable with the treaties) and promis.es (of vigor-
ous  support  for  a  further  development  of  the 
European medium-term economie programme). 
(b)  INSTITUTIONALIZED PARTICIPATION 
OF BUSINESS 
Like  France,  Italy  has  an  Economie  and  Social 
Council instituted by law (CNEL), in which employ-
ers  and  workers  are  represented.  In  addition  to 
an advisory function,  the  CNEL has the power of 
initiating legislation. Besicles the Economie and So-
cial  Council,  the Chambers of  Comm,erce  in Italy 
have a fairly important task; this is not only advi-
sory, but also relates to regulation, impl~ementatio11 
and the settlement of disputes. In addition to em-
ployers from the various sectors,  the workers are 
also represented in the chambers (Sacchi Morsiani, 
Chapter V,  Section 1).  At firm and industry leve! 
there is in Italy no institutionalized co-determina-
tion of workers regarding economie policy. The !ta-lian union movem·ent  apparently does not wish to 
accept joint responsibility with employers for eco-
nomie  policy  at these  levels.  Nor  does  it emerge 
from  the  Italian  report  that  management  and 
labour,  as in France,  are actively engaged in the 
elaboration of sectoral plans in the framework of 
the planning procedure described above. 
(c)  LEGAL PROTECTION 
Article 113 of the Constitution prescribes legal pro-
tection  by  an  independent  ·court  for  subjective 
vights 
1and legal interests vis-à-vis a:ll  actions of the 
Authorities.  While  the  subjective  rights  are  pro-
tected by the ordinary courts, the Council of State, 
as the admini•strativ·e court, supervises the legality 
of the authorities' actions. There is just as little spe-
cialized administrative jurisprudence as in France 
in the field of economie law. 
8.  Economie law in Benelux 
8.1.  BENELUX COOPERATION 
It will be recalled that an economie and monetary 
union  exists  between  Belgium  and  Luxembourg, 
whUe the three Benelux countries are united in an 
economie union. In various fields,  for instance the 
establishment of uniform legislation, harmonization 
of direct taxation, r·emoval of technical and admini-
strative obstacles  to trade and monetary coopera-
tion, Benelux cooperation is further advanced than 
that within the EEC. The experience gained within 
Benelux may therefore be useful for the solution of 
similar  problems  in  the  European  Communities. 
The  importance  of  the  Benelux  experience  is 
strengthened by the fact that the economie and so-
cial  structure,  the  econom>ic  policy  and  the legal 
systems of the thl"ee  Benelux countries, like their 
national character and their history,  display very 
considerable differences.  In fact  these differences 
are no less, and in sorne respects ev·en greater, than 
the  differences  with  and  between  other Member 
States. 
However, in one respect the three Benelux coun-
tries are in a comparable position. Being small coun-
tries, ali three of them - to use an expression of 
the former Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jo-
seph Luns-have a relatively large area of 'abroad'. 
The  size  of  theix  foreign  trade  in  Telation  to 
their  national  production  is  considerably  greater 
than is the case with the large Member States. As 
a  result their ·economies are more open than those 
of the other Member States to the influence of eco-
nomie development in other countries. This makes 
effective medium-term economie policy practically 
impossible,  which  is  being  found  an  increasing 
drawback.  However,  even  following  an  effective 
short-term economie policy has become very diffi-
cult with the present state of liberalization of in-
terstate trade and would become practically impos-
sible in a monetary union with free capital transac-
tions.  It  is  therefor·e  understandable that for  the 
Benelux countries an effective European coordina-
tion of economie policy forms a sine qua non for the 
acceptance  of  a  monetary  union  and free  capital 
transactions. On somewhat different grounds than 
for Italy, which sees its medium-term programming 
above  all  threatened,  vital  interests  are  equally 
at stake for the Benelux countries on this point. 
8.2.  BELGIUM 
Although the gr·eater openness of the Belgian eco-
noroy  and  the  less  pronounced  centralization  of 
power in the central government offer fewer possibi-
lities for an active economie policy than in France, 
the Belgi!an economie system, viewed in the light of 
the common analysis scheme, displays great simila-
rity to  the French one.  The signifi.cance  of cartel 
policy is very limited in Belgium, which cannat be 
said  of  France.  Five-year  plans  are  increasingly 
occupying just as central a pla·ce as in France (bind-
ing  eff.ect  on  the  authorities,  contractual  effect 
for  the  firms  collaborating  in its implementation 
and  for  the  rest  an  indicative  character).  As  in 
France, aid policy is highly systematized (Leburton 
Law). Again as in France, priee control plays a  re-
latively large part and in this respect the law has 
recently come to provide for the possibility of pro-
gramme contracts,  as in FDance.  In the other eco-
nomk legislation too, many interesting parallels may 
be drawn with the French situation,  inter alia on 
the matter of freedom  of establishment,  which  in 
principle is still based on the Allarde Law of 1791. 
As  in  France,  it  can  be  restricted  only  by  law, 
which is not easily applied in practice. 
So far the Belgian legal system has likewise been 
greatly inspired by French law,  though especially 
in the  literature  attention  has  also  been paid in 
recent years  to  other legal  systems.  The Belgian 
Council of State ensures a comparable legal protec-
tion against the authorities to that provided by the 
French Council  of  State,  also in the field  of  eco-
nomie law. 
From the institutional point of view it is first of ali 
also important that the basic law of  15  July 1970 
already mentioned provides not only for program-
ming but also for economie decentralization, which 
is  connected  wi  th  the  existence  of  two  linguistic 
groups among the population, displaying consider-
able diff.erences in demographie, political and eco-
nomie terms too. Another point of institutional im-
19 portance to our study is that Belgium, unlike most 
Member States, does not have an Economie and So-
cial  Co un  cil as the  c·en tral advisory body of eco-
nomie  life,  but separate central advisory  agencies 
for  economie  and  for  social  matters.  Finally,  in 
Belgium as in the Netherlands there are a  number 
of autonomous statutory collaborative bodies of re-
presentatives of  employers and workers for sepa-
rate sectors of business. However, these have fewer 
powers than the Dutch public bodies. 
8.3.  THE NETHERLANDS 
At the time of the Zijlstra report, planning types I 
and II from the common analysis scheme played a 
particular part in the  Netherlands, and then in a 
typically macro-economie form not extended to in-
dividual branches  of  industry.  A  remarkable fea-
ture of this is the independent position of the Cen-
tral Planing Office, which furnishes forecasts both 
to the government and the Socio-Economic Council 
and to  private enterprise.  Medium-term  economie 
policy,  although not absent,  is  nevertheless much 
less  systematic  and much less  strongly  developed 
in a  procedural sense than in Belgium, France and 
Italy.  In  general  economtc  politic•al  thought  has 
been strongly inf.Iuenced by Du  teh economie science. 
This in turn was strongly inUuenced by economie 
thinking in the Anglo-Saxon countries, but never-
theless  displays  clear  traits  of  its  own.  In  parti-
cular it has made a considerable contribution to the 
development of macro-economie models of the na-
tional economy (Tinbergen). The central position of 
the Central Planning Office may be largely traced 
to this 'thinking in models'. 
Whilst the Netherlands  thus  occupied at the time 
of the Zijlstra report an intermediate position be-
tween  Germany  on  the  one  hand  and the  Latin 
countries on the other with respect to planning, the 
same can be said with respect to the furtherance of 
competition. This is particularly valid when allow-
ance is also made for the very considerable incen-
tive that international competition exerts on Dutch 
competition. At present thought ~s being given to a 
further intensification of cartel policy. 
After conclusion of the Zijlstra report sectoral stu-
dies  and  aid  policy  also  developed  much  more 
strongly in the  N etherlands.  However,  aid  po  licy 
has not so far acquired a highly systematic charac-
ter,  any  more  than  in  Germany.  This  applies  in 
particular to measures  of  assistance  to individual 
sectors  or  firms,  and to  a  less  extent to  r.egional 
aid as weil. However, a  more systematic approach 
does seem indicated. 
Programme contracts are less developed as organi-
zational  instruments  in  the  Netherlands  than  in 
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Belgium and France, but somewhat more strongly 
than in Germany. 
Mandatory prescriptions that usually do not essen-
tially affect the operation of the market mechanism 
but, as in Germany, have often been worked out in 
minute  detail,  play  a  r·elatively  larg:e  part  in 
Dutch economie policy (see Dutch report, V.  5 and 
Chapter V).  With respect to qualitative restrictions 
on the freedom of establishment and until recently 
with respect to wage control too Dutch legislation 
contains or  contained  much more  drastic  manda-
tory  measures  than  the  legislation  of  the  other 
Member States.  On the matter of the possibilities 
of priee control Dutch legislation resembles much 
more closely that of Belgium, France and Italy than 
that of Germany. A  systematically elaborated sec-
tora! policy exists only for  agriculture  and trans-
port. 
As  regards  its  material  .content,  Dutch  economie 
policy therefore occupies  a  characteristic interme-
diate position, though with a  few very specifie fea-
tures. From the legal point of view Dutch economie 
law which, like the law in various other Member 
States,  displays  clear  hist.orical  strata  (Dutch  re-
port,  I),  reveals  many  more individual character-
istics. 
(a) INSTITUTIONAL PECULIARITIES 
Both short-term and long-term planning and mea-
sures of assistance are mainly developed extra le-
gem  in  the  N etherlands,  unlike Belgium,  France, 
Italy and, as regards planning, Germany too. There 
is  no  question  of planning legislation,  apart from 
the  legal  basis  of  the  Central  Planning  Office, 
which is of little importance to the content of the 
actual planning. 
In the Netherlands measures of assistance as a rule 
have no further statutory basis than a  budgetary 
law and their contents are therefore legally defined 
just as little as the planning. Programme contracts, 
such as they are, do not have an explicit legal basis 
either. On the other hand the government cannot 
promulgate  any  mandatory  prescriptions  without 
the  express authorization of the  legislator,  which 
is  given per subject, usually accompanied by far-
reaching material and procedural restrictions. Part-
ly because  of this,  the number of important eco-
nomi-e  laws  in  a  formai  and substantive sense  is 
greater than in any other Member States. This is 
reflected in the numher of pages in theDutch report 
devoted to these. 
Another institutional peculiarity of Dutch economie 
law is the institutionalized participation in various 
forms of representatives of employers and workers 
in economie po  licy. This participation varies from a  consultative func-
tion  with  regard  to  ail important and many less 
important economie measures via the right of ini-
tiative or a  monopoly of initiative for the promul-
gation of measures for giving effect to basic laws 
(e.g. the 1954 Business Licensing Law, or the decla-
ration of rules on competition as generally binding) 
to  business'  own responsibility for the implemen-
tation of economie laws or even autonomous regu-
lating powers of organizations of economie life. Of 
particular importance in this context are the Socio-
Economic  Council,  embodied  in  the  Constitution, 
as a highly influential advisory body for the wh  ole of 
social  and economie  policy,  the likewise constitu-
tiona.'l.ly  ·embodied statutory organizations in agri-
culture, the retail trade, the crafts and a number of 
other sectors (vertical and horizontal trade associa-
tions)  and  to  a  less  extent the chambers  of  com-
merce. See for this the Dutch report under IV. For 
the way of participation of buisness in the prepara-
tion  and  implementation  of  social  and  economie 
poUcy  other forms  also  exist, however (see  Dutch 
report Chapter V, under numerous sepa·rate laws). 
A  third  institutional  characteristic  of  Dutch  eco-
nomie law is the great influence of independent ex-
perts  on  the  preparation  and  implem·entation  of 
economie policy. The peculiarity of the Dutch situa-
tion on this point lies above ail in the way in which 
the  interplay  between  government,  independent 
experts  and  representativ,es  of  employers'  and 
workers'  organizations  is  regulated.  A  good  illu-
stration of thi~s may be found in the Socio-Economic 
Council.  One  third  of  its  members  are  indepen-
dent experts, one third employers' representatives 
and one third workers'  representatives.  Moreover, 
the  Central  Planning  Office,  as  an  independent 
agency,  is  also  at the  disposai  of  the  Socio-Eco-
nomic Council and can therefore also contribute to 
the objectivization and the scientific foundation of 
the  discussions  in  the  Council.  Government  offi-
ciais, as representatives of the ministers concerned, 
have only an advisory voice in the Council,  so  as 
to avoid confusion of responsibilities between gov-
ernment and business. 
Mention should finally be made of the fact that by 
virtue of a  recent amendment of company legisla-
tion,  the works councils  of large firms  acquire as 
large an influence on the composition of the board 
of directors as the shareholders. 
(b)  FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
U  nlike the  German,  French  and  Italian constitu-
tions, the Dutch Constitution does not contain any 
specifie  provisions  in the  field  on  economie  law, 
apart  from  the  institutional  provisions  regarding 
the statutory trade organizations. 
(c)  LEGAL PROTECTION 
The legal protection of private persons against the 
authorities under administrative law in the Nether-
lands is on the one hand very efficiently organized 
by the institution of a specialized Business Appeals 
Board. On the other hand the schem·e  displays de-
fects and gaps. For the competences with regard to 
economie  law  are  divided  between  the  Business 
Appeals Board and the Counc11  of State. Moreover, 
so far the Council of State is not formally speak-
ing  an  independent  court,  though  a  Bill  for  the 
amendment of this unsatisfactory situation has now 
been submitted. Finally, neither the Appeals Board 
nor the Council of State is competent with regard 
to a number of important economie laws. However, 
the gaps  thus  existing in legal protection  may in 
principle be filled  by the ordinary courts (Section 
1401  of the  Civil  Code).  See  for  more details  the 
Dutch report under Chapter VIII. 
9.  The economie law of the United Kingdom 
The common  analysis scheme  worked out for the 
original  Member  States  also  proved  to  be  quite 
feasible for the analysis of the economie law of the 
United Kingdom. The la  tt  er is concerned in broad 
outline with the same subjects and similar instru-
ments which, viewed in the somewhat longer term, 
are comparable  to  these occurring in  the original 
Member States. However, a  characterization of the 
economie emphases of economie law in the United 
Kingdom is hampered by the prevailing two-party 
system.  As  a  result of the polarized economie ob-
jectives and instruments of the two main political 
parties,  the  British  economie  system  hovers  be-
tween a  system of very extensive controls,  as ap-
plied by  the  Labour  government  in  the  period 
1966-1970 (with clear parallels with the planning 
systems in France and Italy) and extremely liberal 
tendencies to confine the economie instruments to 
a  few monetary instruments, as seriously consider-
ed by the Conservatives in the Fifties (Daintith I). 
Only  a  relatively  stringent  cartel  legislation  and 
the nationalization of a  number of basic industries 
have remained  a  fairly  constant element in post-
war British economie law in addition to economie 
forecasts and a number of unassailable int,ervention 
minima in the monetary field. For the reason sta  ted, 
historical strata are less dearly visible in British 
economie law than in that of most of the original 
Member  States.  The  British  report  is  thus,  more 
than the other national reports, of the nature of a 
snapshot (Daintith I, last paragraph). 
Short-term economie forecasts (12-18 months) have 
been regularly used since 1941,  and medium-term 
forecasts  since  1962,  the  latter  abov·e  an  as  a 
21 basis  for  the public  expenditure  programme and 
thus not, formally speaking, as a guide for economie 
decisions  by  business.  There  is  consequently  no 
question  of indicative five-year plans in the  Bel-
gian,  French and Italian sense.  Statutory or  con-
ventional rules on the preparation or publication of 
the forecasts do not exist (Daintith, Il. 1). 
The short-term measures are in fact coordinated via 
the annual  parliamentary  budgetary  procedure, 
since the government's budget statement relates to 
ali  the  intended  short-term  economie  measures 
(Daintith, Il. 2.2). 
On the strength of a proposai by the Plowden Com-
mittee in 1961,  against the background of macro-
economie  forecasting  of  the  development  of  the 
total available sources of incarne of the British na-
tional  economy five-year  public .expenditure pro-
grammes are  drawn  up  and since  1969  have also 
been regularly published  (Daintith, !1.2.3.).  In the 
preparation of the three-year or five-year forecasts 
for the development of the British economy repre-
sentatives  of  the  organizations  of  employers  and 
workers participate via the National Economie De-
velopment Council,  the Economie Planning Coun-
cils for each of the eight English regions, Scotland 
and Wales,  and the  Economie Development Com-
mittees for the major industrie. There is  thus not 
the slightest statutory or conventional basis for this 
planning procedure (ibid.). 
The budget is the most important economie instru-
ment  for  influencing  total  demand  (Daintith, 
Il.2.4.1),  and in  this  connection  the  United King-
dom,  like Germany and  the Netherlands,  has the 
system  of  government  authorization - based  on 
the annual Finance Act- to vary tax-rates as part 
of short-term economie policy. The five-year pro-
gramme for public expenditure, which also relates 
to the expenditure of the local authorities and the 
capital  expenditure  of  public  enterprises,  is  the 
most  important  basis  for  medium-term  economie 
policy (Daintith, Il.2.4.2). 
Public enterprises and public contracts, the latter 
since as long ago as 1891, have played an important 
role in the United Kingdom  inter alia  as  indirect 
instruments  of  wage  and pric·e  policy,  the  public 
contracts in the postwar period also as indirect in-
struments of  regional  policy and in sorne  cases  of 
sectoral structural policy (Daintith, !!.2.5). 
Aid policy, as in Germany and the Netherlands, is 
characterized by great volume  and differentiation 
but little system (Daintith, II.3). Besides the tax re-
liefs that are regulated in detail by law and cases 
of permanent aid th  at are likewise based on spe-
ciallaws, British aid policy, like the German and 
Dutch equivalents, now finds  a  direct basis in the 
budget (Appropriation Act).  Under the 1966-1970 
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Labour government this was not the case  (Indus-
trial Expansion Act of 1968,  of which the general 
part was,  however,  repealed by the Industry  Act 
1971, see Daintith, II.3.2). 
Apart from the cartel and monopoly legislation and 
the relatively strongly developed physical planning 
and environment protection legislation, mandatory 
regulations play  a  relatively unimportant part in 
the general economie policy of the United Kingdom 
in comparison to that of the original EEC Member 
States  (Daintith,  11.5).  Sectoral  policy  exists  for 
agriculture and fisheries, energy and transport, but 
is relatively liberal in nature (Daintith, II.6). 
Legal peculiarities 
(a)  FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES 
The United Kingdom does not have a  constitution. 
However, the judge-made common law may be re-
garded as the general background of economie law. 
This started from laissez  faire,  combined with the 
protection of vested rights of property. Under the 
common law, only Parliament may restrict existing 
rights  of property.  This  principle, in combination 
with the parliamentary powers over public finance 
asserted by the Bill of Rights in 1689, largely deter-
mines the extent to which British economie policy 
needs  formai  legal expression (Daintith,  1).  Fore-
casts,  indicative planning  and institutional provi-
sions can therefore be regulated outside the law in 
the United Kingdom by the authorities.  As  men-
tioned above, within the framework of the Budget 
the same applies to aid policy. 
(b)  LEGAL PROTECTION 
Legal protection against decisions by the authori-
ties,  aHhough in principle conceded when the au-
thorities abuse their power or act ultra vires, is not 
very effectiv·e in practice on account of the unwil-
lingness of British courts to restrict the freedom of 
the  authorities  to  put their  policy  into  practice 
(Daintith, II. 8). 
10.  Sorne broad conclusions on the separate 
systems of economie law in their totality 
Conclusions on the separate parts of economie law 
will be recorded in the next two chapters. The eco-
nomie  law  of  each  individual  Member  State,  as 
mentioned above,  displays a  more or less  consid-
erable internai systematic cohesion, even contrary 
to  appearances. It therefore seems useful to draw 
a number of broad conclusions for the separate sys-tems of economie law in their totality in this chap-
ter.  In any  case,  these may be  of  importance  to 
the comparison of these systems, but to a  varying 
extent also to activities of coordination and harmo-
nization with regard to economie law. 
10.1.  THE ECONOMIC ORDER OF THE 
MEMBER STATES 
In his report Zijlstra assumes that the optimal eco-
nomie arder in the EEC will be one of the mixed 
type, in which the ideally typical basic traits of the 
free ·economy are accepted and the task of the au-
thorities with respect to economie !ife is of a highly 
supplementary  or  'condition-creating'  nature: 
'Government policy  in such an arder is predomi-
nantly aimed  at bringing  the  decentralized  deci-
sion-making  units  ('agents')  of  private  origin  to-
gether into as free and harmon1ous a development 
as possible, so that the economie process, as a resul-
tant of  ali  the  partial  decisions  of  these  private 
agents, can develop consistently and efficiently, in 
accordance with the principle of healthy competi-
tion.  This  complementary,  condition-creating task 
of the  authorities roughly divides  into two  parts.  · 
In the first place there is the task of caring for a 
sound  macro-economie  climate,  in  which  the 
growth of the total effective demand corresponds 
to the growth of the total production potential, so 
that neither does unemployment occur as a  result 
of a shortage of effective demand, nor is the infla-
tionary spiral set in motion  as a  result  of excess 
demand  ( ...  ).  In the  second place  (  ...  )  the  auth-
orities have the task of shaping the public institu-
tional and infrastructural framework within which 
the  economie  process  takes  place  so  that inpedi-
ments to sound and effective competition are coun-
tered and a  stable and vigorous  economie  growth 
can be achieved by private enterprise itself (Zijl-
stra, pp. 49 and 62-63). 
The oserva  ti  ons on the economie arder in the first 
and second EEC programmes for medium-term eco-
nomie policy have a  similar purport. N evertheless, 
on the strength of the national reports forming the 
basis of the present report, a  number of comments 
on this characteriza  ti  on  seem  called  for.  Even to-
da  y  it is  certainly  still  true  that  in  aU  Member 
States the ideally typical basic traits of the free econ-
omy have a  dominant  character, and this  applies 
even more strongly to the tenor of the Treaty of 
Rome.  The  establishment of a  common market  is 
clearly  the  basis  of  the  European  CommuniUes, 
from which the economie and monetary union also 
proceeds  as  a  necessary  condition  to  be  further 
completed. It also seems correct  and in line with 
the trend in the Member States to place the main 
emphasis in coordination of economie policy on ma-
cro-economie and indirectly operating instruments 
(Globalsteuerung). The argument that the Commu-
nity institutions are better capable politically, ins-
titutionally and legally of coordinating the overall 
policy of the Member States than their policy with 
regard to individual sectors or regions or the pol-
icy of business itself is also in favour of this.  On the 
latter points the conflicts  of  interest between the 
Member States are greater and the powers of the 
Community are directed more towards countering 
distortion of competition than to positive coordina-
tion  of national  measures.  Nevertheless,  develop-
ments since the compilation of the Zijlstra report 
give reason to ask whether the coordination of eco-
nomie policy should not now go further than is ad-
vocated in that report. The following points, among 
others, may be envisaged in this respect. 
In the first place, the simultaneous pursuit in ali 
Member States of growth of freely disposable pri-
vate incarnes,  private  investments and public  ex-
penditure leads to severe inflation, though the ex-
tent of this differs from Member State to Member 
State. It may therefore be asked whether the coor-
dinated  quantification of the  objectives aimed at, 
with which a start has been made in the third pro-
gramme for medium-term economie policy,  should 
not be extended  to  ali  targets  men  tioned in  this 
programme (in the medium-term). As a  result, sub-
jects like social security, regional policy, protection 
of the environment and aid to developing countries 
then automatically come within reach of the coor-
dination of economie policy in addition to the clas-
sic objectives in the fields of growth, employment, 
priee development and balance of payments, which 
have  already  been  quantified  in  the  third  pro-
gramme. Another argument in favour of such an ex-
tension of the field of operation of coordination pol-
icy is that experience has shownthat the expectation 
existing at the time  of  the first  programme that 
overall growth would automatically lead to a more 
than  proportionate  growth  of the public  services 
was completely unrealistic. 
In  the second  place,  measures  of  assistance  have 
now assumed such proportions in ali Member States 
that  systematic  cooroination  at  Community  lev-
el  will  acquire  ever-increasing  a•scendency  over 
the ·competition-distorting eff.ects of individual ca-
ses. For more and more it will become the rule that 
the majority of the Member States grant regional 
aid or aid to the same sectors.  Insofar as rational 
grounds exist for these measures, as defined in the 
second pvogramme for medium-term economie pol-
i!cy,  mutual coordination will in many cases also be 
the most effective means  of  countering  distortion 
of competition. 
In the third place the matter of environmental pro-
tection forms a good ·example of the fact that coor-
dination of economie policy cannat always escape 
23 detailed mandatory regulations,  also for enterpri-
ses. However, ali Member States have now had the 
experience in more general terms too that 'Global-
steuerung' has to  be  combined in certain circum-
stances with more direct measures. Conversely, the 
large  number  of  more  specifie  measures  in  ali 
Member States makes a  certain overali  coordina-
tion  of  ali  these measures increasingly necessary. 
10.2.  ECONOMIC LEGAL ORDER AND 
PROBLEMS OF INSTITUTION  AL 
COORDINATION 
(a)  INCREASING DEFINITION AND PLANNING 
In various Member States (Belgium,  Germany and 
to a  less extent in Italy and the Netherlands too) 
there proves since the Second World War to have 
been a tendency towaTds increasing lega:l (and sorne-
times  constitut1onal)  definition  of  economie  pol-
ky. As this  c~larifies the policy to be followed the 
tendency should be encouraged as part of the coor-
dination of economie policy in the Member States. 
But the French example shows that insight into the 
interrelation of  the  individual economie  measures 
can best be furthered in a  five-year plan. The in-
stitution of coordinate:d five-year plans in ali Mem-
ber States must a1so  be encouraged :fior  the same 
reason. 
(b)  PROBLEMS OF INSTITUTIONAL 
COORDINATION 
The sometimes considerable differences in constitu-
tional structure of the Member States (e.g.  in the 
degree  of territorial  decentralization  of  ~economie 
policy and in the division of powers between legis-
lator and government) will, on the other hand, have 
to be respected by the Communities, provided that 
this does not endanger the uniform application of 
Community }aw in ali Member States. The situation 
is  different with the participation of management 
and labour in the preparation and implementation 
of the coordination of economie policy. On the basis 
of  experience  in prarcticaUy  ali  Member States it 
seems out of the question that for instance coordi-
na  ted  control of  inf,la ti  on or coordina  ted further-
ance of certain publ,ic services wHI lead to the des-
ired results in the Member States without the ac-
tuel participation of management and labour in the 
pi"eparation of policy at Community level. See the 
warning in this respect by the former chairman of 
the Economie  and Social  Committee,  Ludwig  Ro-
senberg, in his article 'Die Verantwortung der Ge-
werkschaften in einer zukünftigen Wir.tschafts- und 
Wahrungsunion' (The Responsibility of the Unions 
in a future Economie and Monetary Union), Europa 
Archiv 1972, p. 311.  As the national reports do not 
offer sufficient points of contact for this, very con-
24 
crete recommendations on this point should not be 
given.  It seems  certain that the present consulta-
tive function of the Economie and Social Committee 
is inadequate for this. Further, on the strength of 
arguments  advanced by both the unions and em-
ployers it seems certain that greater influence of 
the European Parliament will d.n  itself considerably 
strengthen the willingness of the private sector of 
the  economy  to  assist  in  the  implementation  of 
coordinated economie policy. In addition to propos-
ais  such  as  thos·e  made in the Vedel  Report,  one 
might envisage here a  similar parliamentary right 
of decision to that existing in France with regard 
to the objectives and later the ultimate establish-
ment  of  the  medium-term  programm·es  for  eco-
nomie poUcy. But it seems probablethatin the more 
concrete  elaboration  of  important  proposais 
of  economie  policy  too  a  more  appropriate, 
more  direct  influence  of  management  and 
labour  would  be  useful.  Since  precisely  on  this 
point the procedures in the various Member States 
differ considerably, it might be useful to institute 
a  separate investigation into the optimal forms of 
participation  of  management  and  labour.  On  ac-
count of the important part that independent ex-
perts in different Member States play in the pre-
paration  of  economie  policy  decisions  (Germany, 
Italy, the Netherlands), such an investigation ought 
to devote attention to that role too. The main pro-
blems in the question thus defined seem to lie on 
the one hand in the very varied views about such 
institutional participation  among  the  employers 
and workers themselves and on the other in guar-
ant·eeing  the  actua'l  ultimate responsibility  of  the 
Community  institutions politically  responsible for 
the decisions in question. 
(c)  PROBLEMS OF COORDINATION CONCERNING 
CONTENT 
The fact that since  the last war economie law in 
most Member States has gradually and increasingly 
been developing in the same direction is,  of course, 
conducive  to effective coordination.  A  number of 
particular problems proceeding from very different 
situations with regard to aspects in certain Member 
States  (e.g.  the  highly  divergent  wage  and  pric·e 
policy, the instrumental function of the Italian state 
holding  companies  and  the  French  nationalized 
banks as against the growing autonomy of the other 
public .enterprises,  the  fundamental  objections  to 
extensive restrictions on the freedom of establish-
ment in Belgium, Germany and France) will be dis-
cussed in the next chapter. 
A more general problem of content for coordination 
could, however, proceed from the strong periodical 
fluctuations in economie policy in the United King-
dom which the British report mentions as a  result of the party system there. The traditional 'stop and 
go'  nature  of  British  short-term  economie  policy 
could increase this difficulty. Viewed in the some-
what  longer term,  the party political fluctuations 
of  British ·economie  policy are perhaps less great 
than  at first  sight,  however,  whHe  the  'stop and 
go'  nature  of British  short-term  economie  policy 
will probably leve! out of its own account after ac-
cession  to  the Community in connection  with the 
agreements arrived at on the international position 
of the pound sterling. 
(d)  THE FORMS OF COORDINATION 
As regards the form of coordination of the econo-
mie policy of the Member States, it must first of ali 
be pointed out that the enabling character of many 
important economie laws means in itself that, even 
with mandatory economie regulations, coordination 
of the practical application is often more important 
than  harmonization  of  legislation.  Harmonization 
under Article 100 of the Treaty of Rome of ali man-
datory  rules  for  the  administration  of  economie 
laws that are directed towards short-term adjust-
ment of economie  processes  seems entirely out of 
the question for political, institutional and practical 
reasons. A good instance of the impossibility of this 
is  presented by  priee  legislation.  However,  more 
permanent mandatory rules for the implementation 
of basic laws (e.g.  technical obstades to trade and 
regulations for  environmental protection)  can and 
in sorne  cases  must be  harmonized  under Article 
100. It seems probable that for the coordination of 
tht  more  overall  and  indirect  national  economie 
medium-term  measures,  the  Community  pro-
grammes for medium-term economi'c policy will in-
creasingly be able to form a suitable general frame-
work.  For  a  more  comp1ete  survey  of  the  wide 
range of coordinatton instruments at the disposaJ of 
the Communities, see the first chapter. 
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The principal similarities and differences on aspects of economie law 
in the Member States and their importance for Community policy 
1.  Overall objectives of economie policy 
In Germany the objective of a broad equilibrium is 
laid down in the Constitution as the central objec-
tive of  economie  policy.  It is further  specified in 
the Law to Promote Stability and Growth of the 
Economy  as  the  simultaneous  furtherance  of  a 
stable priee level, a high degree of employment, ex-
ternal  equilibrium  and  a  lasting  and  appropriate 
degree of growth. The balanced development of liv-
ing  candi  ti  ons  in  the  differing  regions  are  also 
embodied in the German Constitution as objectives 
and finally it is laid down by law that the above 
objectives must be attained within the framework 
of a  fr·ee  market economy (Zacher,  No  14).  Social 
policy in Germany certainly does occupy a less im-
portant a  place than for instance in France, Italy 
or the Netherlands (Zacher, 3/2). It  seems to follow 
from  the  Constitution,  the  Stability  and  Growth 
Law and the concept 'social market economy' that 
it is somewhat more detached from economie policy 
than is the case in the latter countries. It appears 
to be viewed more as a necessary suppelementation 
of the market economy pursued. 
In none of the other systems of economie law exam-
ined are the ov·erall economie objectives laid down 
by law. In France the central objective is economie 
growth, as a result of which the emphasis automatic-
aHy falls more than in Germany on medium-term 
economie  policy.  In  order  to  ensure  regular  and 
continuing growth, use is made of short-term eco-
nomie  policy  for  the  maintenance  of  the  central 
equilibria (priees and balance of payments) to assist 
medium-term  economie  policy.  Secondary  overall 
objectives in France are balanced regional develop-
ment and social progress (Fromon, III). In Belgium 
and ltaly the overall economie objectives resemble 
the French ones. However, in both countries more 
stress is placed on balanced regional development. 
In the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, on the 
other hand,  the central  objectives  resemble  more 
closely the German objectives, with a  comparable 
main emphasis  on the objectives  of  stability and 
thus on short-term economie policy. 
The Community's overall economie  objectives  are 
embodied in Articles  2  and  104  of the Treaty of 
Rome. At the Hague Summit Conference on 1 and 2 
December 1969  they were summarized as 'stability 
and  grrowth'.  The  third  programme  for  medium-
term economie policy gives compatible guidance fig-
ures for the vafiious Member States with reference 
to economie growth in the period 1971-75, the de-
gree of attainment of full employment, the devel-
opment of the general priee Jevel and the achieve-
ment  of  external  equilibrium.  However,  no  less 
important is the fact that this programme also lists 
general social objectives to which priority is given 
in ali Member States. These common objectives are 
as  follows:  better provision  of public services (at 
the expense of a  relatively slower growth of pri-
vate consumption), protection of the environment, a 
greater  equality  of  opportunity  for  the  develop-
ment of the indivudal by means of a  better policy 
regarding education and training, a  more just dis-
tribution of incarne and wealth and adaptation of 
the social  security system,  with partial extension 
thereof. Elsewhere in the programme development 
aid, the adjustment of firms to a larger market and 
regional policy are mentioned. 
Experience in recent years has shawn that the me-
dium- and long-term  social  objectives  mentioned, 
insofar as they lay considerable claim to national 
incarne,  may  without adequate quantitative Com-
munity  coordination  lead  to  degrees  of  inflation 
differing strongly from  country  to  country.  As  a 
result,  experience shows  that they may  endanger 
not only the achievement of the objectives already 
quantified  in  the  third  programme  but  also  the 
maintenance of the common market as the founda-
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achieving  a  monetary union. It thus seems neces-
sary to ext,end the quantitative coordination to the 
most important of the social objectives mentioned. 
The prime issue here is not the absolute or relative 
height  of  each  separate  category  of  expenditure, 
although this too may sometimes be of importance 
from the viewpoint of healthy competition and on 
the strength of the objectives laid down in Article 2 
of the Treaty of Rome. However, of greater impor-
tance for achieving the central economie objectives 
of the European Communities is bringing the total 
call on national income made by public expenditure 
into ~equilibrium with private consumption and pri-
vate investments in the various countries. For this 
it suffices for each Member State to be separately 
obliged in a five-year plan to quantify its objectives 
with regard to these three major categories of ex-
penditure and to concretize these objectives every 
year. The first obligation- in the medium term-
could be based on Article  105  or 235,  the second 
one - in the short term - on Article 103  of the 
Treaty of Rome.  Further, the coordination proce-
dures of the Treaty will, of course, have to guaran-
tee that the  objectives  of  the individual Member 
States are compatibLe. In the coordination attention 
should not be confined to the  macro-economie ef-
fects of the objectives. It will also be necessary to 
guard against competition-distorting effects of dis-
parities in the redistribution of national income by 
public expenditure, insofar as these effects are not 
in accordanoe with the objectives of the Commu-
nity treaties. Whether and, if so, how the use of the 
instruments for achievement of the objectives has 
to be coordinated will be discussed in the following 
sections. 
2.  Overall institutional aspects 
As  already explained in the previous chapter, the 
constitutional  and  institutional  structure  of  the 
Member States display  considerable  differences. 
These differences, e.g. in the field of the territorial 
and functional decentralization of economie policy, 
may in practice tend to hinder Community coordi-
nation to sorne extent. In particular the relatively 
strong autonomy of the Lander in Germany and of 
the autonomous regions in Italy may lead to diffi-
culties here. Legally speaking, however, the Mem-
ber States are responsible for observance of Com-
munity law by all their institutions. Under Article 
5  of the Treaty of Rome they are also obliged to 
take ali  general or particular measures to  ensure 
fulfilment  of  their  Community  obligations.  The 
competent  Community  institutions  may  therefore 
confine themselves from  a  viewpoint of coordina-
tion to guaranteeing observance of the above obli-
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gations. In this sense also compare the judgment of 
the  Court of Justice of  15  December  1971  in the 
combined cases 51  to 54-71. 
As  aJready remarked in the previous chapter, en-
deavours win have to be made to organiz~e the coor-
dination procedures  themselves  in such  a  way -
inter alia by the participation in suitable form of 
the European Parliament and of management and 
labour - that  economie  policy  is  coordinated  to 
ensure its maximum effectiveness from an institu-
tional viewpoint too.  There is  a  considerable dan-
ger that Community directives that come into being 
at national, regional or sectoral level without the 
above mentioned ~representative political and social 
bodies being consulted will have an inadequate ef-
fect and engender strong resistance. Effective coor-
dination  is  not possible  without  clear  democratie 
legitimation of authority at Community level. 
3.  Nature and organization of forecasting as an 
instrument of economie policy 
(national reports, 2nd part, Chapter I) 
Forecast that do not lay down future actions, but 
which should be distinguished from current obser-
vations and analysis of the actual development and 
from projections of the development expected (Za-
cher, No 32),  form in ali Member States an impor-
tant instrument of economie policy. However, they 
are vey differen  tl  y organized. 
Current  observations  and  systematic  analyses  of 
the actual economie development are made in ali 
Member States and at Community level above- ali 
by  the  statistical  offices.  They  naturally  form  a 
necessary basis for forecasting the future develop-
ment. 
An  explicit  statutory  basis  for  forecasting  exists 
only in the Netherlands (Dutch report, Chapter I). 
'The  Central  Economie  Plan',  according  to  Sec-
tion 3,  subsection 3,  of the law in question,  'shall 
include collections of figuŒ"es  relating to the future 
level of production in the widest sense,  to the fu-
ture level  and development  of  priees,  of national 
income and its components to the spending of that 
income  and  to  ali  further  data  of  importance  to 
good coordination of economie, social and financial 
policy'. The forecasting is carried out by the Cen-
tral Planning Office (CPB),  assisted on certain as-
pects by working committees on which business is 
also  represented. The forecasts  relate both  to  the 
short-term (the coming year) and - since 1966 -
to the medium-term. Although the text of the law 
would allow of the use of the CPB in task-setting 
programming and thus as  a  preparatory economie 
policy-making  agency,  in  practice  preference  has 
been given to an independent and purely objective task for the CPB. Precisely on account of its inde-
pendence  and  objectivity  the  CPB  is  a  greatly 
valued  adviser not  only for  the  government,  but 
also for the Socio-Economic Council and for private 
enterprise. 
In German  y  independen  t  forecasts, in this case by 
five  large scientific institutes, likewise play a  big 
part. But in addition the government works out its 
own forecasts (Zacher, No 34).  Task-setting or eva-
luating future  projections  is  then  worked out  by 
the  unions  and the  employers'  organizations  (Za-
cher, No 35). But the principal instruments for diag-
nosis,  forecasting  and  projection of  economie  de-
velopment and economie policy are the recommen-
dations of the Board of Experts for Assessment of 
Overall Economie Trends, instituted by law in 1963 
and composed of five independent experts (Zacher, 
No 36).  Like the Central Economie Plan in the Ne-
therlands, this  advice,  which does  not contain re-
commendations for concrete measures but in other 
respects is  of  ~an evaluative nature,  has a  consid-
erable  and  rationalizing  effect  on  public  discus-
sion of  economie policy in Germany. It relates in 
particular to short-term  economie  policy.  Finally, 
every year the Federal Government defines its atti-
tude towards the advice of the Board of Experts in 
its Annual Economie Survey. In addition to a diag-
nosis,  a  forecast  and short-term  projection  and a 
programme for economie policy in the current year, 
this survey a~lso ~contains a  forecast and an evaluat-
ing projection  of  medium-term  development  (Za-
cher, Nos 39 and 40). For the organization of legally 
prescribed  forecasts  in  various  subfields  see  Za-
cher, Nos 32 to 50. 
In France the organization of forecasting does not 
contain any legal guarantees of independence and 
objectivity. The forecasts are compiled by the same 
services  as  are  responsible  for  task-setting,  but 
awareness is growing that a  clearer distinction be-
tween  forecasting  and  setting  tasks  is  desirable 
(Fromont, Chapter 1).  In Italy too no olear distinc-
tion  seems  to  be  made  organizationally  between 
forecasting and programming, but the influence of 
independent experts is greater here than in France 
(Sacchi Morsiani, Chapter 1).  In Belgium it is pre-
cisely  the  influence  of  business  on  the  forecasts 
that seems to be greater, but there is likewise a le-
gal  separation  of  forecasting  and  programming, 
with guarantees of objectivity for the former. The 
Bureau  for  Economie  Programming  instituted  in 
1959 engages in both forms of planning (Schrans, sub) 
1 and Ill). In the United Kingdom short-term fore-
casts have been regularly published since 1968 and 
irregular  forecasts  of  medium-term  development 
since 1963. Statu  tory, conventional or organizational 
guarant~ees of the independence and objectivity of 
the foreca~sts do not exist here either (Daintith, II.l). 
On the strength of the experience both in the var-
ious Member States and at Community level, sta-
tutory or other guarantees of the independence, ex-
pertise  and  objectivity  with  which  forecasts  are 
made seem of very great importance. The danger on 
confusion of scientific analysis and political objecti-
ves is reduced in this way.  Government,  parliament 
and business are ali confronted with objective, per-
haps unpleasant facts and probabilities. These are 
more illustrative of the tasks to be performed and 
the  nature  and content  of the measures  required 
for  this  than task-setting figures that are not ac-
companied by objective :fiorecasts  of the probable 
development if different economie policy alternati-
ves are followed. Finally, a government cannot rea-
sonahly be held responsib1e for any errors in an in-
dependently compiled forecast by the firms relying 
on that forecast. When, on the other hand, the fore-
casts are mixed up with task-setting, business will 
be able to present the political account in the event 
of major discrepancies, for instance in the form of 
requests for aid or protective measures. 
At  Community  level  there is  the following  point 
too.  Experience  has  shown that Community fore-
casts,  if they are to  be good ones,  require  expert 
machinery capable of working out the interdepen-
dences of the national forecasts. 
lt is not enough to add together the national fore-
casts. The considerable departures that reality dis-
plays from  the  quantified objectives  in the  third 
programme for economie policy further heavily un-
derline the danger  of  setting tasks that have not 
been ~compared with objective expectations. The re-
suit is  that no serious attempts are  made to take 
steps consonant with the severity of the task to be 
performed.  The  responsible  authorities  can  take 
refuge in the argument that development has been 
disappointing  and  that  the forecasts  that formed 
the basis of the task-setting have proved too opti-
mistic.  As  forecasting  and  task-setting  were  not 
separated,  no  supervisory  agency  can  therefore 
fault  the  responsible  Community  policy-making 
agencies. Finally, precisely for the Community co-
ordination of economie policy, great value must be 
attached to the rationalizing effect of objective fore-
casts  on public discussions  in the Member States, 
in business and in the Community institutions. 
lt thus seems necessary to conclude that either the 
Council, or the Commission, will have to institute 
an independent  and expert  office  for  forecasting. 
This office will have to cooperate closely with na-
tional independent institutions and with the Com-
munity Statistical Office. lts forecasts will have to 
be published without any national or Community 
policy-making agency having any right of censor-
ship. 
29 4.  Task-setting programming, overall and 
indirect measures 
(national reports, 2nd part, Chapter Il) 
4.1.  THE CONCEPTS 'OVERALL AND 
INDIRECT MEASURES' 
In .emulation of the French report (Fromont, Chap-
ter Il) actions by the state tending to influence the 
economy  as a  whole are regarded here as overall 
measures. Actions by the state tending to influence 
the  economy  without  granting  precisely  defined 
benefits (measures of aid) or without imposing p~e­
cisely  defined obligations on certain firms are re-
garded  as  a  way  of  intervening  indirectly.  They 
consist mainly of utilization of the economie weight 
of the public sector of the economy,  and in parti-
cular that of the budget. 
4.2.  THE RELATION BETWEEN SHORT-TERM 
AND MEDIUM-TERM PROGRAMMING 
As France has gained the most experience with in-
dicative programming and in that country the vari-
ous problems in this connection have been thought 
through the most  rationally, the French views on 
this form of planning will serve as point of depar-
ture in this section. Another argument in favour of 
this is that from the historical point of view there 
is no  doubt that Community views on this matter 
have  been  inspired ·above  all  by  the  French  ex-
ample.  However,  the French vice-president of the 
Commission,  Robert  Marjolin,  made  an  effort  to 
find a synthesis with the then as yet fundamentally 
different views in Germany upon the introduction 
of medium-term economie policy. Thus the coordi-
native function of the market was postulated and 
the word 'plan' avoided. But in the first programme 
in  particular  it  was  ·explicitly  laid  dawn  that 
the  objectives  would  not  be  quantified.  On  this 
point  in  particular there  was  great mistrust  and 
fundamental objections in Germany. As mentioned 
above, it was not until the third programme that a 
start was made with quantification of the principal 
objectives.  Careful  allowance  was  also  made  for 
the experience gained in the other M·ember States. 
As  regards  the  relation  between  short-term  and 
medium-term programming, there seems to be no 
doubt  that  the  French view is  also  the most  ra-
tional  one if  it is  felt that the growth  objective 
occupies too central a place in France. Opinions may 
in fact differ about the objectives of medium-term 
programming  (the  relation  pursued  between 
growth of productive investments, growth of pub-
lic  services,  growth  of  private  consumption  and 
more qualitative objectives like reasonable incarne 
distribution  and  environmental  protection).  But 
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there cannat be any doubt that the attainment of 
tho  se  targets is  al  ways endangered if  care  is not 
permanently  taken  to  maintain  the  fundamental 
equilibria of Article 104 of the EEC Treaty. As this 
stability policy must therefore have been worked 
out in such a  way that attaining medium-term ob-
jectives  is  not  hampered,  the  French  thesis  that 
short-term economie policy must be made to serve 
medium-term economie policy (Fromont,  III) must 
be considered correct for all Member States and al-
sa  for  the  Community as  a  whole.  If one  of the 
planned growth norms is  eXlceeded  too  much,  the 
restrictive  measures  to  be  taken  will  in practice 
espeoially hit private investments and public serv-
ices,  which always occoupy an important place in 
medium-term programming.  Short-term economie 
policy must therefore be directed towards safeguard-
ing medium-term planned objectives. 
From a  legal point of view,  too,  the recommended 
priority  for  medium-term  programming  likewise 
has various advantages. Ta start with, in this way a 
rational cohesion  can be guaranteed in the multi-
plicity of measures of economie law which now is 
all too frequently absent from the practice of most 
Member States. lt  can har:dly be ensured in the sep-
ara  te laws themselves. For prescribing in separate 
laws that there should be consultation with other 
ministers  on  certain  concrete  measures  proves  in 
practice to be completely inadequate for  attaining 
a rational cohesion in the whole of economie policy. 
In the second place fundamental principles of law, 
permanent provisions of economie law and measures 
for attaining medium-term objectives automatically 
acquire in this way a logicatl. position of priority in 
economie poHcy. 
It is therefore advisable that ali Member States in-
troduce medium-term programming (cf. Zijlstra re-
port,  pp.  62-68).  As such programming as a  rule 
is of only indirect influence on the operation of the 
oommon market, an obligation to that effect prob-
ably ·COUJld not be imposed on the strength of Article 
100  but  only  on  the  basis  of  Article  235  of  the 
EEC Treaty. As already mentioned in the first sec-
tion of this chapter, the directive in question could 
among other things lay dawn which objectives have 
to be quantified in the medium-term programmes, 
while it could also contain regulations on the Com-
munity coordination procedure to be followed. 
Thought could be given to prescribing in all Mem-
ber States the promulgation of a  basic law which 
at the same time regulates the main outlines of the 
short-term programming and the instruments to be 
used in  this  (short-term economie  policy).  In this 
way ·comparable Stability and Growth iaws could 
be enacted, which would form a  fortunate synthe-
sis  between  the  legal  situations  in  the  various 
Member  States  examined.  The  institutional  and procedural  aspects  of the regulation  of  program-
ming in the medium- and short-term in such Stabi-
lity and Growth laws will, of course, have to be left 
in principle to the nationallegislators on account of 
the  different  constitutional  situations.  It  will  be 
possible to leave a  large degree of freedom to the 
Member States also with regard to the choice of the 
instruments to be used.  Meanwhile, in connection 
with  parliamentary practice  in  the  United King-
dom, and having regard to Article 189 of the Treaty 
of Rome,  the possibility could also be left open of 
a  political commitment of  a  government  towards 
parliament, not laid down in a  law, with the same 
content as the basic law advocated here. 
4.3.  LONG-TERM AND MEDIUM-TERM 
PROGRAMMING IN THE MEMBER 
STATES 
Although the French Government carries out many 
long-term studies  (often up to 1985),  these merely 
have the significanoe of contributions to the prepa-
ration of the five-year plans. The l1atter relate not-
ably  to  economie  growth,  physical  planning  and 
social progress, but not for instance to incomes pol-
icy,  as  the un1ons  are opposed to this. The French 
plans are of an indicative nature, although in fact 
they are firmly  binding  on  the  government in a 
political sense. They also form the basis for a policy 
concerted with business.  The plans  always  relate 
to the economy as a whole, and sometimes to indi-
v:ldual  branches of industry as  weil. With the ex-
ception of the regional aspects,  they have no sta-
tutory basis but are themselves approved by law. 
The approval law for the Fourth Plan lays down 
that henceforth parliament must also  approve the 
principal objectives of a  plan before it is elabora-
ted. Further, the government must report annually 
on  how  far  it has  been  implemented.  The  plans 
are implemented by application of  ali the instru-
ments  of  economie  law  described  in  the  French 
r1~port (see for further details Fromont, Chapter II, 
Section 1 and Section 3). 
Belgium medium-term planning is clearly inspired 
by  the  French  example,  but,  as  mentioned  pre-
v.iously,  does  have  a  general  statutory  basis,  the 
basic law of  15  July 1970.  The  Belgian ·medium-
term programmes must also be approv·ed by parlia-
ment. Unlike the French example they are formally 
binding on the government and they also form the 
basis for a  stronger contractual binding of the en-
terprises assisting in the implementation than the 
French five-year plans. For the rest they are of an 
indicative  nature,  like  the  French  example 
(Schrans, III). 
As  already m·entioned,  Italian medium-term plan-
ning even has a constitutional basis, but in practice 
dates only from 1967  (with a  precursor in the Va-
noni Plan,  which  related to  the 1955-64 period). 
Social and regional objectives play an even greater 
part in  the  Italian  programmes than in those  of 
France and Belgium. Like the Belgian programmes. 
the Italian five-year plan is binding on the central 
government  (though  not  on  the  autonomous  re-
gions, or at most indirectly via the national invest-
ment policy). For the rest the plan is of an indica-
tive nature only. Ther·e  is  no  question of Unes  of 
policy gea:red  to those of business and thus 'bind-
ing'  the  private sect<Jr  as  strong1y  as  in  France 
and Belgium (Sacchi Morsiani, Chapter II,  Section 
1 and Section 3). 
The  situation  regarding  medium-term  program-
ming  in Germany is  much more complicated and 
thus less clear than in the three Member States al-
ready discussed  (Zacher,  Nos  51  to  69).  Five-year 
programmes that are comparab1e to sorne extent to 
medium-term planning in Belgium, France and Ita-
ly  are  notably  prescribed  in  the  Stability  and 
Growth Law in the field of public finance of Bund 
and Lander (Zacher, Nos 82  to 84).  Although this is 
not legally prescribed, the Federal government fur-
ther includes in the annual economie surveys pro-
jections for the next five years as weil, relating to 
the whole economy (Zacher, No 85).  Howev·er, these 
are less binding as  regards the economie policy to 
be followed  than the five-year  plans in Belgium, 
France and Ital  y. 
In the Netherlands and the United Kingdom medi-
um-term planning with respect to the development 
of the economy as a  whole has not yet acquired a 
permanent  place in .economie  policy  either.  As  a 
result, the various objectives of economie policy in 
the medium-term  are pursued  with  less  cohesion 
than  would have been possible if five-year  plans 
had been regularly compiled.  However since  1966 
medium-term  forecasts  have  been  regularly pub-
lished in the Netherlands. Further, a start has been 
made  with  a  multiyear  budgetary  policy  (Dutch 
report,  Chapter  II,  Section I  and Section  4,  §  2). 
In the United Kingdom regular medium-term fore-
casts have likewise been published regularly since 
1968, while medium-term planning, as in Germany, 
relates  mainly  to  public  finance.  But,  as  in 
Germany, ther·e are also annual medium-term eco-
nomie assessments (Daintith, ILl and II.2.3.). 
Aga·inst  the background outlined above,  it is  cer-
tainly  understandable  that  Commundty  coordina-
tion of the general ·economie policy of the Member 
States has made most progress in the field of pub-
lic  finance  of  the  Member  States.  On  this  point 
reference may also  be made  to  the priority given 
to the coordination of budgetary policy in the reso-
lution of the Council and of the representatives of 
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1971  regarding the realization in stages of the eco-
nomie  and monetary union. However,  the coordi-
nation of budgetary policy relates above all to the 
short-term  which,  for  the  reasons  stated  above, 
does not guarantee a  rational relation to medium-
term economie objectives. N ow that all the Member 
States  examined  have  accepted  a  medium-term 
budgetary policy, the coordination could extend to 
this more than has been the case so far. The recent 
developments in Germany and the United Kingdom 
may further give rise to the expectation that with-
in  the  near  future  the  rationality  of  continuing 
to coordinate the budgetary policy against a  back-
ground of more comprehensive medium-term eco-
nomie plans wiLl  come to be realized in all Member 
States. At that moment consideration can be given 
to  a  better  organization  and  coordination  of 
medium-term economie poUcy,  as advocated under 
4.1  and 4.2 of this chapter. 
4.4.  SHORT-TERM PROGRAMMING 
(short-term economie policy) 
In the field of short-term programming the situa-
tion from theviewpoint of comparativ·elaw is some-
what  different  than  that regarding  medium-term 
planning.  The  Netherlands  has  the  longest  expe-
rience with this.  Under  the  relevant law of  1947 
the Dutch Central Economie Plan is published an-
nually for the purpose of coordinating government 
policy in economie, social and financial fields. Like 
the  'macro-econom~c reconnaissances'  which,  since 
1961,  have  preceded  the  plan  by  six  months,  it 
relates solely to the coming year. As explained in 
Section 3,  the Central Economie Plan, though it is 
only of the nature of a  forecast,  does nevertheless 
have a  great influence on the economie  policy of 
bath the government and  private enterprise.  The 
broad  recommendations  of  the  Socio-Economic 
Council on the socio-economic policy to be followed 
in  the  short-term  often  have  great  influence  in 
practice.  But,  unlike  the  Central  Economie  Plan, 
these recommendations are of a task-setting nature. 
Among the instrum•ents proper to short-term eco-
nomie po11cy, in addition to the budgetary, fiscal and 
monetary instruments of importance in all Member 
States, wage and priee policy plays a  particularly 
important part, and to a less extent construction li-
censing policy and, most exceptionally, limited con-
trol of a  few  aspects of foreign exchange transac-
tions (Dutch report, Chapter II, Sections 1, 2 and 6). 
In German economie  policy,  short-term program-
ming  (Annual  Economie  Survey,  guidelines  and 
concerted adion) occupies a  central position, as in 
the Netherlands. This is on the basis of the Stabi-
lity and Growth Law of 1967.  However, unlike the 
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Dutch  Central  Economie  Plan,  the  Annual  Eco-
nomi!c Survey is also of the nature of a (non-binding) 
explanation of the proposed economie and financial 
policy. It also contains (equally non-binding) guide-
lines for  harmonizing the policy  of local  authori-
ties,  unions  and employers organizations  (Zacher, 
No 70).  The guidelines are discussed in an informai 
exchange of views between the ministers concern-
ed,  representatives  of  the  Bundesbank  and  the 
Bundeskartellamt,  members  of  the  Board  of  Ex-
perts, representatives of credit institutions and of 
workers'  and  employers'  organizations  ('concerted 
action',  Zacher,  No  71).  In  partkular  the  autan-
orny  of  private  employers'  and  workers'  organi-
zations in the field of wage development is scrupu-
lously respected (Zacher,  No  72).  The central ins-
trument of short-term economie policy in Germany 
is  budgetary policy.  Under  the  Stability  and 
Growth  Law  of  1967  this  presents  in  particular 
important possibilities for interim manipulations of 
the economy in the short-term by the government 
which may also relate to the rates of taxation (Za-
cher, No 75).  From a short-term programming point 
of view the advice of the above mentioned Board 
of Experts is also of great importance (Zacher, No 
80). 
In the United Kingdom, too, budgetary policy is the 
central instrument of short-term economie policy. 
However, the budgetary procedure also off  ers the 
government an opportunity of giving, in the Bud-
get statement,  by means  of economie  forecasts,  a 
survey  of the  whole  of  the  proposed  short-term 
measures. Certain forms of control of wage devel-
opment  ar·e  not  absent  from  these  measures  but, 
as in the Netherlands, encounter considerable oppo-
sition (Daintith, 11.2.2). 
Unlike  the  Netherlands  and  Germany,  in France 
short-term  programming  has  no  statutory  basis. 
lt takes the form of an economie and financial re-
port appended to the annual 'loi des finances'. But 
in practice the defence of the fundamental equili-
bria in the short-term occupies an increasingly im-
portant place. In this use is made not only of over-
all and indirect instruments, but also of the whole 
range of instruments of economie policy (measures 
of  assistance,  programme  contracts  and  binding 
regulations, while respecting the autonomy of man-
agement  and  labour  with  regard to  wag·e  policy, 
however). 
In F.rance too short-term economie poUcy is based 
on  short-term  forecasts  (budg·ets  économiques). 
These  are drawn up  twiee  a  year by  ministerial 
officiais and discussed at a  meeting of senior offi-
cia:ls under the direction of the Ministers of Econom-
ks and Finance. Once a year four members of the 
parliament·ary  committees  concerned  participate 
in the discussions  too  (Fromont,  Chapter  II,  Sec-
tion 2). In Italy short-term programming is  regarded as a 
one-year part of medium-term  programming. There-
fore,  unlike  short-term  economie  policy  in  the 
countries discussed previously, it is not primarily 
directed towards stability but in principle is of the 
sa.me  nature as  medium-term programming.  Thus 
there is no question of short-term economie policy 
in.  the true sense (Sacchi Morsiani, Chapter II, Sec-
tion 2). 
Belgian short-term economie policy is most similar 
to the French version. As in France, priee control 
pllays an important role (Schrans VI A). 
Community coordination of Member States' short-
term economie policy may be of a  mandatory na-
ture under Article 103,  paragraphs 2 and 3,  of the 
E:EC  Trea  ty. However, in practice this has not pro-
gressed much beyond joint consultation as referred 
to in paragraph 1 of Article 103. On the basis of the 
situation in the various Member States briefly sum-
marized  above,  it  is  understandable  that  in  this 
consultation the main emphasis falls on budgetary 
policy,  though more  comprehensive forecasts  and 
recommendations are not absent. As already stated 
albove, the continuation of short-term economie pol-
ky against the background of  annual plans with 
respect  to  the  whole  economy  is  also  necessary. 
These annual plans must then further be compiled 
again as part of  five-year  plans.  The fact that in 
Germany  and  France  in  particular the  complete 
au.tonomy of management and labour with respect 
to the establishment of wage development is accept-
ed  as  a  matter of principle  and without any re-
striction seems to e~clude  obligatory~ooordination of 
wage development.  Control of the development of 
profit via priee control,  particularly in Germany, 
likewise encounters difficulties of principle in Ger-
many  and  more  practical  objections  elsewhere. 
Though  in  practice  the  development  of  profit  is 
largely governed by the market situation, this is not 
always in the direction sought by short-term eco-
nomie  policy.  This  applies  in  particular to  firms 
with a  strong market  position  (see  Appendix).  In 
none of the Member States does control of the in-
cornes  in the liberal professions occur.  In view of 
the  macro-economie  insigniftcance,  such  control 
could be important only for psychological reasons, 
and th  en as part of a general in  cornes po  licy. 
Summarizing the situation with respect to the de-
velopment of incomes, it thus seems difficult to ar-
riv'e at influencing the main constituents of nation-
al incom·e  and notably of by far the most impor-
tant ,component- wag·es-via short-term econom-
ie  policy.  One rea,son  why this gap in the instru-
ments of short-term economie policy is very serious 
is  that  wage  development,  unlike  priee  develop-
ment,  i~s  on1ly  slightly coordinated by the function-
i:ng  of the common market in the various Member 
States.  As  a  result,  divergent wage  developments 
occur much more strongly than divergent priee de-
velopments. This can lead to serious disturbances of 
competition and thus,  in extreme  cases,  even en-
danger the existence of the common market, as the 
French wage development  in  1968  showed.  Since 
the mandatory wage control that had proved possi-
ble for several decades in the Netherlands ran into 
growing  opposition  from  the unions,  the  N  ether-
lands has been trying to geta grip on the develop-
ment of  the principal  components  of  national in-
come  by means  of  a  macro-economie  'social  con-
tract' which at the same time ought to relate to the 
main  categodes  of  spending.  Extending  further 
than  the  German  'concerted  action',  this  social 
con  tract would yield a kind of macro-economie var-
iant of  the  Belgian  and  French programme  con-
tracts. In principle the experiment also seems inter-
esting for other Member States and for the Com-
munity coordination of short-term economie policy. 
For  in  this  way  the  autonomy  of  management 
and labour is respected in principle. The Council's 
resolution of  5 December 1972  (Official Journal C 
133, p. 12) also seems to be seeking a solution in this 
direction in the first paragraph of point II. Another 
possibility of getting a  hold on wage development 
would be  to have the public sector,  notably civil 
servants'  salaries,  function  as  wage  ~eader.  Ele-
ments of this solution may be found in the policy 
in France and  the United  Kingdom,  though with 
only moderate success. Since above ali the- often 
very labour-intensive- public services are usually 
the direct  and  (via restrictions on spending) indi-
rect victim of an e~cessive wage development, there 
is  also  much  to  be  satd  for  this  solution.  From 
the point of view of coordination of wage develop-
ment in the various Member States it would also be 
a  considerable gain in itself if sectors with strong 
international competition were to act as wage lea-
ders. In any case it seems advisable- in a Commu-
nity context too - to continue pursuing an effec-
tive  incomes  policy  as  a  part of  short-term eco-
nomie poUcy. The desirability of this is Tightly indi-
cated  in  the  programmes  for  m'edium-term  eco-
nomie policy too.  Like the rest of short-term eco-
nomie policy, this in  cornes po  licy ought to be  ·Conduct-
ed  as  part of  medium-term  incom·es  policy.  This 
should relate not only to growth of incomes but also 
to  income  distribution.  In  conformity  with  the 
Coundl's resolution of 5 December 1972,  it should 
in addition relate not only to  incomes from  work 
(of  employed and self-employed persons)  but also 
to incomes from capital. 
As regards the principal categories of expendittire, 
the present concentration of  Community coordina-
tion on budgetary policy naturally entails the dan-
ger that in particular the public  servic,es  are re-
strkted.  Ooordinated  short-term  ~influence of  the 
level of private investment seems possible mainly 
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the above mentioned resolution on the realization 
of  an  economie  and monetary union,  this  is  also 
being pursued. 
The self-financing possibilities of business are even 
now being coordinated to a  certain extent via the 
priee mechanism through the operation of the corn-
mon market. As evidenced by the previous chapter 
and Section 7.6  of this chapter, in various Member 
States there are political and sometimes very fun-
damental  and  constitutional  objections,  or  objec-
tions embodied in other principles of law, to direct 
investment control. As a result, Community coordi-
nation directed towards obligatory investment con-
trol is out of the question. Nevertheless, the Dutch 
idea  of  a  macro-economie  social  contract  which 
would  also  relate  to  the  level  of investment  also 
seems  interesting  in  this  context  of  expenditure 
control.  Control of private consumption via short-
term economie policy is taking place in sorne of the 
countries examined with sorne success by means of 
the legislation on the hire purchase system  to be 
discussed  below.  Further,  for  all  Member  States 
the instrument of short-term increase or reduction 
of direct or indirect taxes,  which  has an  explicit 
legal  basis in  Germany,  the Netherlands  and the 
United  Kingdom may be  recommended.  However, 
the effectiveness  of this instrument is  conditional 
on the expenditure-restricting effect of tax increa-
ses not being cancelled out again by means of wage 
indexation.  On this point statutory or other effec-
tive measures seem desirable in all Member States. 
From a Gommunity point of view increases in indi-
rect taxes have the advantage that as  a  result of 
the  country  of  destination  principle  they  do  not 
change  the  competitive  situation  between  firms 
from various Member States. When direct taxes are 
increased,  a  competition-disturbing  effect  of  this 
kind is difficult to avoid in practice. Moreover, on 
oligopolistic  markets it is  difficult to prevent the 
direct tax increase being passed on via a  priee in-
crease. Raising indirect taxation and a  directly re-
sultant restriction of private consumption may be 
accompanied by a  less stringent restriction of pub-
lic  services  than  would  otherwise  be  necessary. 
This direct tie wi  th the pursui  t  of a  balaneed re-
striction of the various categories of spending may 
make  the  tax  increase  more  readily  acceptable 
from a  political point of view. In this  respect too 
the idea of a social contract may be important. The 
package  of public services rendered possible  may 
forman obvious compensation for the restriction of 
private consumption. ln view of the harmonization 
of rates sought for the principal consumption taxes 
a certain degree of Community coordination of tax 
increases and reductions will, of course, be desira-
ble in due course. And the increasing similarity of 
the short-term economie trend in the Member Sta-
tes  also  seems  to be make  a  coordination  of  this 
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kind more and more feasible. Rate differences of a 
few percent will presumably remain possible even 
within the framework of harmonized rates of turn-
over tax and consumption taxes. 
4.5.  THE OVERALL INSTRUMENTS 
OF ECONOMIC POLICY 
Partly  because  comparative studies  have  already 
been  published  on  the  main  aspects,  this  subject 
can be dealt with in brief after the preceding sec-
tions. For legal details see the national reports. 
The  most  important  overall  instrum~ents  of  eco-
nomie po  licy in all Member States are  overa11 budge-
tary policy,  overall taxation policy,  overall  policy 
with respect to public investments and overalJ mon-
etary  policy.  For  the  concept  'overall  instru-
ments' see Fromont, Chapter Il, Section 4.  Overall 
policy  with regard to public investments forms  a 
very important instrument for attaining the objec-
tives  of  medium-term  economie  policy in France 
and in ltaly (especially France,  including  the  in-
vestments of the public sector of the economy). By 
reduction of the number  of special discount rates 
French  economie  policy is  also  acquiring  a  more 
overall  character  than before.  However,  selective 
credit policy still plays a  big part there (Fromont, 
Chapter II, Section 4,  IV). For ltaly, besides the  close 
ties  between  these  overaH  instruments  and  five-
year plans,  further  economie  details  that may be 
mentioned are the modernization of budgetary po-
licy (Sacchi Morsiani, Chapter II, Section 5,  1)  and 
the modernization of taxation poUcy (op. cit., Chap-
ter II, Section 5,  Il). ln Germany foreign economie 
and monetary policy,  as  an overall instrument of 
economie policy, plays a  more important role than 
in the other Member States, a role which moreover 
is  laid down  by law (Zacher,  Nos  104  to  110  and 
115  ).  An ai:d  to Communi  ty coordination of economie 
policy  is  the  fact  that Article 4  of  the  Stability 
and  Growth  Law  expressrly  obliges  the  Federal 
Government first to exhaust all possibilities of in-
ternational coordination  (Zacher,  No  108).  Further 
details that may be mentioned are the authoriza-
tion  of the government introduced under Articles 
26 and 27  of the StabiHty and Growth Law to rais·e 
or lower income and company tax for  reasons  of 
short-term economtc policy by 10 °/o and to acceler-
ate or deoelerate collection of thesre  taxes together 
with the Gewerbesteuer (trade tax) (Zacher, Nos. 97 
and  98).  As in the  Netherlands  and Luxembourg, 
the strong progression of income tax in Germany 
has  an  automatic  anti-cyclical  effect  (Zacher,  No 
99). In the Netherlands too a moderillizationofbudg-
etary policy is  being prepared, inter alia by revi-
sion of the Accountabiliy Law of 1927  (Dutch re-
port, Chapter II, Section 4,  §  2).  As a  further de-tail  the  pursuit  of  'macro-economie  programme 
con  tracts' (social con  tracts in addition to the longer-
standing  coordination  in  the  Socio-Economic 
Council  may be  recalled.  From the Dutch report 
and from  the bill recently submitted with regard 
to  exchange transactions, one further has the im-
pression that control of domestic and foreign capi-
tal transactions occupies a relatively important po-
sition in the Netherlands. 
From the legal point of view the following points 
wHl deserve special attention: 
Coordination of the policy of the decentralized ter-
ritorial  authorities  with  central  policy  should be 
guaranteed  by  statutory  national  regulations  in 
Member States with a  large degree of regional or 
lm!al  fiscal  and budgetary autonomy. Examples of 
such regulations may be found in the German and 
Dutch  reports.  For  Community  coordination  of 
economie policy no great difficulties have become 
apparent so far on this important point. 
Both for the coordination of economie  policy and 
for the economie policy of the European Communi-
ties themselves, it is highly important that in Ger-
many,  the  Netherlands  and  the  United Kingdom 
expenditure policy, including aid pol1cy, can aocord-
ing to the national reports concerned be based di-
rectly and exclusively on the budget. Except for a 
number of funds  expressly regulated in it (Guid-
ance and Guarant·ee Fund(s) for agrtcwlture and So-
cial Fund), the Treaty of Rome seems to allow of 
an identical view at Community level.  lt  ,is clear 
that  this  point  is  inter  alia  of  great  importance 
to  the  concrete content of  the budgetary  powers 
granted to the European Parliament. However, for 
Italy a different view applies under Article 1 of the 
Italian  Constitution.  The third  paragraph of  this 
article lays  down  that not only  state incarne but 
also  state expenditure must have a  legal basis  in 
other substantive laws than the law approving the 
budget.  However,  it does  not follow  from  this -
and for the parliamentary powers this is also im-
portant  - that  the  substantive  legislation  must 
precede the budget item. It may also follow it (Sac-
chi Morsiani,  Chapter II,  Section 5,  I).  The choice 
between the two systems that the Community insti-
tutions will make has, as stated, important political 
consequences.  But  in  addition  the  differences  of 
opinion also  have  a  practical  significance for  the 
clarity  and  systematic  nature  of  the  Member 
States'  aid P.Olicy.  The problem will therefore be 
reverted to iri that context. 
A third legally important pointis the degree of le-
gally  guaranteed  independence  of  the  Central 
Bank. The extremes in this respect are formed by 
Germany, where the independence of the Bundes-
bank is expressly laid down in Article 12 of the law 
in question  (Zacher,  No.  111),  and  France,  where 
many of the most important monetary decisions are 
taken by the 'Conseil national du  Crédit',  a  body 
of fairly broad ·composition which in practice, how-
ever,  always follows  the dire.ctives  of the govern-
ment. Although the Central Bank in France, too is 
more than a purely executive agency and its sugges-
tions are often adopted by the government, its de-
pendence on the latter  may  perhaps nevertheless 
present sorne problems for decision-making in the 
planned system  of  central banks (Fromont,  II-2. 
4.  D).  Lega.Uy speaking, the other countries occupy 
intermediate positions.  But in practice the autan-
orny of all central banks is fairly great, while con-
versely a  certain degree of collaboration between 
central bank and government  occurs  in  all coun-
tries in practice. The point is,  of course,  of great 
importance to the 'system of central banks'  being 
pursued  under  the  resolution  of  22  March  1971. 
The compUcated and time-consuming decision-mak-
ing procedures of the Council of Ministers make it 
extremely desirable that necessary monetary deci-
sion  can  be  ta  ken  in  the  short-term  wi  thin  this 
system of central Banks, whether or not after con-
sultation with the  Monetary  Committee.  Perhaps 
prior to this the powers of the central banks will 
have to be harmonized.  As  this  harmonization 
would be required not so  much in the interests of 
proper functioning  of  the common market  as  for 
achieving other objectives of the Treaty, it would 
probably have to be based not on Article lOO  but 
rather on Article 235  of the Treaty of Rome. As re-
gards transactions with non-EEC countries, Article 
70 of the Treaty can perhaps also be used as a legal 
basis. 
The directive or regulation concerned could leave 
a  few very fundamental decisions,  for instance on 
the point of changes in exchange rates, to the Coun-
cil of Ministers, while in ·emulation of the legisla-
tion of for instance the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom (see the reports in question under Chap-
ter II, Section 4,  § 3) the Council, at the proposai of 
the  Commission,  could  also  be  gran  ted  formai, 
authoritiy  to  give  the  'system  of  central  banks' 
instructions on the policy to be followed. If there is 
good ·Contact hetween the central banks, it willprob-
ably  not  be  necessary  in  practice  to  make  much 
use of such authority.  Mandatory  coordination of 
the use of all other overall instruments mentioned 
as  a  part of  short-term  economie policy can take 
place under Article 103 of the EEC Treaty. Whether 
this mandatory coordination must be preceded by 
an overall harmonization of the pattern of the budg-
et, the national systems of taxation or the national 
monetary  legislation  is  a  question  which  cannat 
yet be answered in general with certainty. Conse-
quently, this report recommends such harmoniza-
tion on only a few points. 
Medium-term coordination should be performed as 
part  of  the  Community  and  national  indtcative 
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mandatory nature. The coordination of mandatory 
national  regulations  with  reference  to  short-term 
economie policy will be reverted to below (see 7  .2). 
4.6.  PUBLIC ENTERPRISES AS INDIRECT 
INSTRUMENTS OF ECONOMIC POLICY 
As  the public sector of the economy,  particularly 
in Italy, forms an extremely important instrument 
of economie policy, the ltalian situation will be ta-
ken as the point of departure for this. First of ali a 
distinction must then be made between enterprises 
performing public services and subject to state  'con-
trol rega~ding priee determination, investment pol-
icy and other aspects  of mangement, and the en-
terprises in which the state participates as a share-
holder.  In  the  first  case  criteria  of  'general'  or 
'socio-economic'  earning  power,  established  as 
part of a general economie programme, are decisive 
for  the whole  policy  of the  firm.  The  legislation 
with regard to corporate bodies is inevitably appli-
cable, at least in principle:  in this case efficiency 
and the principle of legality are not easy to recon-
cile in practice. As instruments of economie policy 
the enterprises in which the state participates are 
therefore much more important. Here the ballast of 
statutory regulations and the concomitant bureau-
cracy is less. The major state holding companies-
IRI and ENI- and their subsidiaries have a great 
degree of autonomy. However, conformity of their 
po  licy wi  th general economie po  licy is  assured by 
personal  contacts  between the Minister  for  State 
Participations  and  the  managements  of  the state 
holding companies and via directives of the Com-
mittee  for  Economie  Programming  (CIPE).  These 
directives  may relate inter  alia to  the volume  of 
investment and the part of this that has to be made 
in  the  less  developed  regions.  The state  holding 
companies are legally obliged to operate in accor-
dance with the principle of profitability. On vari-
ous points, e.g. in the cartel legislation drafted, pub-
lic enterprises in Italy occupy an exceptional posi-
tion. See for further details Sacchi Morsiani, Chap-
ter Il, Section 4. 
In France the use of public enterprises as  instru-
ments of economie policy has been much more con-
fined to the big public utilities in the fields of po-
wer supply and transport. However, on the basis of 
the Nora Report of 1967  the government has also 
begun to increase the autonomy of the public utili-
ties. 
The same applies to their investment and changing 
policy (Fromont, Chapter Il,  Section V).  But else-
where in his report Fromont points to the partici-
pation of  the - largely nationalized - banks in 
credit  policy,  a  highly  important  instrument  of 
French economie poUcy (Fromont, Chapter V,  Sec-
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tian 2,  Ill). On this point, though, the nationalized 
banks are treated no differently from the private 
ones in the legislation. Nevertheless, the state has 
furthered the foundation of a large number of spe-
cial financial  institutions, of which it usually ap-
points the mangements and which have the task of 
contributing to financing the government's invest-
ment policy. Thus to a  limited extent one can still 
speak  of  an  instrumental  participation  of  public 
enterprises in French economie policy. 
In the United  Kingdom  the  importance  of  public 
enterprises to  investment  policy  and  wage  and 
priee policy seems fairly considerable (Daintith, Il. 
2.5). 
In Belgium the five-year plans are binding on pub-
lic  enterprises  as  regards  their  investments 
(Schrans, II). They are often exempt from the gen-
eral rules of law. 
ln German  y  and the N ether  lands there is likewise 
a fairly extensive public sector of the economy. The 
public utilities in particular are under more or less 
strict control of the C·entral or decentralized autho-
rities here too. In other sectors of business conside-
rations of general economie policy play a particular 
part in the decision of the authorities to found or 
participate in enterprises, and to a smaller degree in 
the management of the enterprises in question. Un-
like the situation in Italy, there is  no  question in 
these  countries  of  a  systematic  instrumental  use 
of public enterprises or participations as part of me-
dium-term economie policy. Strangely enough, pub-
lic en  terprises in German  y  are nevertheless large-
ly  e~cepted  from  cartel  legislation  (see  the  re-
ports concerned, Chapter Il, Section 5). 
The Zijlstra report regards the public sector of the 
economy as a major problem and contains lengthy 
and important remarks on it (pp. 29-31, 43, 49-52 
and 60-70). The report notably f.ears  that an ins-
trumental use of pu  bUc enterprises to serve the gen-
eral objectives of economie poUcy will only be ten-
able in the long run if certain privileges and ex-
ceptional positions are granted. 'At a further stage 
this may lead to  a  situation',  according to the re-
port,  'in which  private enterprise  is  placed  in  so 
unfavourable a  position in  respect of the govern-
ment-run enterprises that either it will have to be 
successively taken over by the authorities or given 
considerable  support.  Above  a  certain  limit  that 
cannat be fixed with exactitude a  further expan-
sion of the system of public enterprises may there-
fore start the nation on a  downward path  whose 
terminus is  the centrally controlled ·economy'  (op. 
cit., p.  29).  The report contains in the main two re-
commendations  for  economie  policy.  The first re-
commendation  is  concerned with coordinated sur-
veillance of the public sector to see that it does not 
exceed one or more of the three limi  ts sta  ted in the report of territorial demarcation of markets (pub-
lic!  utHities),  of costing  requirements  of the  opti-
mal size of an enterprise, inevitably leading to the 
creation of a  monopoly ('natural monopolies'), and 
of the primary nature of the goods and services pro-
duced (op.  cit., pp. 49-50). In view of the reserva-
tion with regard to the right of property in Arti-
cle 222  of the Treaty of Rome, this recommendation 
seems difficult to put into practice. But against this 
is the fact that in the common market one of the 
criteria for  nationalization in the  constitutions  of 
France and ItaJ.y - the existence of a facturai mon-
opoly - will not often have been complied with. 
O:n  account of  the tendency emerging  from  most 
national reports to strengthen the autonomy of pub-
lie enterprises on the basis of a  profitability prin-
ciple,  Zijlstra's  second  recommendation  seems 
more feasible.  This  policy  recommendation is  for 
harmonization of the instrumental value of the pub-
lie sector at nil (op.  cit.,  p.  52).  To  the extent that 
this  should  not prove  possible,  harmonization  of 
instrumental  use  ought  to  take  place  as  part  of 
medium-term Community planning (op.  cit.,  p.  52, 
elaborated on pp. 68-70). Article 90  of the Treaty 
of~ Rome also seems to proceed from the principle 
of  harmonization  of  the  instrumental  use  of  the 
public sector at nil. In particular the Member Sta-
tes will not be permitted in principle to maintain or 
in.stitute for the public sector any protective meas-
ures,  eX!ceptiona1  positions  or  fiscal,  financial  or 
other privileges that are  forbidden by the Treaty 
for private enterprises. Nor may they impose any 
re~strktions of competition on public concerns and 
equivalent enterprises. Further, they may not oblige 
these to engage in discrimination or other competi-
tion-distorting  practices  that  are  forbidden  for 
themselves  or  for  private  enterprises  (Article  90, 
paragraph 1).  The enterprises of the public sector 
themselves come under the Treaty's rules on com-
P•~tition. An exception applies under Article 90, par-
agraph 2,  solely for enterprises entrusted with the 
operation of services of general economie interest 
or  having  the  character  of  a  revenue  producing 
monopoly.  But this exception too  holds good only 
in.sofar  as  application  of  the general rules  of the 
T-reaty  would  hamper  performance  for  the  task 
entrusted to them. In no case may the development 
of the volume of trade be influenced to an extent 
at variance with the interests  of  the Community. 
The  latter  addition  prevents  the  Member  States 
from laying down for these enterprises regulations 
that are themselves at variance with other provi-
sions of the Treaty. Instances are import levies, dis-
criminating  taxation  of  imported  products  and 
measures having the same effect, such as quantita-
tive import restrictions. The Commission is entrust-
ed with guaranteeing the application of these var-
ious prinoiples, which olearly tend towards the nil 
point advocated by Zijlstra (Article 90,  paragraph 
3).  The question now arises whether, if necessary, 
Article 90  also allows of Zijlstra's subsidiary solu-
tion,  harmonization of instrumental use as part of 
the medium-term economie programmes. This does 
in fact appear to be the case. 
For in principle Article 90 declares not just the rules 
furthering  competition  but ali  rules of the Trea-
ty  applicable  with  regard  to  government  policy 
(Article  90,  paragraph  1)  or the enterprise policy 
itself (Article 90,  paragraph 2)  in the public sector 
of the economy. The rules relating to coordination 
of the  economie  policy of  the Member States are 
thus also applicable. Insofar as the public sector of 
the economy is used as an instrument of economie 
policy, the Commission even has at its disposai, un-
der Article 90, paragraph 3,  exceptionally effective 
powers for bringing instrumental use into line with 
the aims of coordination.  However,  in the case of 
paragraph 1 of Article 90  the Commission, in  the 
exercise of its coordinative powers may permit no 
exceptions, and within the framework of paragraph 
2 in any case  no  major  exceptions,  to the Treaty 
articles relating to free and undistorted movement 
of  goods,  persons, services and capital. The latter 
is important, since it emerges from the national re-
ports that the public sector enjoys certain privile-
ges  or  statutory  exceptional  positions  in  various 
Member States whose effect on international com-
petition ought to be examined in more detail. At-
tention will have to be paid not only to the differ-
ences  in  privileges  of  the public  enterprises  but 
also  to  the  differences  in  burdens  imposed.  The 
question to what extent and in what way the Com-
munity itself ought to participate in due course in 
the public sector of the economy is not considered 
in this study. 
4.7.  OTHER INDIRECT INSTRUMENTS 
Among other indirect instruments most of the re-
ports deal in particular with the deliberate use for 
purposes  of  economie  policy  of  the government's 
demand function on the market (marchés publics). 
On 27  April 1968 the French government laid down 
principles for a deliberate policy in this field which 
pro  vide in particular for  an accelera  ted reform of 
the  industrial structures.  For this  purpose, under 
the  further  directives  of  10  October  1969,  when 
awarding contracts the quality of the firm's man-
agement and the efforts made by the firm to reduce 
costs and improve the services performed must also 
be  taken into account (Fromont,  Chapter  II,  Sec-
tion 6).  In the Netherlands there is no question of a 
more or less systematic use of the public markets. 
Commercial  principles  (the  most favourable  offer 
from the commercial viewpoint, attention being na-
37 turally paid to quality, delivery time, etc.  as well 
as  priee)  prevail  in  this  field  too  (Dutch  report, 
Chapter II, Section 7).  In Germany and the United 
Kingdom public contracts are used as instruments 
to  serve  various  purposes  of  national  economie 
policy, but less systematically than in France. This 
is  understandable, if only because these countries 
do  not have medium-term programming compara-
ble  to  the  French  five-year  plans  (see  Zacher, 
No  151  and above ali No 165,  and Daintith, Il.2.5). 
In  any  case,  the  instrumental  nature  of  public 
markets in France as part of systematic industrial 
policy  must  not  be  overestimated.  The  primary 
aim is a rationalization of public contracts. 
Coordination in this  field  will  have  to  guarantee 
above ali that on public markets too no discrimina-
tion on the grounds of nationality occurs in law or 
in fact. Articles 30,  57  and 100 of the EEC Treaty can 
be applied for this, and this is already being done. 
With regard to contracts of public enterprises Arti-
cle 90,  paragraph 3,  can also be used for this pur-
pose. Insofar as the Community dcnstitutions, on the 
strength  of  the  situation  in  the  va!rious  Member 
States briefly summarized  above,  are prepared to 
permit instrumental use of public markets for ob-
jectives  of economie  policy,  the principle  of  non-
discrimination  will  have  to  be  respected  in  this 
connection. This need not present any insurmoun-
table  difficulties  if  public  markets  are  used  for 
overall purposes of economie policy. However, the 
use of public markets for purposes of regional or 
sectoral policy does not seem compatible with the 
prin  ci ple  of  nondiscrimina  ti  on  men  tioned  unless 
there is strict harmonization of the policy of ali Mem-
ber States. To a limited extent it will also be possible 
to  use  Community contracts or  Community-coor-
dinated  national  contracts  as  instruments of eco-
nomie policy. In this case too the principJe of non-dis-
crimination will have to be observed. For this fun-
damental  Article 7  applies to  Community institu-
tions themselves too. 
The other indirect instruments of economie policy 
that  are  mentioned  in sorne  reports  (notably  the 
German and Dutch ones) are discussed elsewhere in 
this report. 
5.  Measures of assistance 
(national reports, 2nd part, Chapter III) 
(a) In this summary report it will suffice to make 
a few general remarks on the importance of this 
instrument of economie policy and the problems 
of coordination that arise at Community leve! in 
this connection. 
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(b) It  clearly  emerges  from  the  national  reports 
(II.3) that measures of assistance now occur to a 
considerable extent  in  ali Member  States and 
have developed into a central instrument of eco-
nomie policy. 
(c)  Partly in  connection  with the legal view  pre-
vailing in those countries that measures of assis-
tance can be based directly on the budget, the 
measures in Germany, the Netherlands and the 
United  Kingdom  form  a  rather  unsystematic 
and unclear whole. On the strength of the above 
legal view, these countries have hardly any sta-
tutory standards in the field of assistance. The 
German Stability and Growth Law does,  how-
ever, prescribe in its Article 12  that every two 
years a  report must be published on the aid pol-
icy fol.lowed, while there are also private publi-
cations.  In  the  Netherlands  the  government 
usually informs  parliament of its  most impor-
tant policy intentions by letter. 
(d) In  Belgium,  France  and  Italy  aid  policy  is 
based on a  much more highly developed stand-
ardization  and  systematization  of  substantive 
law from both the legal and the administrative 
point of view. This is bound up on the one hand 
with the above mentioned legal  view  in those 
countries that the budget alone does not offer an 
adequate legal basis for measures of assistance 
and that in addition to this formai  legal basis 
definition in terms  of  substantive law is  nec-
essary. On the other hand, the more systematic 
nature of aid policy in these countries is natur-
ally connected with the medium-term program-
ming policy  existing  in these countries.  Assis-
tance  and  sometimes  also  'negative  financial 
inc·entives' (levies in various forms) are obvious 
instruments for supporting a policy of indicative 
planning. 
(e)  The principal objectives of general measures of 
assistance applicable to the whole of the econ-
omy and the whole territory that emerge from 
the national reports are the following: further-
ance of exports, furtherance  of  saving and in-
vestmen  t, furtherance of the regrouping of firms, 
furtherance of research, protection of the envir-
onmen  t  and influencing the short-term economie 
situation. 
(f)  The principal objectives of a  non-general kind 
·emerging from the reports are the furtherance 
of a  balanced regional distribution of econo~ic 
activities over national territory, aid to certain 
sectors,  aid  to  housing,  aid  to  hotel-building, 
aid to vocational training and retraining. 
(g)  The  forms  of  assistance  encountered  are  ex-
tremely varied. The most important forms  are 
tax reliefs (often applied on behalf of the objec-
tives listed under (e) applying to an firms), loans (selective provision of credit, loans at a low rate 
of interest and loans that need not be repaid in 
certain  circumstances),  credit  guarantees  and 
other  forms  of  guarantee,  differental  charges 
for power and transport, non-recoverable bonu-
ses and conditional or unconditional other forms 
of  direct subsidization.  Finally,  indirect  forms 
of assistance, such as government contributions 
to  research institutes on behalf of industry. In 
addition, preferential awards of public contracts, 
the provisions of services free of charge or sale 
of  land  at  reduced  priee  and  infrastructural 
measures  in favour of certain enterprises,  and 
also state participation in firms  will,  however, 
also have to be regarded as  measures of assis-
tance in certain circumstances (Zacher, Nos 164 
to 166,  Dutch report, III, Section 1,  Sacchi Mor-
siani  Chap.  III,  Sections  1  and  6).  Checking 
against Article 92  of the EEC Treaty will pre-
sent  particular  difficulties  when  other  provi-
sions of the Tr·eaty enter into consideration for 
application,  notably  the  regulations  regarding 
the  free  movemen  t  of  goods,  services,  persans 
and capital. The best example from practice is 
formed  by  semi-fiscal  charges  of  which  the 
proceeds go  to domestic firms. With the excep-
tion of ·the tax reliefs, exemptions and discrim-
inatory  application  of  mandatory  regulations 
in favour  of  certain enterprises are dealt with 
elsewhere in this chapter (Section 7 below). 
The tax reliefs may be of the nature of gener-
ally vaUd statutory reliefs, but in sorne Member 
States they may also be reliefs granted on a dis-
cretionary basis to certain enterprises and thus 
individualized  (Fromont,  II-3.1).  Most  other 
forms of assistance are applied at discretion on 
account of their nature. In order to avoid arbi-
trariness  in  their  application,  this  inevitably 
discr·etionary nature of the greater part of aid 
policy  makes  it of  great  importance  that  the 
Member States lay down general Unes of policy 
on the application. 
(h) Community policy with r·egard  to the aid pol-
icy of the Member States, will, on the strength of 
A·rticle  92,  have  to  be  directed  primall"ily  to-
wards countering distortion of competition to the 
detriment  of  enterprises  from  other  Member 
States. With respect to regional aids and meas-
ures occuring  in ali or practically ali Member 
States in favour of certain branches of industry, 
this countering of distortion of compeition will, 
however, have to be increasingly  accompanied 
by rationalization and harmonization of the aid 
measures.  In  this  connection  rationalization 
means above ali the requirements that measures 
of assistance are not used to prop up antiquated 
industrial  structures  or  to  found  unprofitable 
new  enterprises and  that  they are suitable  in 
form, content and imposed conditions to guaran-
tee  as  well  as  possible  the  attainment of eco-
nomi.c objectives that are rational from the Com-
munity viewpoint. Without a Communityregion-
al policy and a  Community sectoral policy for 
the branches of industry in question this is diffi-
cult to attain. As  mentioned above,  the second 
programme  for  medium-term  economie  policy 
con  tains a number of useful criteria for a ration-
al  aid  policy,  to  which  interested  readers  are 
referred. Community policy seems clearly to be 
developing  in the  direction indicated,  too.  See 
for this the 'First report on competition policy', 
annexed to the Fifth General Report on the acti-
vities of the Communities, pp.125-164, andpub-
Ushed  in April  1972.  It emerges  from  the  na-
tional  reports  that  the  autonomous  policy  of 
most Member States is  also evolving clearly in 
the direction of greater economie rationality of 
aid policy. 
Where measures of aid are not rational or where 
they are given to firms orto branches of indus-
try which  are  not  assisted  or less  assisted  in 
most  Member  States  the  Commission  when 
applying Article 92  will inevitably refuse such 
aids  so  as  to  avoid  unreasonable harm to  the 
competitors  from  other  Member  States.  An 
example of a measure of assistance which is not 
rational in purpose, form and content would be 
the case  of  assistance towards operation  of  an 
unprofitable enterprise in a  branch of industry 
that is not supported elsewhere and for  which 
the Community as  a  whole has  a  considerable 
overcapacity. 
An important  and as  yet  unsolved problem is 
formed by the unequal effect that regional meas-
ures  of  assistance  may  have  on  certain bran-
ches of industry in the various Member States. 
Instances  are again branches of  industry with 
structural overca  pa  city.  However,  according  to 
the report quoted, a  solution to this problem is 
in preparation. 
(i)  As  noted  above,  there  is  at  present  a  great 
difference in  transparency and  systematic na-
ture of aid policy between Belgium, France and 
Italy on the one hand and Germany, the Nether-
lands  and  the  United  Kingdom  on  the  other. 
This difference reinforces the argument already 
adduced in this report for introduction of a me-
dium-term  Community-coordinated  economie 
policy in ali Member States. Such a  policy will 
also be able to benefit a coordinated and ration-
al aid poUcy of the Member States which does 
not have the effect of distorting competition in 
trade between Member States. According as the 
Commission's  policy  displays  a  clearer line,  it 
will also be easier to ask ali Member States le-
gaUy to lay down general lines of policy regard-
ing the measures of assi,stance. 
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further arises of the extent to which it is desir-
able that the Community itself also makes grea-
ter use of the instrument of aid than is the case 
at present (Investment Bank, Social Fund, Agri-
cultural  Fund  and  specifie  measures  within 
ECSC and Euratom). This certainly seems expe-
dient in respect to regional policy, since uniform 
regional development is vital to the proper oper-
ation of the Monetary Union pursued. For in a 
monetary union the Member States lose the ex-
change rate as an instrument for combating se-
vere regional unemployment. In the third pro-
gramme for medium-term economie policy it is 
even rightly  asked  whether in the long run a 
monetary union does  not require a  much more 
radical  financiaJ  ha'rmonization  between  the 
Member States. In the field of sectoraJ policy a 
possibility  of  Community  aid  likewise  seems 
desirable above all in two  cases.  The one case 
concerns measures of  assistance  for furthering 
research  or  development  of  clearly  European 
importance. In spite of Article 92,  paragraph 3 
(b),  experience  in  the  past  period  shows  that 
these are difficult to get started as purely na-
tional  ventures without financial support from 
the Community. The second case concerns bran-
ches of industry where a  coordinated aid policy 
would be of great importance but could not be 
instituted without  Community  participation in 
the financing. 
(k) As regards the legal basis of Community meas-
ures of assistance, reference may first be made 
to what has already been said about this above 
(Chapter  II,  4.5).  A  reasonable  compromise 
between the various legal points of view seems 
to be offered by the Italian attitude that meas-
ures of assistance must be based not only on the 
budget but also on a substantive regulation, and 
that this substantive regulation can also be es-
tablished after approval of the budget item. In 
all the  cases  mentioned  a  legal  basis  for  the 
substantive regulation can certainly be found in 
Article 235 of the Treaty of Rome. 
6.  Programme contracts 
(national reports, 2nd part, Chapter IV) 
The concept 'programme contract' was introduced 
in France in the 1960  interim plan. The need had 
arisen for a summary in quasi contracts per enter-
prise  of the various discretionary financial  facili-
ties granted (tax concessions, loans and subsidies). 
In this way an even more rational relationship with 
the objectives of the five-year plan could be obtain-
ed  than  by  attaching  conditions  to  the  various 
facilities  separately.  The  most accurate definition 
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was  given in  1962  by  the Ministry for  Industry: 
Quasi contracts are r·eciprocal  agreements or dec-
larations of intent between the State 'and an enter-
prise aiming on the one hand at the performance by 
this  ~enteDprise of a  programme of investment re-
search or production and, on the other hand,  the 
appropriate  financial  aid  (loans  from  the  FDES, 
grants towards technical research, equipment bonu-
ses,  letters  of  permission,  authorization  to  have 
recourse  to  the  finandal  market  etc.)'  (Fromont, 
Chapter IV). The benefits granted by the State in a 
programme agreement may also consist in exemp-
tion  f,rom  mandatory  regulations.  The  principal 
examples of this are the fiscal advantages mention-
ed  (Chapter  IV,  Section  1)  and  the  contractual 
priee contrais differing from mandatory priee reg-
ulations  (Fromont,  Chapter IV,  Section  2).  Intro-
duced in 1966, by the beginning of 1970 the contrac-
tual pri:ce contrais in industry had ~already develop-
ed  into  the  ]orm  of  priee  control  most  used.  On 
28  February  1970  107  pri:ce  program·me  contracts 
concerned more th  an 90°/o of the branches of industry. 
The obligations that the industrial enterprises as-
sume relate not only to priee determination but for 
instance also to programmes of increasing produc-
tivity, export and research. On the other hand, pro-
gramme  contracts  with  commercial  and  service 
organizations relate mainly to  the  priee policy  to 
be followed. So far programme contracts for whole 
branches of industry have been concluded with the 
steel industry and the computer industry (Fromont, 
Chapter IV,  Section  3).  The greater  autonomy  of 
public  enterprises  already  mentioned  is  likewise 
accorded in programme contracts (Fromont, Chap-
ter IV, Section 4). 
So far the French example has been foHowed not-
ably in Belgium (Schrans, V,  V  A  and VI).  In the 
other  countries  examined this new instrument  of 
economie policy has as yet not or hardly developed 
(see the reports concerned under Chapter IV).  Na-
turally  care  must  be  taken that  the  government 
does  not make  promises  as part of  a  programme 
contract that are in conflict with Articles 30,  53,  62 
and 92 of the Treaty of Rome. 
Since most Member States make little or no use of 
the  instrument,  it  seems  improbable  that  within 
the  foreseeable  future  a  Community-coordinated 
use of this instrument by the Member States can 
be pursued for the attainment of specifie objectives 
(e.g. of sectoral policy). However, the Communities 
themselves  could  conclude  programme  contracts 
within the limits of their financial  resour·ces.  In-
stances might be the European  Investment Bank, 
the Social Fund and the Agricultural Fund and also 
joint development projects as part of industrial pol-
icy.  Furthe·r,  attention  has  already  been  drawn 
above  to  the  possibility  of  macro-economie  pro-
gramme  contracts,  which  are  being  exp·eriment-
ed with  in  the  Netherlands.  In principle this  in-strument too could be used at Community level, but 
this would have to  be preceded by a  very strong 
Europeanization of the organizations of employers 
and workers. 
Insofar as connected with the granting of financial 
advantages to  be borne  by the state, the Belgian 
and  French  programme contracts  can be  checked 
against the obj-ectives of the Community under Ar-
ticles  92  and  93  of the EEC Treaty.  Greater pro-
blems  are presented by  the  programme contracts 
from the viewpoint of coordination. From the eco-
nomie  point of  view laxer priee  controls  for  the 
ent1erprises  in question can  cerfainly yield an ad-
vantage comparable to  a  subsidy.  As these  laxer 
priee controls may serve inter alia to promote ex-
ports,  the result may also be entirely comparable 
with the purpose and operation of a  forbidden ex-
port  subsidy.  N  evertheless,  Article  92  do  es  not 
seem applicable here, since these financial advan-
tages are not paid for out of state funds.  It will 
therefor·e be necessary to fall back on more general 
articles  of  the  Treaty,  in  particular  Articles  101 
and 102. In a certain sense these form the lex gene-
ralis of Articles 92  and 93.  However, perhaps the 
enterprises that are  exempt from  certain manda-
tory regulations may be regarded as enterprises to 
which 'special OT exdusive rights' have been grant-
ed within the meaning of Article 90,  paragraph 1. 
Should this prove possible upon closer examination, 
the procedure of  Article  90,  paragraph  3,  can be 
applied in sorne cases.  This procedure is  more ef-
fective than that of Article 101 or 102. 
7.  Manda  tory regulations 
(national reports, 2nd part, Chapter VI) 
7.1..  INSTITUTION  AL LEGISLATION 
The general institutional situation of the Member 
States in the field  of economie policy has already 
been dealt with  in Chapter II of this  report and 
Section  2  of this chapter. The problem of general 
pol:itical decentralization has also already been dis-
cussed. This section will discuss the role of a num-
ber of special institutions, not forming part of the 
central institutions or the decentralized authorities 
of the state, with special tasks in the field of man-
datory regulations and other subjects of economie 
law. 
(a) CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY 
Ali the Member States examined have Chambers of 
Commerce  and Industry  as territorially represen-
tative bodies of the local or regional economy. How-
ever, the  re are differences  in name, legal char  ac-
ter,  composition and  powers. For the purposes  of 
this report the following points seem of particular 
importance. As  a  rule the Chambers are statutory 
bodies. In Germany, Italy and the Netherlands the 
task of the Chambers includes the issuance of certi-
ficates  of origin, which are of gr·eat importance in 
the correct application  of the EEC  regulations  in 
the field  of  foreign  economie  transactions.  But in 
Ital  y  and  the N etherlands in particular they  also 
have a statutory task in the implementation of var-
ious other laws. In thos·e  cases too,  of coUTse,  the 
powers to take binding decisions are of particular 
importance. In Italy these powers are mainly in the 
field  of industrial property rights  other than  pa-
tents, technical customs  disputes and the  issuance 
or certification of various documents. These docu-
ments  relate  to  such  matters  as  the  founding  or 
closure of enterprises. In a  number of exceptional 
cases the Chambers also  have powers in the field 
of  the  right  of  establishment  (Sacchi  Morsiani, 
Chapter  V,  Section  1,  I).  In  the  Netherlands  the 
Chambers play a  part inter alia in the application 
of the Commercial Register Law, legislation on es-
tablishment, the Clearance Sales Law and the Law 
restricting the gifts system (Dutch report, Chapter 
V, Section 1, § 2, and Section 7). 
From the point of view of Community coordination 
the  participation  of  Chambers  of  Commerce  and 
Industry in the  implementation of  mandatory re-
gulations of economie law may present sorne  pro-
blems. This applies in particular when these man-
datory regulations originate from Community law 
(customs legislation) or have formed the subj·ect of 
Community  coordination  or  harmonization  (com-
pany law or the right of establishment) or when in 
their  application  other  regulations  of  mandatory 
Community  law  (e.g.  the  general  and  particular 
prohibitions  of  discrimination  on  the  grounds of 
nationality) have to  be considered. In  those  cases 
there  will  have  to  be  adequate  guarantees  of 
thorough supervision and legal protection against 
incorrect decisions. 
(b) PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS OF CERTAIN 
BRANCHES OF INDUSTRY AND 
LIBERAL PROFESSIONS 
The most compr·ehensive regulation in this field is 
to be found in the Netherlands, with its Industrial 
Organization Law of 1950. Under this law statutory 
organizations of trade and industry with major reg-
ulatory and administrative tasks, often of a  man-
datory nature,  can  be  instituted.  They  also  have 
important financial means of their own. The Socio-
Economic Council mentioned above (the SER)  was 
itself  instituted  by  the  above  law  as  the  senior 
agency of trade and industry. In addition to its ad-
visory powers already mentioned, it has a  number 
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tions for  the economie  organizations  for  separate 
sectors  of industry hav·e  developed  above  ali  for 
agriculture,  fisheries,  the  industries  processing 
agricultural produce or fish, the trade in these pro-
ducts,  the  retail  trade  in  general  and  the  crafts 
(Dutch report, Chapter V, Section I, § 1). 
The  public  organizations  or  other  organizations 
with statutory tasks for liberal professions are not 
dealt  with  in  the  Dutch  report  and  occur  only 
sporadi.eaUy  (the  most  important  example  is  the 
legal profession). 
In France, in addition to the Chambers of Commerce 
and  Industry,  there  are  chambers  for  agriculture 
and crafts. In addition to the chambers for agricul-
ture there  are  the  much  more  important  'offices 
publics professionnels', pubUc institutions of differ-
ing  kinds  for  the implem·entation  of  agricultural 
policy,  which  are  co-administered  by  r·epresenta-
tives of agriculture. In addition the private 'socié-
tés  professionnelles  et  interprofessionnelles'  play 
an important part in the implementation of econom-
ie policy not only in agriculture but also in indus-
try. They are under state control (Fromont, Chap-
ter V,  Section 1, I and II). 
In Germany functional decentralization of manda-
tory  powers  takes  place  in  general  by means  of 
'horizontal'  functional  deconcentration  of  tasks 
within the state organization  (Zacher,  No  195).  In 
this connection,  in addition to institutions which are 
also found in other Member States, mention may be 
made of a  German peculiarity, the highly indepen-
dent  'Bundesoberbehorden'  (superior  federal 
authorities), such as the influential Bundeskartell-
amt (F,ederal Cartels Office), the Bundesamt für die 
Gewerbliche Wirtschaft  (Federal  Office  for Trade 
and Industry), the Bundesamt für Ernahrung und 
Forstwirtschaft (Federal Office for Food and Fores-
try) and the Kohlebeauftragte (Coal Commissioner) 
(Zacher,  No  248).  Here too there is evidence of an 
obvious reserve on the part of leading German pol-
itidans  to  grant representatives  of trade and in-
dustry true joint responsibility for economie policy. 
As autonomous pubHc oecupational and profession-
al organizations-with only limited economie  pow-
ers - the craft chambers,  the agricultural cham-
bers of the liberal prof·essions play a part in addi-
tion  to  the Chambers  of  Commerce and Industry 
(Zacher, No 255).  These organizations have manda-
tory powers mainly in the field of professional dis-
cipline (Zacher, No  257)  and sometimes - notably 
the craft chambers- with regard to admission to 
the occupation or profession (Zacher, No 259).  They 
have important tasks in the field ofvocational train-
ing (Zacher, No 258).  Public professional organiza-
tions - with above ali statutory disciplinary pow-
ers - have  been  instituted  in  Italy  for  a  very 
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large number of liberal professions (Sacchi Morsi-
ani, Chapter V, Section I, II). 
From a Community point of view, the same applies 
to the trade, industrial and professional organiza-
tions discussed here, mutatis mutandis, as was men-
tioned above with regard to the Chambers of Com-
merce and Industry. State control and legal protec-
tion will have to be regulated in such a  way that 
the Community institutions can supervise the cor-
rect application of Community law. On account of 
the great differ·ences in this field between the var-
ious Member States, it seems pointless to attempt 
harmonization of the public organization of indivi-
dual branches of industry or professions. The sec-
tors for which they exist and the  powers granted 
them differ too  much for  that. Moreover, compul-
sory harmonization would again be in conflict with 
the principle of the Member States being respon-
sible  for  their  own  organization. lt seems  more 
feasible to aim in sectors with a  highly developed 
Community policy at the foundation of Communi-
ty-regulated  private  organizations  which,  as  in 
France,  can participate in implementation of pol-
icy. It is therefore understandable that, above ail in 
the field of the common agricultural policy, such an 
endeavour may in fact be noted. 
7.2.  REGULATIONS OF SHORT-TERM 
ECONOMIC POLICY (national reports, 
2nd part, Chapter V, Section 2) 
This  subsection  will  deal  in  succession  with  the 
mandatory regulation of priees (7.2.1.), wages (7.2.2.), 
the credit system (7 .2.3.),  the hire purchase system 
(7.2.4.) and other points of application of short-term 
economie policy (7 .2.5). 
7.2.1. PRICE REGULATION 
Ail the countries examined have a  general statu-
tory basis for manda  tory priee regulations. In Ger-
many, however, the highest courts have ruled that 
the use of priee control as an instrument of active 
economie policy is inadmissible, only application of 
defensive  purposes  being  admissible  (Zacher,  No 
274).  In practice,  therefore,  priee fixing  measures 
are an exception in Germany (Zacher, No 275),  also 
as regards special sectors (Zacher, Nos  276  to 286). 
In the  Netherlands and  the  United Kingdom  the 
application  of  priee legislation had been rejected 
for political reasons at the time of compilation of 
this report, but only recently so in both countries 
(1971  and  1970  respectively).  Only  in  Belgium 
(Schrans, VI A),  France (Fromont, Chapter V,  Sec-
tion 2,  I)  and Italy (Sacchi  Morsiani,  Chapter V, Section 2,  I)  does mandatory priee control form an 
important instrument of short-term economie pol-
icy  ..  However, in Belgium and France, as mentioned 
above,  a  clear connection has been established be-
tween  priee  control  and  medium-term  economie 
programming (Chapter III, 6,  above). This connec-
tian is in line with the view developed above all in 
France that short-term economie policy is only an 
instrument for adjusting the economie process for 
the sake of the derived medium-term economie de-
velopment. 
A  c~omparison of the development of priees in the 
various Member States shows no clear correlation 
between the rate of prke increases and the exi·stence 
or  not  of  mandatory  priee  regulations.  Priee  in-
creases in the past years have not al  ways been high-
er in Member States or branches of industry for 
which  no  priee  ceiling  was  fixed  than  in  those 
where this had been the  case. It thus seems that 
other  economie  circumstances  or  other  economie 
measures can lead to at least just as stable a  priee 
development as  priee measures  can.  With respect 
to these other measures one might first of all en-
visage  measures for  strengthening  priee competi-
tion. These are consequently regularly recommen-
ded by the OECD and the European Communities 
(see also the Appendix to this report). In addition 
the state can usually exert influence on the general 
priee development via its own policy either directly 
(rates of taxation and charges for public services) or 
indirectly (restriction of overall demand by monet-
ary policy, increased taxation and restriction of gov-
ernment spending). In the case of cost-push inflation 
it will sometimes also be possible to exert influence 
on  cost  development  without  mandatory  regula-
tions  being  required.  Partly  on  account  of  the 
fundamental objections that exist to priee control 
in a  number of Member States, Community furth-
erance of a  comparable degree of priee stability in 
ali  Member States need not  therefore  entail any 
harmonization  of  priee  legislation  for  the  time 
being.  Provided  that  harmonized  obj·ectives  are 
attained on this point, the Member States may be 
left ·a  considel"able degree of :freedom in the choice 
of the measures to be ta~en. GreaHy differing priee 
developments would of course in the long run not 
be compatible with a monetary union. 
Insofar as national priee measures are applied these 
may not enter into confUct with Community law. 
The danger of this is the greatest in sectors where 
the Oommunities thems·elves possess price-regulat-
ing powers (agriculture, transport, coal and steel). 
In other sectors too national priee policy may, how-
ever,  enter into 'conflict with Oommunity law. In 
pa.rticular,  minimum  priees  and  fixed  priees,  by 
ha.mpering imports of for·eign goods or services at a 
lower  priee,  may  conflict with Article  30  of  the 
Treaty  of  Rome.  As  emerges  from  the  Commis-
sion':s dÏ!rectives on the strength of A·rticle 33, para-
graph  7,  of the  EEC  Treaty,  the fixing  of  maxi-
mum priees may, however, also yield in sorne cases 
measures of the same effect as quantitative import 
restrictions. As already exp1ained when discussing 
the  priee  programme  contracts,  a  detailed  priee 
policy may also  lead to other forms  of distortion 
of  competition.  The  Commission  will  therefore 
- under the supervision of the Court of Justice-
have to continue with the graduai development of 
a  number of lines  of conduct  to ensure  that the 
priee policy of the Member States is in conformity 
with the Treaty. 
7.2.2. W AGE REGULATION 
In all the co un  tries examined wage determina  ti  on 
is left in principle to free bargaining between em-
ployers  and  workers.  In  all  countries  examined 
(with the exception of the  United Kingdom?)  the 
result of free bargaining effecting a  whole branch 
of industry can further be declared generally bind-
ing on ail enterprises of that branch of industry in 
the part of  the country concerned.  AU  the coun-
tries  .examined,  with  the  exception  of  Germany 
(Zacher, No 289)  also have a legal minimum wage. 
On  the  other hand,  only  the  N etherlande  (Du  teh 
report, Chapter V,  Section 2,  §  3)  and the United 
Kingdom (Daintith, II.5.2.1)  have a statutory possi-
bility of mandatory influencing of wage increases 
for purposes of short-term economie policy. How-
ever, in those countries too  use of this possibility 
summons up  great opposition on the part of  the 
unions. In all other Member States there are fun-
damental objections  to  mandatory intervention in 
this field. 
Having  regard  to  the  situation  in  the  different 
Member  States  thus  summarized,  it  will  not  be 
possible for the time being to direct coordination of 
the  short-tevm  economie  policy  of  the  Member 
States with respect to the development of ineomes 
towards equivalent possibiHties of direct manda  tory 
intervention in wage increases. However, the sp·end-
ing  of  private  incomes  can  be  mandatorHy  re-
stricted in favour of public services or as part of a 
balaneed restriction of all categories of expenditure 
via a taxation policy, ooordinated if necessary. How-
ever,  this  :i!s  conditional on it being impossible to 
pass on tax increases on the strength of wage in-
dexation. The effect of excessive national wage in-
creases on the balance of payments cannot be com-
pensated  for  in  a  monetary  union  by  unilat·eral 
devaluation.  Excessive wage  increases,  differing 
from Member State to Member State, will therefore 
have to be countered otherwise than by compulsion 
(see Chapter III.4. above). 
As remarked above (Chapter II, 10.2), until the Eu-
ropean  Parliament  and  management  and  labour 
exert a  greater influence on the main outlines of 
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important aspect of the problem of short-term eco-
nomie policy do not seem feasible. In recent years 
even massively increasing unemployment as a  re-
suit of excessive wage increases has no longer prov-
ed a:lways  to  rlead  to  sufficient moderation.  Thus 
the operation of the market mechanism can only be 
relied on to a limited extent for regulation of wage 
development with reference to short-term economie 
policy. 
7.2.3. CREDIT REGULATION 
I t  is  righ  tl  y  rem  ar  ked in the  German and Italian 
reports that (the possibility of)  mandatory regula-
tion of the credit system is one of the most impor-
tant  instruments  of  short-term  economie  policy 
(Zacher, No 291;  Sacchi Morsiani,  Chapter V,  Sec-
tion 2,  III). This also applies to Community short-
term economie policy. Ali Membel!" States have large-
!  y  equivalent  powers  for  restricting  credit  (see 
the cited places in the German and Italian reports 
and further Fromont, Chapter II, Section 4,  IV, sub 
3,  Daintith, 11.5.2.2.,  Dutch report, Chapter V,  Sec-
tion 2,  § 5,  Schrans, VI A). This simplifies coordina-
tion of national credit policy at Community level. 
As the centrai banks in most of the countdes exam-
ined  (notably in  Germany,  Ita1y,  the Netherlands 
and the United Kingdom) exert in law or in fact a 
predominant influence on credit policy, it will in 
the main be possible for community coordination to 
take place by m·eans of the system of central banks 
being sought. However, it is possible that for this 
an amendment of Belgian and French legislation is 
requked, since in these countries the 'Commission 
bancaire' and the government (Conseil national du 
crédit on the proposai of the Minister of Economies 
and Finance) respectively have a greater influence. 
It  ought  to  be  investigated  to what  extent too  a 
more extensive harmonization of credit legislation 
is  necessary  under  Article  100  of  the  Treaty  of 
Rome. In particular the German powers in this field 
perhaps  seem  inadequate  in  comparison  to  the 
powers in other Member States (see Zacher Nos 113, 
142 and 291). Really mandatory measures will prob-
ably be required just as little at Community level 
as in the majority of the  Member States. Insofar 
as formally mandatory measures are required, the 
government will have to be called in in most Mem-
ber States. Similarly, at Community lev·el mandat-
ory coordination of me  as  ures of credit po  licy can 
be  effected  only by the  Council  of  Ministers,  on 
the strength of Articles 103 of the EEC Treaty. 
Legislation on the credit system does not as a  rule 
relate solely to the short-term economie policy as-
pects.  In addition it usually relates to micro  eco-
nomie supervision of banking business to guarant·ee 
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the public's interests. The German, Dutch and !ta-
lian reports in particular contain relatively detailed 
information  on  this.  Harmonization  of  national 
legislation on  this  point  will be necessary  not so 
much in the framework of the coordination of the 
economie policy of the Member States as in that of 
realization  of the right  of  establishment and  the 
free  provision  of  services  in  the  banking  sector 
(Article  57,  paragraph  2,  and  Article  66  of  the 
Treaty of Rome). 
For the establishment of  a  common market  with 
undistorted  competition  the  competitive  situation 
between the banks and the possibility of using the 
banks in a  selective credit policy as an instrument 
of  medium-term  economie  policy  are likewise  of 
importance. For the possible regulation of the first 
point in the legislation regarding supervision of the 
banks, notably with regard to control of bank merg-
ers,  the Dutch  and  Italian  reports  contain  useful 
information.  The  problems of  Community coordi-
nation on this point do not differ essen  tially from 
those in the field of cartel and monopoly legislation 
in general. They ·can  be solved within the frame-
work of Articles 85-90 of the Treaty of Rome (see 
Chapter IV, 7.5  below). Compulsory participation of 
the banks in a  selective credit policy in favour of 
certain enterpdses or groups of enterprises, accord-
ing to the national reports, P'lays a  particular part 
in France (Fromont, Chapter V, Section 2, III sub 2) 
and Italy (Sacchi  Morsiani,  Chapter V,  Section  2, 
111-3). From the economie point of view, these are 
measures of  assistance  which at Community level 
give  rise  to  similar  problems  of  coordination  as 
other measures of assistance. From the legal point 
of  view  the  Commission  may,  however,  have  to 
base its coordination policy on this point on Article 
90,  paragraph 3, as weil. 
7.2.4. LEGISLATION CONCERNING  HIRE 
PURCHASE SALES 
As  an  instrum·en  t  of  short-term  economie  po  licy 
this  legislation has  proved  particularly important 
in the postwar period in France (Fromont, Chapter 
V, Section 2,  IV) and the United Kingdom (Daintith, 
Il.5.2.2a).  True, the Belgian, Italian and Dutch re-
ports mention (under VI A,  Chapter V,  Section 2, 
IV and Chapter V,  Section 2,  § 6 respectively) com-
parable  powers under short-term economie  policy 
to  prescribe  accelerated  repayment.  However,  in 
these countries  the  practical significance of these 
powers for short-term economie policy proves less 
than in the two countries first mentioned. The Ger-
man report states no comparable powers. 
Most legislations regarding hire purchase sales at 
the  same  time  contain  regulations  to  protect the 
public. The Italian and Dutch reports in particular 
contain extensive details of these. As long  as hire purchase sales have not  assumed 
any great volume in international trade, harmoni-
zatilon or ~coordination of the application of the leg-
islation  in  question  does  not seem  urgent.  From 
the point of view of short-term economie policy this 
is a.n instrument that does not seem of such impor-
tance that its use or otherwise should be imposed 
on the Member States. If its application in excep-
tional  cases  were to 1lead  to discriminatory inter-
fertmce with imports (for instance through less fa-
vourable  hire  purchase  terms  for  imported  pro-
duc:ts), action could be taken against this under Ar-
tide 30 et seq. of the Treaty of Rome. Dutch legisla-
tion still contains a  number of establishment regu-
lations (with regard to hire purchase financiers and 
door-to-door canvassers) which have to be appraised 
on the strength of Articles 52-57 of the Treaty of 
Rome. 
7.2.15. OTHER MANDATO.aY REGULATIONS OF 
SHORT-TERM ECONOMIC POLICY 
The German and Dutch reports also contain refer-
ences to a few other mandatory regulations of great 
importance to short-term economie policy in those 
cou.ntries.  In  this  connection  the  German  report 
specially  mentions  the  mandatory  regulations  re-
lating to foreign  trade and payment transactions. 
Mention is also made of the provision in exchange 
legislation that subjects indexation of debts in Ger-
man  currency  calculated  with  reference to  other 
currency or the priee of gold or other goods  and 
services  to the approval of  the central bank  (Za-
cher, No 293). Regulations of the former kind natur-
ally  also  occur  in  other  Member  States,  though 
there they are not so  clearly regarded  as  instru-
ments of short-term economi~c policy as is the case 
in Germany. As long as no common capital market 
has:  come into being, exchange legislation presents 
particularly great possibilities here. The problems 
of  coordination in  this  field  are  discussed  in the 
section on the legislation for foreign trade and ex-
change transactions (Chapter III.  7.4  below). Perma-
nent regulations on rate clauses in private contracts 
like  the  Article 3  of  the  German  Currency Law 
mentioned by Zacher,  though  certainly of impor-
tance to short-term economie policy, will have to be 
coordina  ted in monetary  po  licy  ra  th  er  than  in 
short-term economie po  licy. 
The Dutch report states the importance that consi-
deration of short-term ~economie policy may have if 
social insurance legislation is amended for instance 
in the determination of the date of introduction of 
extensions  of the social security system or of in-
creases  of  contributions or  benefit as part of the 
existing legislation (Dutch report, Chapter V,  Sec-
tion 2,  § 7).  For the time being there seems to be no 
reason for mandatory coordination of this point un-
der short-term economie po  licy. 
7.3.  LEGISLATION FOR SITUATIONS OF 
SHORT  AGE (national reports, 2nd part, 
Chapter V, Section 3) 
7.3.1. LEGISLATION FOR SITUATIONS OF 
SHORTAGE IN OPERATION 
The national reports with respect to France, Italy 
and  the  Netherlands  supply  information  under 
Chapter 5.3  on legislation in  force in those coun-
tries in connection wi  th the housing shortage (and 
the shortage of sorne business premises). From the 
information supplied it may be derived that only in 
part of the Netherlands is a  permit system still in 
force for the use of housing, based on the Housing 
Accommodation Law 1947 (Dutch report Chapter V, 
Section 3,  § 1,  Il). However, in recent years aboli-
tion  of  this  rationing system with respect to  the 
housing accommodations  avaHable  ha.d  been  pro-
ceeding  apace.  In  the  three  countries  mentioned, 
on the other hand, rent control is still of practical 
importance. Liberalization in this respect seems to 
have made the least progress in Italy, where as late 
as 1970 the freezing of rent incr·eases- with many 
amendments  - was  extended until  31  December 
1973- and also  applies to small  business  premises. 
ln  France  rent  control  relates  in  particular  to 
dwellings built before 1948 and those built in cities 
since 1948. Rents in the Netherlands have gradually 
been liberalized in much of the country since 1967. 
As rent control mainly makes its effect felt within 
the Member State  concerned,  coordination  of  the 
policy  regarding  to  it  does  not  seem  an  urgent 
matter. 
Legislation relating to scarcity of land,  water and 
minerais and other natural resources is dealt with 
elsewhere  in this  report  (Chapter III,  7.6  and III 
8.1  below). 
7.3.2.  RESERVE LEGISLATION FOR EMERGENCIES 
Legislation for shortages caused by war, the danger 
of war and other emergencies is strongly developed 
above all in Germany and the Netherlands, but also 
occurs in other Member States. 
The  British Emergency  Powers Acts  of  1920  and 
1964 ar·e  of particular importance in practice to sit-
uations  of  shortage  ·caused  by  strikes.  However, 
like the powers in the event of a food shortage un-
der the Agriculture Act 1947, they can also be app-
lied to other emerg,ency situations (Daintith, 11.5.3). 
45 The French ordinanoe of 7 January 1959 relates ex-
press[y to national defence in the event of war and 
the  threat of war, and  ~can lead  to  a  completely 
centrally controlled  economy.  A  law dating from 
1969  'regulat·es the use of the mercanttle marine in 
the  same  extraordinary  circumstances  (Fromont, 
Chapter V, Section 3). 
The German constitution makes provision for exten-
sive emergency powers to be granted to the insti-
tutions of the Federation in the event of war or the 
threat of war (Zacher, No 294). However, these pow-
ers  have  no  specifie  economie  signiftcance.  But 
also the laws containing precautionary measures for 
special  economie  ~emergencies concentrate  on  the 
case of war and threat of war. The most general re-
gulation in this field  is contained in the Economy 
Safeguarding Law of  3  October  1968,  which con-
tains reinforced powers for exercising general con-
trol on production, processing, distribution and the 
provision of services (Zacher, Nos 296 and 297). An 
interesting pointis that even this law still contains 
a  guarantee  of  the fundamental  principles of  the 
market economy: 'The regulations shall be limited 
to  the  absolute  minimum.  Their content  shall be 
such  that they interfere as little as  possible with 
the  freedom  of  economie  activity  and  have  the 
!east possible effect on the productive capacity of 
the economy as a whole'. The law in question also 
regulates  the  obligation  to  keep  stocks  as  a  pre-
paratory measur:e.  Further-reaching obligations of 
this kind exist under sepaŒ"ate laws, in particular in 
the field of crude oil (Zacher, No  297). For the food 
supply  the  Food Safeguarding  Law also  contains 
extraordinary  powers  for  other  emergencies than 
war and the  danger of  war.  The  re  are  further 
emergency  laws  for  transport than  war  and  the 
danger of war. There are further emergency laws 
for transport, water supply and manpower (Zacher, 
Nos 300 to 305.) For certain other emergencies sepa-
rate regulations and organizations make measures 
possible (Zacher, Nos 305 to 309). 
Like Germany, the Netherlands has very complete 
emergency legislation.  However,  the  Dutch  legis-
lation can be applied in the event of other extra-
ordinary  circumstances  than  war and the danger 
of war. Eight laws are dealt with in the report. A 
Bill for  an emergency law for priees discussed in 
the report is still under consideration in the States.-
General (Dutch  report,  Chapter V,  Section 3,  §  2, 
I  to IX). 
It is thus apparent that at !east four Member States 
possess powers in the extraordinary circumstances 
stated to take over complete control of production 
and distribution. Quantitativ·e distribution measures 
must inevitably be accompanied by control meas-
ures for imports and exports. It is therefore clear 
that  utiliz·ation  of  the  exœptional  powers  stated 
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in the  reports  can  put the  common  market par-
tially or wholly out of operation. Article 224 of the 
Treaty of Rome seems not so much to allow of this 
possibility explicitly as to assume it. However, the 
obligation is  added to consult together in order to 
prevent  the  functioning  of  the  common  market 
being  adversely  affected by  such  measures.  Now 
that various Member States have detailed legisla-
tion on this matter, it seems  advisable that,  as  a 
precautionary  measure,  the  Commission  already 
starts to  further such consultation.  This  consulta-
tion would have to be particularly directed towards 
the introduction of harmonized rationing measures 
and mutual assistance in situations in which inter-
state trade has not been fully dislocated by acts of 
war or disorders, but other emergencies as stated 
in Article 224 exist.  In this way Community soli-
dari  ty could be main  tained in emergencies too. 
In situations  of  shortage  not  connected  with  the 
emergencies mentioned in Article 224,  the Council 
can  take  regulatory  action  under  Article  103, 
paragraph 4,  of  the Treaty of  Rome.  This  power 
has also  been repeatedly used already. The prac-
tice  of  its  application  shows  that  the  Council's 
measures may both relate to  the prevention of  a 
shortage  (compulsory  stockpiling,  authorization of 
measures to encourage imports) and tend to autho-
rize the Member States to apply export-restricting 
measures. Dange!l'  of war or war elsewhere in the 
world may also lead to application of Article 103, 
paragraph 4. Article 224 is not affected by this. 
7.4.  FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS 
(national reports, 2nd part, Chapter V, 
Section 4) 
The appUcation of the largely comparable legisla-
tion ·Of  the Member States regarding foreign trade 
and foreign payments (reports, Chapter V, Section 
4)  may not, of course,  enter into conflict with the 
Community legisil.ation  on  the four  f·reedoms,  the 
harmonization of legislation (including customs leg-
islation)  and common  trade policy,  as  interpreted 
by the Court of Justice. It seems to follow from re-
cent jurisprudence of the Court that purely formai 
licensing systems may also be at variance with the 
provisions  of  the  Treaty.  Commercial  policy  vis-
à-vis non-member countries will not so much have 
to be  cooT~dinated as replaced by a  common com-
mercial policy (Article 113). It does not seem oppor-
tune to go  into the problems of the common com-
mercial policy in this report, since it does not fall 
under the main theme of this study. 
In the field of capital transactions the liberalization 
of  transactions within the Member States,  as  the 
reader will be aware, is  much less  advanced than 
with regard to the other freedoms provided for by the Treaty  (free movement of goods,  persons  and 
services). This is both in accordance with the Treaty 
and with the close ties between capital market poli-
cy  and  monetary policy existing  in the economie 
reality of all Member States. There are also links 
with short-term economie policy and medium-term 
economie  policy.  In  France  supervision  of  inter-
national  capital  movements  is  deliberately  also 
used  as  an instrument  of  industrial  policy  (Fro-
mont, Chapter V,  Section 4,  III).  This  report  will 
not go further into the great drawbacks of the non-
existence of a  common capital market. In view of 
the links with other aspects of the non-existence of 
a common capital market. In view of the links with 
other  aspects  of  economie  and  monetary  policy 
mentioned above it is self-evident that the r,esolu-
tions of 22  March 1971  relating to the realization of 
the  econom1c  and  monetary  union  deals  in  close 
interconnectd.on  wiÎ.th  further  liberalization  of  the 
movement of capit<al and .coordination of the capital 
market  policy  of  the  Member  States.  The  close 
link:  with the coordination of the rest of economie 
and  monetary policy  will  certainly  automatically 
come  up  for  discussion  with that coordination in 
praetice, so that it is understandable that the reso-
lution  contains  no  clear pronouncements  on  that. 
It emerges from the various Commission documents 
on  ,the  subject that  the  institution  of  a  common 
capital market wiH  also  require v.arious  measures 
iior harmonrization of ,legislat1on.  Both the resolution 
on the economie and monetary union and the Trea-
ty of Rome itself (Article 70)  also make provision 
for coordination of the regulation of capital trans-
actions with non-member eountDies. The Unks that 
exist on this point in the various  Member States 
with economie policy in general and also in sorne 
cases  with foreign  policy  in general may hamper 
this  coordination. Examples of such links may be 
found above ali in the German and French reports. 
In intra-EEC trade exchange control will, of course, 
gradually  have  to  be  abolished.  But  in  addition 
such harmonization of exchange legislation will be 
necessary that the system of central banks to be 
set up can coordinate the application. 
7.5.  REGULATIONS CONCERNING MARKET 
STRUCTURE (rules governing  competition) 
(national reports, 2nd part, Chapter V, 
Section 5) 
It will be known that Germany has very detailed 
cartel legislation. As mentioned above, the 'market 
economy' there forms an independen  t  aim of eco-
nomie  po  licy.  In the German view,  a ttainmen  t  of 
this aim also  automatically furthers attainment of 
the objectives of stability and growth. Consequent-
ly,  in the German view cartel policy can  also be 
practised with a  high degree of autonomy by the 
Federal  Cartels Office.  The law assumes a  prohi-
bition of cartels, but allows of a number of excep-
tions  (Zacher,  No  355).  The government  has  also 
proposed  that  a  preventive  ,control  of  important 
mergers  be introduced (Zacher,  No  365).  Supervi-
sion of abuse of economie power is already possible. 
For the German views on the relation between su-
pervision of ,concentration and other forms of eco-
nomie policy see the extract from the official point 
of  view of  the  Brandt Government  with  r,espect 
to the 1971  Annual Report of  the Federal Cartels 
Office, appended to the present report. 
For a more detailed survey of the main  outlines of 
German law on this matter, reference may be made 
to the German report. However, wi  thin the frame-
work of this summary it is also important that the 
central  place  which  the  endeavour  to  maintain 
effective competition occupies in German economie 
policy has also  been explicitly laid down in other 
important economie laws. Thus instruments of com-
mercial policy can also be utiliZ'ed for the further-
ance of competition,  ~and a:-especting and even pro-
moting a  free-market franiework is also expressly 
prescribed in the  Stability and Growth Law (Za-
cher, Nos  336  and 366).  General economie policy is 
further  directed towards free  international  trade, 
abolition  of  'dirigiste'  and  protective  measures, 
privileges, etc.  (Zacher, No.  366).  Exceptions to the 
principle  of  market  economy  exist  notably  for 
public  services,  agriculture,  fisheries,  transport, 
elements of power supply, credit and insurance and 
the labour market (Zacher, Nos 338  to 352).  Certain 
rules for competition, which in principle is free, are 
laid down in the legislation against unfair competi-
tion (Zacher, No 368)  and the regulations regarding 
clearance  sales,  hire purchase  transactions,  dis-
counts,  priee publicity  and  'rules of  competition'. 
FinaHy,  the  German  report  also  deals  with  the 
legislation  on  industrial  and inteUectual  property 
rights in this connection (Zacher, No  369).  Declara-
tions of 'generally binding' or compulsory carteli-
zation are  rejected on  principle (Zacher,  No  372). 
If mandatory vegulations are needed for a  branch 
of  industry,  the  legislator  must  attend  to  them 
(ibid.). 
Despite considerable differences in legislative tech-
nique and procedure the practical results of British 
cartel  legislation  (Daintith,  II.5.5)  probably come, 
closest to those of Germany. British legislation also 
proceeds from the assumption of conflict with the 
national interest,  which can be refuted  by  relati-
vely few cartels. Multilateral resale priee mainten-
ance is automatically forbidden in the United King-
dom  too.  Control  of  mergers is  already  in force. 
British cartel and merger control, like German car-
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that  are ·entirely  or  highly  independent.  Finally, 
since  ~eartel and monopoly legislation is one of the 
relatively few  areas of  important legislation that 
are maintained broadly by governments of the two 
big parties, its plaee in thewhole of economie policy 
in the United Kingdom seems almost as fundamen-
tal as in Germany. 
In ali other countries examined there are ties which 
are much stronger institutionally and in their con-
tent between cartel  and concentration  policy  and 
other aspects of economie policy. In France compe-
tition is not officially regarded as an end in itself, 
but solely as an instrument for the attainment of 
other goals  of economie  policy (Fromont, Chapter 
V,  Section  5,  §  1).  However,  formally  speaking, 
French legislation,  like  German  legislation,  starts 
from  an  interdictory  principle,  and  the  practical 
application too is rather strict in principle, indeed 
in sorne respects (resale priee maintenance and ex-
clusive sales  agreements)  even stricter  than Ger-
man legislation. However, the quantitative impor-
tance of cartel policy (number of cases dealt with) 
is much less than in the Federal Republic and the 
United Kingdom, even though the individual com-
petition-limiting  practices  (refusai  to  sell,  indivi-
dual resale priee maintenance, etc.)  are sometimes 
more stringently regulated.  In addition,  the  free-
dom of competition is limited more strongly than in 
Germany by rules (e.g. a ban on discrimination and 
a prohibition of selling at a loss). But above all the 
French government is less chary than the German 
one  about actively  promoting self-organization  of 
trade and industry, restructuring, cooperation and 
concentration (Fromont, Chapter V,  Section 5,  § 2, 
and Chapter V,  Section 5,  §  3).  Use is made of a 
wide range of instruments for this: special men  ti  on 
may be  made of the  following in addition  to the 
sectoral  planning procedures  already  discussed: 
bankruptcy legislation,  new forms  of  cooperation 
regulated by law (société conventionnée and grou-
pement d'intérêt économique) and the use of meas-
UI'Ies  of assistance in various forms. Fina:lly, general 
economie  po  licy  and  legislation  in  France  are 
less embued with the principle of competition than 
in Germany. But, as mentioned above, in the prac-
tice of the last ten years partly under the influence 
of  the  European  Communities,  there has  been  a 
clear  tendency  perceptible  towards  gr·eater  con-
vergence of French and German policy, also on the 
point  of  the  importance  of  competition.  Thus  in 
France  too  supervision  of  abuse  of  economie 
power has been introduced. 
Dutch  cartel legislation  is  based on the principle 
of  abuse,  without a  general legal presumption of 
conflict with the national interest as in the United 
Kingdom (Dutch report, ChapterV, Section 5,  § 1, I). 
However,  Dutch law does contain elements of in-
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terdictory legislation (notably with regard to mul-
tilateral and,  for sorne  important branches  of in-
dustry,  individual  resale  priee  maintenance  too). 
These int·erdictory elements can be further expand-
ed by law. As in the United Kingdom, there is also 
compulsory notification,  which simplifies  supervi-
sion of all agreements made. Amendment of cartel 
agreements in such a  way as to increase competi-
tion is  regularly enforced. In 1971  the Socio-Eco-
nomic Council was asked by the government to ad-
vise  on the introduction of a  general interdictory 
principle. Enterprises in a powerful economie posi-
tion which abuse their position may have imposed 
on them for instance an obligation to supply goods 
or a  ban on conditional sales; priee provisions are 
also  possible;  obligations  to  supply  in  particular 
have alr·eady been repeatedly imposed (in cases of 
boycott). The connections with other objectives of 
economie policy emerge inter alia from the use of 
the law for purposes of priee control and from the 
possibility  of  declaring  competition-regulating 
agreements genera.Lly binding. The statu  tory organi-
zations of trade and industry already mentioned in 
this  report  can  also  lay  down  generally  binding 
ag:r~eements in restraint of competition to a limited 
extent, but these may not stand in the way of heal-
thy competition (Dutch report, Chapter V, Section 5, 
§ 2,  II and Section 3,  § 2).  For mergers, apart from 
the  supervision  of  bank  mergers by  the Nether-
lands Bank,  there are solely rules  of conduct for 
mergers of  the Socio-Economic  Council.  However, 
these serve mainly to protect the interests of share-
holders and  employees  (Dutch  report,  Chapter V, 
Section 5,  § 3,  I).  The Socio-Economic Council has, 
however, been asked about the desirability of more 
extensive merger  control.  Ali in  ali,  Dutch cartel 
legislation and competition policy seem to  occupy 
an intermediate position between that of Germany, 
France and the United Kingdom. 
The attempts to introduce cartel legislation in Italy 
hav·e  still  not  ·succeeded.  The  Bill  presented  is 
based on an interdictory principle and contains an 
important exceptional position for the public sec-
tor (Sacchi Morsiani, Chapter V, Section 5).  Belgian 
legislation  on  cartels  is  hardly  ever  applied  in 
practice (Schrans, VI-D). It is based on a principle 
of abuse. 
The difference pointed to in the policy of the Mem-
ber States with respect to competition do not yield 
such great problems from the viewpoint of Commu-
nity coordination as might be feared at first sight. 
For,  as soon as agreements in restraint of compe-
tition or abuse of economie power (in the Commis-
sion's  opinion  monopolizing  mergers,  too)  can in-
fluence commerce between the Member States, the 
rules of the Community treaties relating to compe-
tition (Articles  65  and 66  of the ECSC Treaty and 
85  and 86 of the Treaty of Rome) and directly valid in ail Member States are applicable. In this way a 
uniform poltcy can be ~argely guavanteed with re-
spe~ct to aH  competit~on-distorting  business practices 
liable to affect the proper functioning of the corn-
mon market. Many authors rightly argue that this 
proper  functioning  of  the  common  market  can 
also be hampered by sales offices and other forms 
of national cartels that do not directly relate to im-
ports  or  exports.  Coordination  of  national  cartel 
policy  with  respect  to  cartels  and  positions  or 
power with purely local effects certainly does not 
seem urgent. Article 65  of the ECSC Treaty is also 
applicable to that. The main problem that has still 
not been sufficiently settled therefore seems to be 
the gearing of national cartel policy to Community 
policy in cases coming under both Community law 
and national  law.  Problems  on this  point  cannot 
occur when under Community law an agreement in 
restraint of competition is forbidden which has been 
admitted under  national law.  In  such  a  case the 
precedence  of  the  prohibition  under  Community 
law is an established fact. As the experience of the 
pa'St period shows, it does not give Tis~e to difficulties 
in practice either. Nor will a  strict national inter-
dictory practice with regard to national cartels be 
liable to cause any difficulties. But dangers of in-
sufficient coordination threaten in cases in which a 
national  cartel  authority  forbids  international 
agreements on the strength of its national legisla-
tion, while this may perhaps appear desirable at a 
later date from the viewpoint of Community poli-
cy.  In those .cases it thus seems desirable with re-
spect  to  intended national prohibitory orders and 
ot.her orders to the same effect to introduce under 
Article 87  of the Treaty of Rome an obligation for 
national cartel authorities to inform the Commission 
and  this would have  a  limited suspensive action. 
The Jimtt.ed  suspensive  action  could  then  be  ex-
tended by the Commission in preparation of an order 
of its own. The need for regulation of this matter is 
strengthened by the accession of the United King-
dom,  sinc·e  there the application of  cartel legisla-
tion  is  in  the hands  of  an  independent tribunal. 
Problems of coordination in the relationship with 
other nationail cartel authorithies canas a rule also 
be solved without mandatory regulations, given the 
ex.isting  close  cooperation  with  the  Commission. 
Formally speaking,  problems  may, however,  arise 
in the Federal Republic too on this point on account 
of the autonomy of the decisive departments of the 
Federal Cartels Office. 
As em·erges from the various national reports, there 
is often a  close  connection between the nature of 
the cartel policy of a  country, its economie  struc-
ture and its general economie policy. In France and 
Ita.ly cartel legislation is clearly subordinate to me-
dium-term planning and also shows obvious traces 
of the latter. On the other hand, in Germany the 
foundations of the 'market economy'  exert a  con-
siderable effect precisely on  other aspects of eco-
nomie legislation. 
With regard to  the combination of  furtherance of 
competiton  and  planning  which  is  sought,  the 
Community cannot, for various reasons, pursue an 
average of the policy of the Member States. It has 
already been argued above that on the point of me-
dium-term programming the Community will have 
to follow the direction of France, Belgium and Italy 
ra  th  er th  an th  at of German  y,  the N ether  lands or 
the  United  Kingdom,  though,  otherwise  than  in 
France, for the time being a sectoral policy must be 
pursued in  exceptional  cases  only.  Conversely,  it 
seems desirable that the Community continues its 
cartel and concentration policy,  which highly fur-
thers  competition  in  comparison  to  the  average 
policy of the Member States. Now that the broad 
outlines  of  Community  cartel  and  concentration 
policy have been mainly laid  down  by numerous 
test case decisions of the Commission and by judg-
ments of the Court of Justtce, a  gr·eater quantita-
tive result of the combating of forbidden restraints 
on  competition  will  have  to  be  sought.  Further-
more,  after combating such restraints relating  di-
rectly to interstate trade, attention will also  have 
to  be  paid  to  national  agreements  hindering  the 
proper  functioning  of  the  common  market  more 
indirectly. Although, as  remarked above,  Commu-
nity law is also applicable with regard to these na-
tional cartels, a rational division of work would be 
furthered if aH  Member States had equivalent pos-
sibilities  of  combating  these  nationa1l  cartels  at 
nationallevel. Though adaptation of national cartel 
legislation to Community law does not have to be 
prescribed, it does seem desirable. The steps taken 
by France, Italy and Luxembourg in this direction 
must therefore be applauded. 
A relatively stringent cartel policy and more gener-
ally clear free-market point of departure of Com-
munity policy in the field of industry,  commerce 
and other sectors is advocated in the first.place by 
the arguments that may be adduced against cartels 
in generall. For these 'arguments, see Zij.lstra's views 
(Zijlstra report, pp. 50-55). However, this calls for 
two ·oomments.  In  the  fir·st  place the EEC  cartel 
palicy of the last ten years has .rightly m'ade it clear 
that Zij;1stra's highly negative opinon of cartels (op. 
cit.,  p.  54)  is of particular importance with respect 
to ~cartels controlling the market. Forms of collab-
oration  between  firms  that  do  not  control  the 
market need a  much more nuanced point of view. 
As long  as  the influence  on  market conditions  is 
'discernible',  the  indictory  principle  should,  it  is 
true, form the point of departure of active control. 
But this point of departure should not render use-
fui  forms  of  collaboration  impossible.  'Til'ifling 
cases'  in which the collaboration cannot harm the 
position of outsiders as a  result of the small share 
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left entirely out of consideration. The second com-
ment is that Zi}lstra's predominantly positive view 
of the merger movement (op. cit., pp. 56-57) seems 
correct only as long as mergers do not lead to mon-
opolies  or control of the ma1r ket by a  very small 
number of enterprises. At the time of publication 
of his report the danger of control of the market by 
one or a few firms was not great, but it has now be-
come  quite  real in a  number of  sectors.  On  this 
point too the Commission seems to be adopting the 
correct line of conduct. 
However, there are also a  number of special addi-
tional reasons for the Community to follow a  rela-
tively sharp anti-cartel and anti-monopoly policy. 
In the first place, the competition-furthering effect 
of imports  for the  Community as  a  whole  is less 
than for the individual Member States, which have 
a  much  higher  import  ratio.  As  a  result,  cartels 
comprising ali or practicaliy ali manufacturers of a 
certain product of the Community are less  under 
pressure from outside competition than is the case 
with cartels covering ali the producers of one Mem-
ber State. For that reason alone close supervision of 
market-controlling agreements is called for. In the 
second place, the Community institutions have in-
sufficient powers for the time being and the con-
flicting interests between the Member States with 
regard to the separate sectors of business are as a 
rule too great to make an efficient sectoral Commu-
nity policy possible. With a strong intergovernmen-
tal set-up in particular, conflicting national inter-
ests make an efficient division of work by system-
atic sectoral policy impossible as a  rule. Coordina-
tion of the micro-economie decisions by the market 
usually leads to better results.  In the third place, 
in a  number of Member States there prove to  be 
such fundamental  or  practical  objections  to  'self-
organizations'  of  business,  to  sectoral  policy  with 
the participation of business and to any other form 
of systematic  sectoral policy that  these stand  no 
chance with the present institutional relationships 
in the Community. 
7.6.  REGULATIONS REGARDING ACCESS 
TO THE MARKET (national reports, 
2nd part, Chapter V, Section 6) 
7.6.1. PHYSICAL PLANNING (national reports, 
2nd part, Chapter V, Section 6,  § 1) 
As the national reports show, legislation on physi-
cal planning displays great differences from Mem-
ber State to Member State in objectives, legal ins-
truments applied and more or less detailed manner 
of elaboration. As regards the objectives, of parti-
cular importance to our study is the extent to which 
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there  are  connections  between  physical  planning 
policy, the regional aspects of g·eneral economie pol-
icy and the new objectives in the field of protec-
tion of the environment. As regards the legal ins-
truments  used,  this  subsection  deals  exclusively 
with the mandatory regulations regarding the free-
dom of establishment. 
In this oonnection special mention should be made 
of the mandatory regulation of the establishment 
of enterprises  in the Paris  region.  Above  certain 
minimum limits, this regulation includes on the one 
hand the requirement of a  licensing permit and on 
the other a system of differentiated charges on the 
erection and extension of buildings. The connection 
with  decentralization  policy  regarding  industrial 
and other economie activities finds clear expression 
(Fromont, Chapter V, Section 6,  § 1). 
The Italian report deals in particular with legisla-
tion  in  the field  of urban planning.  This  legisla-
tion has no restrictions wi  th respect to freedom of 
industrial  establishment.  The  migratory  move-
ments (notably from  south to north)  are followed 
rather  than  guided  (Sacchi  Morsiani,  Chapter  V, 
Section  6,  §  I).  The  decentralization  of  economie 
activities  is  pursued in  another way in  the five-
year plan (investments in state holding companies, 
measures of assistance, infrastructural works). This 
has already been dealt wi  th in preceding sections. 
General  German  legislation  on  physical planning 
contains only obligations for  official  agencies and 
in particular no restric.tions on the freedom of estab-
lishment of enterprises (Zach·er,  No 377).  However, 
through land organization and regional measures of 
assistance  physical  planning  does  definitely have 
consequences  for  investment activity (Zacher,  No 
378).  And in addition there are supplementary ins-
truments for the promotion of economie activity on 
behaU of regional equi!librium and regional devel-
opment (ibid.). 
In the United Kingdom, on the other hand, there is 
a very close link between physical planning, which 
is  very  highly  developed  statutorily  (Town  and 
Country  Planning Acts),  and the economie  policy 
for  distributing industry  and  employment.  In the 
latter framework planning permission is  essential 
for, but not a guarantee of, building approval in the 
context of physical planning. The system is applied 
throughout the country (Daintith, II.5.6.1). 
Dutch physical planning legislation resembles most 
closely  tha  t  of the United  King  dom,  but the link 
with  economie  decentralization  policy  is  less 
strongly developed than in the latter country. From 
national via provincial to locallevel physical plans 
in the Netherlands become increasingly stringent in 
nature. At locallevel binding instructions are also 
given  to  enterprises,  including  licensing  systems (Dutch  report,  Chapter V,  Section  6,  §  1).  Various 
other laws relating to aspects of physical planning 
may also restrict the choïc.e of location of enterpri-
ses. Consideration is being given to introducing into 
the overpopulated west of the country a  regulation 
res·embling that :tor the Paris region. 
From  a  viewpoint  of  coordination  of  economie 
policy the aspects of physical planning that are not 
pri:mariày economie ones seem mainly of importance 
in the field of infrastructural wor  ks for transport 
and in the frontier districts. Mere plans which are 
not concerted with  each  other are still  regularly 
drawn up.  The coordination of the compilation of 
the international road plan still leaves much to be 
desired  too.  As regards the  economie  aspects,  for 
attainment of the objectives of regional policy of 
the Community it would certainly be advisable to 
strengthen the ties between physical planning for 
regional distribution of employment in ali Member 
States.  A  closer  study  of  the  experience  in  the 
Un:lted Kingdom and in the Paris region would be 
of great use  for  this.  Further,  the legislation  re-
lating to land consolidation or more generaHy the 
leg:lslation  regarding  the  lay-out,  acquisition  and 
use  of agriculturail land are of  particular import-
anc:e  to  Community agricuiltura'l structural policy. 
This specifie point will be reverted to in the section 
on sectoral  policy.  Finally,  there seems  to  be  no 
doubt that the battle against environmental pollu-
tion cannot be viewed in detachment from policy 
with respect to physical planning and regional dis-
tribution of industrial activity. When this aspect is 
also taken into account, the expectation seems jus-
tified that the systems of licences for the establish-
ment of business  which in  particular restrict the 
fre1:!dom  of choice of loc  a ti  on will come to play a 
greater part  than is  at present the  case  in  most 
countries. From a  Community point of view there 
need in principle be no objection to such a develop-
men.t. 
7.6.:2. CONTROL OF FOREIGN INVESTMENTS 
(national reports, 2nd part, Chapter V,  Section 6, 
§ 2) 
In most co un  tries examined there is a  certain de-
gree of control of foreign  investments, mainly for 
reasons of monetary or short-term economie policy 
(Zacher,  No  380,  Daintith,  II.5.6.2,  Dutch  report, 
Chapter V,  Section 6,  §  2,  and Section 4).  Only in 
France and Italy are foreign investments subject to 
control for reasons of industrial or sectoral policy 
too  ..  In France direct investments by non-nationals 
of 1~EC countries are subject to control as and when 
the  economie  situation  so  requires.  AU  foreign 
investments (also those from other Member States) 
are further subject to control for r·easons of balance 
of payments policy. The legal basis is exchange reg-
ulation  (Fromont,  Chapter  V,  Section  6,  §  2,  I). 
Financial  investments  (portfolio  investments  and 
loans) are also subject to certain controls, but these 
are connected more with capital market policy and 
balance of payments policy than with industrializa-
tion policy. The same applies to contracts for indus-
trial and certain intellectual property rights (Fro-
mont, Chapter V, Section 6, § 2, II and III). 
In Italy there is a  licensing policy particularly for 
foreign investments in the petroleum and natural 
gas industry, insurance and banking. For the rest 
foreign investments are not impeded. On the con-
trary,  they are legally encouraged  by guarantees 
with regard to the possibility of transferring prof-
its abroad (Sacchi Morsiani, Chapter V,  Section 6, 
§ 2). 
From the Community point of view it is, of course, 
first  of  ail important that  equal  opportunities of 
establishment are created for the nationals of the 
various  Member  States  together  with  ·a  ·common 
capitaJ market within the Community. As Œ"egards 
investments  coming  from  non-m·emher  countries, 
coordination,  given  the  views  in  most  Member 
States, only seems conceivable as regards the mone-
tary  and short-term  economie  policy  aspects  for 
the time being. As a basis for coordination Articles 
70  and  103  qualify  in particular. With  regard  to 
the  aspects  of  industrial  policy,  views differ  too 
strongly. 
7.6.3. QUANTITATIVE INVESTMENT CONTROL 
(national reports, 2nd  part, Chapter V, Section 6, 
§ 3) 
There is  a  statutory possibility of quantitative re-
strictions  on  domestic  investments  in  Belgium 
(Schrans, VI E),  France (Fromont, Chapter V,  Sec-
tion 6,  § 3),  the Netherlands (Chapter V,  Section 6, 
§ 3) and the United Kingdom (Daintith, II.5.6.3). For 
the German situation on this point cf. Zacher, Nos 
397  to  402.  By quantitative  restrictions of invest-
ments  are  meant  regulations  controlling  invest-
ments in number, sum invested,  productive  capa-
city,  volume  of  demand  vis-à-vis  supply  already 
available or other quantitative criteria. Instead of 
the distinction made in this report between qualita-
tive and quantitative investment restrictions, a  dis-
tinction could also be made between subjective in-
vestment restrictions (relating to the firm manage-
ment) and objective ones (business restrictions re-
lating to  the  firms).  The latter distinction,  which 
would  fit in better with German linguistic  usage 
might,  however,  give rise  to  considerable  misun-
derstandings in sorne other Member States. Conse-
quently, in accordance with the uniform grouping, 
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been employed in this section. In ali Member States 
theve are obj'ections in principle to this kind of re-
striction of freedom of establishment. However, the 
countries allow of exceptions to this principle. 
The Dutch basic law on the matter permits quanti-
tative investment restrictions for a number of spe-
cial situations. Howev·er, it has not been applied for 
years.  In Belgium a  regulation is in force  for the 
flour  industry  only.  In  France  and  the  United 
Kingdom  quantitative  investment  restrictions  are 
of importance  to only  a  few  sectors, and  then as 
part  of  a  more  comprehensive  structural  policy. 
Germany  and  Italy  do  not have  any  mandatory 
quantitative  investment  restrictions,  but  solely 
measures to encourage investment. With regard to 
public enterprises the measures in Italy may also, 
be of a  mandatory nature (Zacher,  No  381,  Sacchi 
Morsiani, Chapter V, Section 6,  § 3). As the problem 
of quantitative investment restrictions proves to be 
important in practice only as part of a  more com-
prehensive sectoral policy or in connection with the 
question of public enterprises, from the Community 
point of view it will have to be solved notably in 
that connection. As a  rule, the functioning  of the 
common  market  will  make  national  quantitative 
investment  restrictions  for  controlling  productive 
capacity  outside the framework  of  a  Community 
sectoral policy fairly meaningless. For the national 
legislator is not capable of restraining the produc-
tive  ,capacity  in  or  imports  from  other  Member 
States.  Effective  control  of  productive  capacity 
would  be  possible  only  at  Community  leve!,  but 
seems very difficult to realize politicaHy and organ-
i2Jationally outside the sectors of agriculture, trans-
port and perhaps ·energy too. 
In sectors of small and medium-sized business (e.g. 
pharmacies)  and  other  sectors  with  purely  local 
markets  (e.g.  restrictions  on the  establishment of 
department stores in small municipalities) quanti-
tative  restrictions  on  establishment present prob-
lems  from  a  Community point  of view mainly in 
connection  with  the  right  of  establishment.  The 
fundamental  objections  of  various Member States 
that in  those  sectors  too  a  harmonized  policy  of 
quantitative  establishment  control  is  hardly  con-
ceivable from the political point of view. Summing 
up, therefore, it seems advisable to reject in prin-
ciple  quantitative  r,estrictions  of  the  freedom  of 
establishment outside the framework of Community 
sectoral policy. For special situations exceptions to 
this principle may be permitted, provided that the 
objectives of the Treaty of Rome in the field of the 
right of establishment are not endangered as a  re-
suit. According to the national reports, these excep-
tions will p:robably not be numerous. Italian legis-
lation wi  th respect to the retail trade is  discussed 
in the following subsection. 
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7.6.4. QU  ALIT  AT  IVE ESTABLISHMENT 
REQUIREMENTS (national  reports,  2nd  part, 
Chapter V,  Section 6,  §  4) 
On the strength of the principle of the freedom to 
conduct a  business which has already been discus-
sed severa! times,  France has persona! qualitative 
requirements  for  establishement  or  rather prohi-
bitions on carrying on a business mainly for objec-
tified  reasons  of public safety,  morais  or  health. 
Reasons of public safety or morais also cover mat-
ters which elsewhere are  ranked under standards 
of  good  character  or  reliability,  such  as  a  clean 
record with regard to certain kinds of oUences. For 
certain professions, such as bankers, insurers or in-
surance agents, there are stricter requirements of 
this kind (Fromont,  Chapter V,  Section  6,  §  4,  I). 
Unlike sorne other Member States, France does not 
make  a  clear  distinction  between  the qualitative 
establishment requirements .relating to persons and 
to  business installations.  In particular, reasons  of 
public  safety or health can lead to  both kinds  of 
establishment requirements.  Thus  in  this  context 
the French  report mentions licensing  systems  for 
protecting persons living in the vicinity of danger-
ous  or  objectionable  factory  installations  (a  law 
dating  from  1971,  amended  severa!  times  since 
then) in addition to laws relating to the production 
of war material, private detective agencies and  a 
dozen other industrial and  business  activities.  Li-
C·ensing systems on grounds of economie policy exist 
only  in  connection  with  a  more  comprehensive 
sectoral policy (Fromont, Chapter V,  Section 6,  § 4. 
II). lt should be mentioned that on the strength of 
the constitutional pecularities of France dealt with 
in Chapter II ali the restrictions of the freedom of 
establishment  mentioned  are  based  on  a  formai 
law. 
Germany proceeds from the principle of freedom of 
choice of occupation laid down in Article 12  of the 
Constitution. The Federal Constitutional Court has 
derived  from  this  that access  to  a  profession  or 
occupation may not in principle  be made subject 
to  subjective  or  objective  restrictions.  On  the 
'Strength of this principle, certain restrictions of the 
freedom  to  conduct  a  business  are  more  readily 
accepted than restrictions of the freedom of estab-
lishment.  Furthermore,  subjective  guarantees  of 
public order referring to persons are more readily 
accepted  than  objective establishment  regulations 
on the strength of circumstances beyond the control 
of the person concerned. The latter are considered 
admissible  only as  an ultimate  remedy if  funda-
mental Community values cannot be protected in 
:sorne  other way  (Zacher,  No  382).  With  regard to 
independent  economie  activities the  constitutional 
principle of the freedom of choice of occupation is 
supplemented by the principle  of  the freedom  to conduct a business, which has been laid down since 
as long ago as  1869  in Article 1 of the Industrial 
Code.  Like  the  French  Code  Civil  the  Industrial 
Code does,  however, allow of statutory exceptions 
and restrictions with r·espect to the principle (Za-
cher,  No  384).  Carrying on a  business may be for-
hidden. This is notably possible on account of unre-
liability or the danger of impairment of central le-
gal values, and also in accordance with a proposed 
legal amendment for  the protection of other very 
great general interests or of the workers. The con-
duet of business may also be subject to a licensing 
system  (Zacher,  No  388).  In the broad outlines  of 
elaboration too German law seems in principle to 
be  closely  related  to  French legal  views  on  this. 
The German report does,  however,  create the im-
pre·ssion that German law is more varied and elab-
o~ated in greater detail and that requtrements of 
vocational training or professional ability and sol-
veney requirements play a  somewhat greater part 
(Zacher, Nos 396 and 398). The number of regulated 
professions and bu,siness activities also seems grea-
ter in Germany  than in  France.  The report even 
explains that an exhaustive survey has never been 
attempted either by  the  authorities or  by  econo-
mis:ts.  The report itself therefore only gives exam-
ples, though these ar·e numerous in themselves (Za-
cher,  No  388).  The German parallel to the French 
Public Nuisance Act of 1917  is  to be found in Ar-
ticle  16  of  the  Industrial  Code:  'The  erection  of 
installations which, as a  result of their location or 
the nature of the business  premises, may involve 
considerable disadvantages, dangers or nuisance for 
the owners or occupants of neighbouring land shall 
be  subject  to  the  permission  of  the  competent 
authorities'.  But in  addition  there  are  numerous 
speeial  statutory requirements  made of  industrial 
installations (Zacher, No 397). 
As has already been remarked in the discussion of 
quantitative investment  restrictions,  in  particular 
every  'criterion  of  need'  is  disputed  with  special 
vigour  by  jurisprudence  under  A·rticle  12  of  the 
German Constitution (Zach·er, No 399). Nevertheless 
in the inter·est of exceptionally important Commu-
nity goods there are exceptions to the prohibition of 
criteria of need which exists above ali in the trans-
port sector  (Zacher,  No  400).  The  German  report 
BJlso  contains valuable information on the regulation 
of the relation between private freedom of estab-
lishment and the existence of public utiUties,  and 
further  on  regulations  with  regard  to  activities 
conn·ected  with the e::x:ercise  of public powei"  (Za-
cher, Nos  403  to 406).  As comparative material on 
these  last two points is  absent  from  most  of the 
other reports, they will not be dealt with further. 
Belgian  legislation  on  this  subject  resembles  in 
principl·e French law and likewise proceeds from a 
statutory principle of  freedom  to conduct a  busi-
ness.  Otherwise  than  in  Germany,  pub[tcation  is 
regularly made of the business activities for which 
a  licence  is  required in  advance  (Schrans,  VI  E). 
Requirements of professional ability play an even 
somewhat greater part  in  Belgium  than  in  Ger-
many (ibid.). 
Requirements of good character or financial sound-
ness are, on the other hand, the main criteria in the 
United  Kingdom  for  qualitative  requirements  for 
carrying  on  a  business.  Requirements  of  profes-
sional abHity for admittance to certain branches of 
activity seem to play no significant part there (Dain-
tith, II.5.6.4). 
The situation in Italy and the Netherlands is quite 
different  from  that  in  the  countries  mentioned 
above.  According  to  the  Italian  report,  in  Italy 
licensing systems mainly play a part in connection 
with sectora;I  policy  (Sacchi  Morsiani,  Chapter V, 
Section 6,  § 4,  and Chapter VI).  Otherwise than in 
Belgium,  Germany,  France  and the United King-
dom  they thus primarily serve  objectiv·es  of eco-
nomie  (sectoral)  policy.  In  the  field  of  the  retail 
trade Italy ·also has a licensing system operated by 
local authorities on the basis of a criterion of need. 
However,  revision  of  this  system,  which  greatly 
hinders  modernization  of  the  Italian  distribution 
system, is in preparation (Sacchi Morsiani, Chapter 
V, Section 7). 
In the Netherlands too establishment legislation is 
primarily regarded  as an instrument of  economie 
policy which is  distinguished rather sharply from 
the legislation on public order. Except with regard 
to  admittance  to  sorne  liberal  prof·essions,  where 
the situation is  different, in the existing licensing 
systems for  enterpreneurs or  enterprises require-
ments of good character therefore play hardly any 
part (Dutch report, Chapter V,  Section 6,  § 4).  The 
legislation for protection of public health or safety 
or other considerations of public order - such as 
the Dutch law on nuisance- is only exceptionally 
marged with other restrictions  of the  freedom  to 
conduct a  business.  It is  consequently dealt with 
separately in the Dutch report, Chapter V, Section 8). 
The  fundamentally  different  background  to  the 
economie policy of Dutch establishment legislation 
outlined  here thus  also  entails  practical differ·en-
ces.  Perhaps it has something to  do  with the  ab-
sence of a written fundamental right of freedom to 
conduct a  business.  However, in  political practice 
this  freedom  has  al  ways  been  regarded  in  the 
Netherlands too as a  valuable possession not to be 
treated  lightly.  The  number  of  sectors  for  which 
there ·are licensing systems seems on balance to be 
less th  an in Germany and France. The N ether  lands 
too rejects in principle the use of a criterion of eco-
nomie need. 
Since the Netherlands, as mentioned above, has no 
five-year  pl
1ans,  Dutch  qualitative  establishment 
legislation must not be considered within the frame-
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Germany terminology it is much rather a  part of 
the  'Dauerordnung'.  The  principal  economie  ob-
jectives pursued will be briefly summarized here. 
The  first group  of laws contains primarily requi-
rements of professional ability or other guarantees 
of the leve! of conduct of a business in the interests 
of the branch of trade or industry itself (Business 
Licensing Law 1954,  Retail Trade  Licensing  Law, 
Insuranc-e  Agency Law, see Dutch report, Chapter 
V,  Section  6,  §  4,  I).  A  second group  of laws lay 
dawn requirements for admittance to and often also 
for  the exercise of economie activities for  protec-
tion of the public (Dutch report, Chapter V,  Section 
6,  § 4,  II).  This group includes the laws relating to 
the insurance  business,  sorne  provisions  from  the 
Credit System (Supervision) Law, a  few provisions 
from the Hire Purchase System Law, the Money-
lenders Law, the Pawnshop Law, the Pensions Funds 
and Saving Funds  Law,  the Law containing pro-
visional me  as  ures re  la  ting to building societies, the 
Law  on  supplying  labour  1965  and  the  Labour 
Placement Law 1930.  Objectives of public arder in 
establishment  regulations  for  trade  and  industry 
are pursued only in the Provision of Medicines Law, 
the  Cinema Law,  the  Drink  and  Catering  Trade 
Law and Artide 437,  paragraph 4,  of the Criminal 
Code  regarding  itinerant  waterborne  buying  and 
vending (Dutch report, Chapter V, Section 6,  § 4, III). 
Summarizing,  there  are  considerable  differences 
between the qualitative standards of the Member 
States with regard to the possibility of conducting 
a business. These differences are based on a funda-
m·ental difference of opinion. Particularly in France 
and  Germany,  the  legally  - in  Germany  also 
constitutionally- established principle of the free-
dom to conduct a business has led to restrictions of 
this  freedom  being based primarily on considera-
tions  of  public  arder.  N  otably  in  Ital  y  and the 
N ether  lands,  on the other hand,  such restrictions 
primarily find a basis in considerations of economie 
policy.  Belgium  and the United  Kingdom  occupy 
an intermediate position.  The differences in point 
of departure have also led to major differences in 
elaboration. To start with,  the point of departure 
of public arder is  more likely to lead not only to 
preventive supervision  with  an  aocompanying  li-
censing system but also to possibilities of repressive 
measures intervening in further oonduct of a busi-
ness and p.ossibly for forbidding  it.  In the S'econd 
place,  the  differences  in point  of  departure  may 
lead to  differences in determination of the sectors 
for  which  regulation  is  introduced.  In  the  third 
place, in the Belgian, German and French systems 
ther·e is no clear dividing line between regulations 
re  garding  access  to  the  market  for  reasons  and 
requirements  of  public arder  with  regard  to  the 
business installa  ti  on, the mann  er of carrying on the 
business and so on. lt  is consequently not surprising 
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that on this point of national legislation a uniform 
systematic arrangement proved unattainable in the 
national reports.  A  more important aspect is that 
the coordination of aU  provisions concerning access 
to  nonwage-earning  activities  and  the  exercise 
thereof, as prescribed by Article 57 of the Treaty of 
Rome,  is  considerably handicapped  by the  above 
differences in objective, method, scope and content 
of those provisions. 
These  difficulties  are  further  aggravated  by  the 
f·act that in a number of Member States there proves 
to  be a  ·large number of those provisions of pub-
lic order, although this does not exc•lude the appli-
cability of Article 57,  paragraph 2,  if those regula-
tions are of a general nature applicable to bath the 
country's  own  nationals  and to  aliens.  Article  56 
relates  only  to  specifie  regulations  for  aliens. 
Examples of such specifie regulations may be found 
in Fromont, Chapter V, Section 8, III.2. 
Finally, when one reads in the German report that 
in Germany even chimney sweeps are charged with 
activities in exercise of public authority, it becomes 
olear that application of the e~ceptive provision for 
activities in exercise of public authority (Article 55 
of the Treaty of Rom·e) has led to many difficulties. 
For the time being it seems sensible, having regard 
to the fun  dam  en  tal differences of opinion emerging 
from the legislation of the Member States on this 
point,  to  continue  the pragmatic  approach  of  the 
Commission  and  the Council.  Once  again equiva-
lence of effect of the measures taken seems more 
important than equivalence of applied criteria and 
methods of intervention. It does, however, seem ad-
visable to aim in accordance with a uniform classi-
fication into sectors at better publicity with regard 
to  ali  licensing  systems  existing  in  the  Member 
States with reference to acc·ess  to and exercise of 
non-wage-earning activities. It further seems advis-
able to aim at a better coordination of the various 
licensing systems that may exist side by side for a 
given establishment. Perhaps it will not be possible 
to  channel  together  aU  the  licensing  procedures 
that have to be gone through for one given estab-
Hshment.  Nuisance  legislation,  physical  planning, 
environmental protection and other regulations on 
consideraHons of pubUc safety or public hea.Uh are, 
however, very clos•ely interconnect·ed in thetr objec-
tives. For this reason procedures for application for 
licences should not be organized entirely indepen-
dently of one  another,  :at  !east in  these fields  of 
legis•la ti  on. 
7.6.5. GRANTING  CONCESSIONS  FOR  NATURAL 
RESOURCES (national reports, 2nd part, 
Chapter V,  Section 6,  §§ 5 and 6) 
In view  of natural  circumstances  and  considera-
tions of technical and economie rationality, only a 
limited number of operators can participate in the prospecting for and above ali the production of the 
principal 'subterranean natural resources (coal, pe-
troleum, natural gas, the most important ores and 
a  :few  other minerais like salt). Moreover, in bath 
the  production  of  minerais  underground  and  in 
surface workings the legal relation to the owner of 
the surface must be regulated. Finally, guarantees 
for various Community interests tend to be created 
here. In this field ali Member States therefore have 
more  or  less  comparable  general  concession  sys-
tems. In addition, the Dutch report mentions sepa-
rate statutory concession systems for peat digging, 
dr.aining  and  impoldering,  excavations and water 
extraction,  while  the  French  report  refers  to  a 
concession  system  for  waterfalls  (chutes  d'eau). 
The I talian report  also  deals  wi  th the concession 
systems for the use of public land. 
The most important differences  in the  legislation 
con.cern the regulation of the manner and extent of 
state  participation  in  the  working  or  the  profit 
derived from it. This varies from an exclusive work-
inl~  right  for  hydrocarbon  compounds  (Italy)  or 
coal  (United Kingdom)  for  a  state enterprise,  via 
state  participation  rights  in  private  operation 
(Dutch Mining Law for the Continental Shelf),  to 
fixed  royalties  (the most usual  system). Partly in 
connection with the proviso  for regulation  of the 
right  of property in Article  222  of the Treaty of 
Rome,  the  Community  will  have  to  accept  these 
differences. 
On the  other  hand,  from  a  Community point  of 
view there must of course be supervision to ensure 
that in the granting of concessions there is no dis-
crimination  on  grounds  of  nationality.  Further, 
ca:re  must be taken that no  conditions or obliga-
tions  are  imposed  on  the  holders  of  concessions 
which  lead  to  discrimination  in  accordance  with 
nationality orto the favouring of certain groups of 
industrial customers. Finally, other conditions may 
exist with respect to marketing of the minerais pro-
du.ced that give rise to coordination problems. This 
will be reverted to when discussing the legislation 
in the field of energy policy (Chapter III.8.3 below). 
7.'7.  REGULATION OF SPECIFIC ASPECTS 
OF MARKET BEHAVIOUR (national 
reports, 2nd part, Chapter V, Section 7) 
The regulations discussed in this subsection contain 
notably  rules  with  regard  to  market  behaviour 
without which freedom of competition might have 
so1:!ially  undesirable consequences for  the compet-
ing  business  themselv,es  or  their  employees,  for 
other branch·es of industry or for customers. Other 
regulations primarily serve the transparency of the 
market. As ali regulations dealt with in this subsec-
tian relate only to secondary aspects of market be-
haviour, then by definition they leave the principal 
possibilities  of  competition  (with regard  to quan-
tity, quality, priees and conditions of delivery and 
payment) intact. Harmonization thus does not seem 
particularly  urgent  in  general.  The  relative  ur-
geney of harmonization of certain aspects of this 
category is broadly indicated below. 
7.7.1. UNF  AIR COMPETITION 
A  separate study in depth ha·s  ~already been pub-
lished on this subject with proposais for harmoniza-
tion (Ulmer, The law on unfair competition in the 
Member States of the European Economie Commu-
nity). It will therefore not be discussed at length 
here. On account of the close connection with cartel 
legislation, part of the legislation in this field has 
been dealt in various national reports under that 
category (Zacher, Nos. 427  to 443, Fromont, Chapter 
V,  Section 5,  § I).  A  distinction must be made be-
tween general rules in the field of unfair competi-
tion  and  special  regulations  on  certain forms  of 
market behaviour. Only the latter may be regarded 
as  part of  economie  legislation  in  the  narrower 
sense. Examples in most Member States are formed 
by the legislation on the  opening hours  of shops, 
on clearance sales and on giving extras, bonuses or 
discounts. In France and Belgium resale at a loss is 
also forbidden (Fromont, Chapter  V, Section 5, § 1 to 
2,  and Schrans, VIF). In the United Kingdom the 
only specifie legislation in the field of this subsec-
tion is that relating to shop hours. (Daintith, II.5.7.). 
Insofar as the specifie regulations dealt with here 
relate only to the retail trade, differences may lead 
above  ali in the frontier districts to international 
distortion of competition. Harmonization of the leg-
islation  relating  to  the  giving  of  presents  seems 
the most urgent in this category, since in this field 
differences in legislation may also have consequen-
ces  outside  the frontier districts.  One could envi-
sage on the one hand gift campaigns in interstate 
trade (e.g.  by producers or mail arder firms),  and 
on the other the harming of enterprises whose nor-
mal business is selling products given as presents. 
7.7.2. REGULATION FOR CONSUMER PROTECTION 
Som·e  of  the  regulations  dealt  with  under  7.7.1. 
serve to protect both competitors and customers. In 
addition, in ali Member States there are rules for 
competition which serve primari:ly or even exdu-
sively to protect customers. The regulations in hire 
purchase legislation aim·ed  at consumer protection 
should be included among these. Others that belong 
to  it are the French and Belgian bans  on condi-
tional sales and snowball sales systems (Fromont, 
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regulations for countering misleading of the public 
in the field of priees and qualities also form part of 
this  group  (Fromont,  Chapter  V,  Section  7,  II, 
Schrans,  VI  F,  Daintith,  II.5.8).  Harmonization  of 
legislation in these fields  seems  just as urgent as 
harmonization of  the  legislation on free  gift  sys-
tems. 
7.7.3. REGULATIONS FOR FURTHERING 
TRANSPARENCY OF THE MARKET 
Apart from the  possibilities of laying  down priee 
indication regulations which occur in most Member 
States, in this connection mention should be made 
of the organization of trade fairs,  public markets, 
produoe, stock, insurance .and freight exchanges and 
auctions (Zacher, Nos 414  and 415).  As this subject 
- with the exception of the stock exchanges- has 
not been dealt with in most national reports, it will 
not be discussed further here. Discriminatory pro-
visions in stock  exchange regulations  with regard 
to the negotiability of shares and other securities 
from other Member States must, of course, be done 
away with a:s part of the liberalization of the move-
ment  of capitaL  Regulations conoerning  the  divi-
sion  of commodities  into economie  quality classes 
(commercial  classification  legislation)  are  dealt 
with only in the German report (Zacher,  No  421). 
The 1atter group of regulations can naturally ham-
per imports of products from other Member States. 
See for the problems arising in this question Chap-
ter III.  7  .8.2 below as well. 
7.8.  REGULATIONS OF PUBLIC ORDER 
(national reports, 2nd part, Chapter V, 
Section 8) 
U  nder  thi,s  heading  the  na  tionaJ  reports  in sorne 
cases  discuss  general  regulations  of  private  law, 
crimina:l law and police  law,  and  a1so  traffic and 
building regu}aHons (Zacher, Nos 425 and 426).  Also 
mentioned  are  special  laws  for  countering  fraud 
(Fromont, Chapter V,  Section 8,  II, Daintith, II.5.8) 
or for protection of public order and morais (Fro-
mont, Chapter V,  Section 8,  III) or for protection of 
national art treasures (Fromont, Chapter V,  Section 
8,  IV).  On  account  of  their  great  importance  to 
Community  coordination  of economie policy or to 
the freedom of interstate trade, only two groups of 
regulations  will  be further  discussed  here.  These 
groups compris.e on the one hand the rules concern-
ing protection of the environment and on the other 
product  regulations  on  considerations  of  public 
safety or health. The product regulations relating 
to definition and economie quality can also best be 
dealt with in this connection (Fromont, Chapter V, 
Section 8, II). 
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7.8.1. PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT 
Legislation for protection of the environment is al-
ready very highly developed in German  y  (Zacher, 
Nos  427  to  443),  the  Netherlands  (Dutch  report, 
Chapter V,  Section 8,  § I)  and the United Kingdom 
(Daintith, II.5.8.e). In France too, in addition to the 
general  law  of  1917  for  the  protection  of  the 
surroundings  of  industrial  installations  against 
nuisance, there is legislation in the fie1d of air and 
water  pollution  (Fromont,  Chapter  V,  Section  8, 
V).  In Italy the basic law in the field of air pollu-
tion is still applied in practice only with respect to 
the heating of houses,  while general legislation in 
the f1eld  of water pollution is still absent (Sacchi 
Morsiani, Chapter V, Section 8). 
As remarked in the statement of 22  March 1972  of 
the Commission  to the Council  regarding  a  Com-
munity programme  in  the field  of ,environmental 
protection, the latter problem confronts the Com-
munties and the Member States with major new 
problems. In the first place, technical collaboration 
and  coordination  of  the standards  of  permissible 
poHution is  particuiarly necessary with regaro.  to 
'trans-frontier'  air  and  water  pollution.  This  re-
quires -in  various combinations - among other 
things close cooperation between the riparian states 
of  the  international  rivers,  the  North  Sea  and 
the Mediterranean. As this cooperation will not al-
ways involve aU  Member States and will on occa-
sion ,a,lso  involve non-member countries,  it seems 
conceivable that the Communities wHl in part leave 
this  technical  cooperation  to  other  bodies  than 
Community institutions, with a  guarantee of their 
vital interests. The connection with other aspects of 
Community policy does not seem so great here that 
the Community could not leave the details of the 
technical  cooperation  within  the  framework  of 
general gu1delines to other organization or forms of 
collaboration, for instance for the Rhine, the Meuse, 
the Moselle,  the North Sea and the Mediterranean 
r,espectively. The same applies mutatis mutandis to 
the technic,al cooperation and coordination of meas-
ures in the neld of air pollution by industrial in-
stallations. Again within the framework of c-ertain 
general guidelines this can be ilargely left to bilat-
eral  cooperation  between  the  Member  States  in-
volved on each occasion. Air pollution and further 
polluting  effects  of  marketable products  will,  on 
the other hand, hav,e to be combatted by harmoni-
zation of the  national regulations  with respect to 
the products concerned. The m,easures to be  ta~en 
in this respect will, after aU,  have to be geared to 
one another down to details, in order to avoid tech-
nical obstacles to interstate trade. 
A  second aspect of protection  of the environment 
relates to  calculation of the costs of the environ-
mental  prot,ection  measures.  Here  the  economie aspects prevail and the Community must therefore 
fully accept the responsibility in principle. Differ-
ent principles in this field might lead to severe in-
terstate distortion of competition in the conditions 
for  establishment and  production.  In this  respect 
the Commission concurs with the point of view that 
these social costs must be assigned to the products 
or activities that have caused the costs.  However, 
in its proposai of  22  March 1972  the  Commission 
rightly  comments that the Œ"equirement  of  undis-
torted competition in no way requires complete har-
monization of all air and water pollution standards. 
In view of the cumulative effects  of international 
air and water pollution by industry coordination of 
the measures to be taken is definitely necessary to 
that extent. This has already been mentioned. Inso-
far as  no external effects occur in other Member 
States, it is,  however, a sound idea for the Member 
States to  gear their measures to the differing de-
grees of air, water and soil pollution existing in the 
various territories of the Community. In that case 
these differences in m·easures  cannot yield distor-
tion of competition any more than other differences 
in natural conditions of competition. 
In the  third place,  to  EEC will,  according  to  the 
Commission's  proposai,  have to  take the environ-
mental protection  aspect into account  in its corn-
mon commercial, agricultural and transport policy. 
The same applies to its supervision of national aid 
measures, social policy, investment policy in the as-
soeiated developing countTies, energy policy, region-
al po:Hcy,  industri:al policy and policy with regard 
to research and developmen  t. 
Finally, it is clear that the problem is also of special 
importance to the other two Communities. In con-
nection with previous parts of this report, it seems 
useful also  to  point to  two  more general aspects. 
The first  is  the  clos·e  connection  between protec-
tion  of  the  environment,  physical  planning  and 
regional policy that should exist not only in an eco-
nomie and technical sense but also in an adminis-
trative sense. A  large number of m•easures,  prohi-
bitory standards and  licensing systems  and other 
mandatory regulations on the one hand and meas-
ures of  atd,  charges and other financi<al  measures 
on  the other must be combined into  a  well-coor-
dinated  and  efftcienhly  organized  body  of  meas-
ures. Presumably in this connectilon central coordi-
nation of policy (at Community and nationallevel) 
will have  to  be  accompanied by a  usually highly 
territorially decentraUzed implem·entation. The pow-
ers in sorne of the fields of policy mentioned, not-
ably that of physica·l planning and nuisance legis-
l!a1:.ion,  •can hardly be used writh full knowledge un-
less this 1is done at a very ~local, decentraLiz·ed leve!. 
Probably the combination with regional or national 
procedures for obtaining licences  can also be best 
organized at this leve!. In this connectton reference 
has already been made to British experience. In the 
Netherlands the coordination of the application of 
the various licensing systems with  respect  to  the 
establishment of very large firms  is organized by 
what  is  called  a  'covenant  procedur·e'  (Dutch  re-
port,  Chapter V,  Section 8,  I,  III-9). In this pro-
cedure the various agencies concemed with estab-
lishment agree on the same Hne of oonduct. 
The second general aspect re  la  tes to the connection 
with medium-term  economie  policy.  Protection of 
the environment makes a  relatively heavy call on 
national income and as a  rule the costs are passed 
on in the  priees. Environmentalpro.tection win there-
fore  tend to ·raise  priees. It is of essential impor-
tance  that it does  not further aggravate inflation 
indirectly via wage indexation and that aUowance 
is made for the claims of environmental protection 
in the growth of  other  categories  of expenditure. 
This can best be considered as part of medium-term 
economie  policy,  and it once again underlines the 
necessity of calling in management and labour. For 
here both growth policy and incomes policy are at 
stake. 
7.8.2. COMMODITY LEGISLATION 
Most  of the reports contain brief data (the Dutch 
report  goes  into  detail)  on  the  general  statutory 
framework  in  which  regulations  relating  to  the 
composition, the designation, the packaging and the 
use of certain products can be promulgated for rea-
sons of public health or safety, sometimes also for 
reasons of consumer information or rationalization. 
Differences between the standards laid down and 
the method of supervision may, as the rea  der will 
be  aware,  lead to  very  considerable  obstacles  to 
interstate trade, and it is therefore understandable 
that the harmonization of this  kind  of  regulation 
forms the most •extensive part of the Community's 
activities for the harmonization of legislation. 
The  technical and  methodical problems  arising in 
these harmonization activiti-es  cannot be discussed 
here. From a legal point of view three distinctions 
seem of particular importance. The first distinction 
is that between regulations of public order, which 
are allowed by Article 36 of the Treaty of Rome to 
hamper imports or exports, and commercialization 
regulations  of  a  different, notably economie  kind, 
which are not allowed by that article to hamper ex-
ports or imports. In the first case only harmoniza-
tion of legislation under Article 100  (or 43)  of the 
Treaty of Rome ·can present a  solutton. In the se-
cond case recourse may also be had to Article 30 or 
Article 36.  Otherwise than one might expect on the 
strength of the text of Article 36 at first sight, suc-
cessful action can also be taken before the compe-
tent court against  much of the import-hampering 
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and intellectual property on the strength of Article 
36  or 85 of the Treaty of Rome. On this point there 
is an extensive jurisprudence of the Court of Jus-
tice, to which reference may be made. The second 
distinction is that between on the one hand manda-
tory regulations of public order and on the other 
indirectly mandatory standardization of qualitative 
regulations  worked  out  by private  organizations. 
The la  t~ter standards may acqui!~e  an indire.ctly bind-
ing character for instance because the authorities, 
functioning as a  principal, refer to them (Fromont, 
II-5.8.B.b).  Even  if  the  authorities  make  these 
standards  binding  but  leave  the  laying-down  of 
them to private organizations, the obstacles to in-
terstate  trade  proceeding  from  differences  from 
country to country cannot simply be eliminated by 
harmonization of the l·egislation under Article 100 
of the Treaty of Rome.  Rather, it is primarily of 
importance here that  the  private  standardization 
institutions of the various Member Stats arrive at 
harmonization  of the standards or at Community 
standards.  Consequently,  development  is  in  that 
direction.  Meanwhile,  a  closer  comparison  seems 
desirable with respect to the legal prot-ectton exist-
ing in the v·arious Member States against actualiy 
discriminating standards of the private institutions. 
It appears from a  recent German publication that 
gaps can easily come into being on this point (Ul-
rich,  Rechtsschutz  gegen  überbetriebliche  Normen 
der  Technik,  Fe~dinand  Enke  Verlag,  Stuttgart 
1971).  The third important legal distinction is that 
between the harmonization of  the content  of  the 
material standards  and  the  solutions  of  the pro-
blems of the competence of the national authorities 
in their application. The principle of territoriality 
with  regard to  actions  by  the  authorities  means 
that only a  system of  joint recognition  of acts of 
control and administrative o!I'tders can  prevent  double 
checks  or  no  checks  at  ali,  which  in  their  turn 
tend to hamper imports. 
8.  Mandatory sectoral regulation 
(national reports, 2nd part, Chapter VI) 
8.1.  AGRICULTURE AND RELATED 
SECTORS 
The most regulated sector in ali Member States is 
agriculture.  The material  content  of  the national 
policy of market  regulation  is largely determined 
by Community agricultural policy.  For this sector 
the national  reports  are therefore  particularly of 
importance  for  obtaining  a  rough  idea  of  agri-
cultural structural policy, which is still v·ery inade-
quately  harmonized.  They are  also  of importance 
for obtaining insight into the very different ways of 
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implementing the common agricultural policy. Man-
datory regulations of importance to the structural 
reforms in agriculture may be found: 
in  the  Netherlands  notably  in  the  Agricultural 
Holding  Law  (report,  Chapter  VI,  Section I,  §  2) 
and the Land Consolidation Law  (~eport, Chapter 
VI, Section I, § 3); 
in France notably in leashold legislation, the legis-
lation on the inheritance of agricultural land, su-
pervision of and encouragement of the expansion of 
farm  s·ize  (Fromont,  Chapter VI,  Section 1,  I  and 
II) and the legis:lation on the various forms of co-
operation between :farmers  (Fromont,  Chapter VI, 
Section 1, III); 
in Germany notably in land legislation and within 
the framework  of  aid  measures  (Zacher,  No  454) 
while; 
in Italy structural policy seems to be conducted al-
most exclusively by means of aid measures (Sacchi 
Morsiani, Chapter VI, III). 
Of course measures of assistance also play an im-
portant part in agricultural structural po  licy in the 
other Member  States,  but in  this  subsection  the 
mandatory sectoral regulations are primarily con-
sidered. 
The national  reports confirm  the impression that 
the  mandatory  instruments  of  structural  policy 
are most developed in France. 
Two further  remarks also  seem important within 
the context of this study. In the first place, in most 
Member States so many different aspects of agri-
culture are regulated that it is of great importance 
to coordinate the effects of the various regulatory 
measur·es. 
Market  regulations  has  its  ·effects  on  structural 
dev·elopm,ent.  Conversely,  the different structural 
measu~es can  influence market  conditions and in 
certain circumstances distort them. The structural 
policy of the Member States wi:ll therefore have to 
be much more strongly coordinated at Community 
leve!. This appUes in particular to ali the different 
kinds  of  measures  of  assistance,  since  this  in-
strument occupies  a  very important  place  in  ali 
Member States. However, attainment of the Com-
munity's objectives  in the field  of farm  size may 
for  instance  also  be  hampered  by  leasehold 
law  and  land  legislation.  This  too  may  give 
rise  to  unequal  conditions  of  competition.  The 
second  remark  concerns  the  importance  of  the 
agricultural sector and the relation between agri-
cultura~l market policy and inter ·a.J.ia  monetary pol-
ky, common commwcial policy and general income 
distribution.  These  factors,  and  also  the  connec-
tian between agricultural structural policy and re-
gional industrialization policy and protection of the environment, make it an urgent matter that agri-
cultural policy as a  whole be fitted better than up 
to now into medium-term economie policy. 
8.2.  TRANSPORT 
The second sector highly organized in ali Member 
States is  that of transport. Within this overall re-
port reference must be made to the national reports 
for the fairly considerable differences between the 
national legislations. As is the case for agriculture, 
the Treaty of Rome offers a  clear legal basis for a 
common policy on  this.  However,  in practice this 
common policy is still very inadequately developed. 
This is harmful not only for a rational int~ernation­
al division of work in this  ~important service sec-
tor itself but also  for  the optimal development of 
interstate movement of goods. It further gives rise 
to sometimes considerable distortion of competition. 
For general economie and monetary policy at Com-
munity  level,  transport policy is  important  above 
ali in connection with regional policy. 
8.3.  ENERGY 
For the differences in legislation in this sector too 
reference  may  be  made  to  the  national  reports. 
Coordination  of the general  energy policy  of the 
Member States as part of a  common energy policy 
is, on the strength of the Treaties, possible only on 
a strongly liberal basis, but does entail the need for 
a  fairly large number of harmonization measures. 
Certainty of long-term supply at the Jowest  pos-
sible priee, equal acœss of aH  customers to the pd-
mary sources  of  energy and  equivalent rules  for 
competition between the  various  kinds  of  energy 
should be the principal objectives here. On account 
of  the great  dependence on imports,  the common 
commercial policy in this sector will have to play 
an  important  role  vis-à-vis  the  producing  coun-
tries. It is  also  the condition for the final adjust-
ment of the French regulations governing crude oil. 
In the event of a shortage of certain forms of ener-
gy Article 103, paragraph 4,  allows of every neces-
sary degree of shortage measures. However, up to 
now it has not been necessary to go  further than 
laying down regulations in the field of stockbuild-
ing.  Measwres  of  intervention with regaro  to  in-
vestment policy can if necessary be based on Art-
icle 235  of the Treaty of Rome. The same applies 
to  the  encouragement  of  new  initiatives  in  the 
fields of exploration ·and working. 
Between energy policy and medium- and long-t~erm 
economie programming there is again a very obvi-
ous link. The possibilities of growth of the economy 
of the Member States after ali depend in part on 
the possibilities  of  the  energy  supply.  There  are 
also  close  ties with the problems of  protection of 
the environment, transport policy, industrial policy 
and other aspects of Community policy. Finally, a 
difference  in  energy  priees  leads  to  sometimes 
severe distortion of competition. 
8.4.  OTHER SECTORS 
Other sectors for which in the section on binding 
sectoral regulations of the national reports a  com-
prehensive, interrelated policy is stated are: 
(a) house-building  (Fromont,  Chapter  VI,  Section 
4,  Zacher, No 456); 
(b)  the  pharmaceutical  industry  (Fromont,  Chap-
ter VI,  Section 5,  Sacchi Morsiani,  Chapter VI, 
VI); 
(c)  the  press  and  cinema  {Fromont,  Chapter  VI, 
Section 6); 
(d)  crafts (Zacher, No 446); 
{e)  credit  and  insurance  (Zacher,  No  451,  Sacchi 
Morsiani, Chapter VI, Section 6, IV and V). 
But in fact non-economie motives form the basis for 
the mandatory provisions in the first three sectors, 
for (a)  reasons of urban p[anning, public health and 
safety, for (b) motives of pubHc health, for (c) consi-
der·ations  of 'Cultural  policy.  The economie  objec-
tives of  sectoral development are  mainly pursued 
in these sectors too by means of measures of assis-
tance. German craft legislation seems to ha'V'e  been 
inspired more by the professional ethics of the old 
guild system than by considerations of rational eco-
nomie policy. In Germany and Italy too the legis-
lation on credit and insurance is not primarily di-
rected  towards  the  development  of  these  sectors 
as such, but rather towards the protection of public 
in  terests or - in the case of the banks - their use 
as an instrument of monetary policy. It has all'leady 
been  remarked  above  that  Community  coordina-
tion  on  the  first  point  will  have  to  be  effected 
within the framework of the realization of the right 
of establishment and the free movement of services 
in this sector.  The coordination problems with re-
gard to the instrumental  function  of the  banking 
system have already been discussed in another con-
nection. 
8.5.  CONCLUDING REMARKS ON 
SECTORAL POLICY 
The German report in particular states a number of 
mandatory measures for  other fie1ds  of industry, 
trade and services than the ones mentioned here. 
Howe'V'er,  these all"e  too individual to make oit  pos-
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them.  Summarizing the  enti~e situation emerging 
from  the  national reports,  mandatory  regulations 
are obvious exceptions as instruments of a coherent 
sectoral development policy.  They occur above ali 
in the sectors of agriculture, transport and energy. 
The  limited  use  that the  ECSC  has  made  of its 
mandatory  powers  of  regulation  in the  coal  and 
steel sectors also  seems  to confirm that as  a  rule 
mandatory .regul~ations do not forman essential in-
st~ument for sectoral poUcy. The instruments of in-
dicative planning, aid and programme contracts are 
of much greater importance. 
Sectoral policy at Community leve!- especially in 
the case of strongly intergovernmental procedures 
- encounters  special  problems  proceeding  from 
the conflicting interests of the Member States. As 
mentioned  above,  it can  hardly be expected  of  a 
national minister that he sacrifices his less efficient 
national enterprises for the sake of a  better inter-
national division of work. Consequently, he will not 
be  readily prepared to  cast his vote  in favour of 
coordination measures resulting in that. This draw-
back makes itself felt the most strongly when man-
datory  measures  are  taken  for  that  purpose.  As 
long as the concrete elaboration of sectoral policy 
cannot be left to a supranational body which bears 
responsibility only for the interests of the Commu-
nity as a whole, it will therefore be difficult for an 
efficient Community sectoral policy to develop. Not 
only on the strength of the 'Wirtschaftsverfassung' 
of the European Communities but for this practical 
reason too the optimal division of work in the corn-
mon market will therefore have to be left as a rule 
to the operation of the mechanism of competition. 
Only in the few  sectors in which the interests  of 
most of the Member States run parallel cana better 
sectoral structure be expected of a common sectoral 
po  licy. In the other cases the measures of assistance 
and  programme  contracts  of  the  Member  States 
wl!ll  have  to  be  ·coorrdinated  by  the  Commission 
with the primary aim  of preventing distortion  of 
competition to the disadvantage of certain Member 
States. This will also have to be the main aim in the 
supervision or harmonization of mandatory national 
regulations. 
9.  Enforcement of economie law 
(national reports, 2nd part, Chapter VII) 
It emerges from the national reports that the sanc-
tions  for  ensuring that  mandatory  regulations  of 
economie  law are complied with differ quite con-
siderably in the Member States. These differences 
relate among things to the degree of specialization 
of economie penal law, the nature and extent of the 
sanctions, the liabtlity of corporate bodies to punish-
ment  and  the  significance  of  administrative  and 
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civil-law sanctions in addition to penal sanctions. 
From a  Community point of view these differences 
may present considerable  drawbacks above  ali  in 
offences against Community law or against nation-
al ·mandatory law harmoni21ed by the Community. 
This is  of importance for  instance to  Community 
legislation in the field of agriculture or transport, 
common customs legislation and the harmonization 
of  technical  regulations  with  regard  to  the  com-
position  of  products.  Community  regulations  in 
these fields lose much of their value as a guarantee 
of equal  treatment  of  ali  Community enterprises 
if broadly the same sanctions for the same offences 
are not guaranteed. Moreover, difficulties of detec-
tion and prosecution may occur when the enterprise 
is  established in a  different state from the one in 
which the offence was committed. 
Harmonization of the severity of the sanctions ac-
tually applied cannot, of course, be achieved solely 
by harmonization of  the  statutory possibilities  of 
sanction. However, this does not exclude the possi-
bility of harmonization of the definitions of offen-
ces, requirements of guilt, punishments and further 
sanctions being of importance to a uniform sanction-
mg of ~au standa~ds of Oommunity l'aw or national 
law based on Community law. Viewed in the long 
term, it may perhaps prove necessary to extend the 
area for which Community law itself regulates the 
sanctions and where Community organizations also 
apply these sanctions themselves. An intermediate 
solution would be to authorize a Community m·gan-
ization  to appeal  to  the  Court of Justke  against 
national court judgments after sufficient harmoni-
zation of national sanction law with respect to of-
fences  against  EEC  law '(or  national law derived 
frorp.  this).  In the field of prosecution it may per-
haps be necessary  in the long  run in sorne  cases 
to create a  right of denunciation for a  Community 
organiza  ti  on. 
However, the most urgent priority seems to be the 
more efficient regulation of the division of powers 
between the Member States in sanctioning. By bet-
ter cooperation  in  detection,  prosecution  and  the 
execution of sentences, by amendment of the appli-
cable principle of territorialiy in penal legislation 
in favour of the country of establishment, or by a 
combination of such arrangem1ents,  the difficulties 
of effective sanctioning arising from the applicable 
principle of territoriality ought in any case to  be 
elimina  ted. 
10.  Legal protection 
(national reports, 2nd part, Chapter VIII) 
Regulation  of  the  legal  protection  of  enterprises 
and individuals 'against the authorities also proves 
to  vary greatly in the  legislation  of the Member States. The differences relate inter alia to the divi-
sion of powers between administrati'VIe  courts and 
ordinary courts, the degree of specialization of ad-
ministrative law in the economie field, the kinds of 
legal acts against which  an appeal may be made, 
the grounds for appeal and the nature of the deci-
sions that the various courts may make. Thus the 
competence  of  the ltalian  court is  confined  to  a 
strict check  on legality.  One gains  the impression 
from the various national reports that the readiness 
of the court to restrict the freedom of decision of 
the authorities in the economie  field  differs  quite 
considera  bi  y.  A~ccotding to  the reports  on  France 
and  the  United  Kingdom,  this  readiness  is rela-
tively smali in the countries mentioned. 
Ali these differences are in turn important from a 
Community point of view above  ali to the extent 
that verification against Community Jaw is involv-
ed.  For  the  question of  the  extent to  which  the 
statutory and practical differences in the regulation 
of  lega1l  protection has also  J~ed 1in  prractice  to an 
unequal degree of legal protection in the original 
Member  States,  reference  should be  made to the 
reports of the 1973  FIDE congress in Luxembourg. 
In anticipation of this comparative study of juris-
prudence in the Member States on Community law 
and the ensuing discussion, it does not seem appro-
priate  as  yet  to  formUJlate  recommendations  for 
this.
1 
1  See for this in particular the General Report for the 
sixth  international  congress  for  European  law 
(Luxembourg,  24-26  May  1973)  by  P.  Verloren van 
Themaat on jurisprudence with respect to a European 
economie order. 
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Summary and principal recommendations 
1.  Summary of the preceding .chapters 
Purpose and method of the study 
1.  It is examined to what extent, for the establish-
ment of a common market and for the realization of 
an economie and monetary union, harmonization of 
the economie law of the Member States is neoessary 
and how this harmonization can be achieved.  The 
development  of  the  Communities'  own  economie 
law cornes up for discus,sion only indirectly (Chap-
ter I.l). 
2.  Both the establishment of a  common market re-
quired by Article 2 of the Treaty of Rom1e  and the 
coordination  of  economie  policy required by that 
article cali for  numerous  measures of harmoniza-
tion or cool'dination of nationa·leoonomicJJaw. While 
the  establishment  of  a  common  market  usually 
requires  lasting  and  binding  common  standards, 
this is much less the case with respect to the coor-
dination of economie policy. Thi's Jeads to new in-
stitut1onal problems (Chapter I.l). 
3. Both for the comparative analysis of the econom-
ie 1}aw  of the Member States and for the analysis 
of the economie law and the instruments of coor-
dination  of  the  European  Economie  Community, 
the planning typology by  Professor Zijlstra, publish-
ed  by  the  Commission  in  1966,  proved  to  be  a 
usable point of departure. After a  few adaptations 
of  the  typology  to  the  objectives  of  the  present 
study, both the economie law of the M·ember States 
and the instruments  of coordination of the Trea-
ty of Rom.e  wel'e divided into  the following eight 
groups of instruments: 
1. economie forecasting; 
2. indicative  short- and  medium-term  planning, 
supplemented  by  overall  and  indirect  instru-
ments for attainment of the objectives set; 
3. measures of assistance; 
4. programme contracts; 
5. mandatory regulations; 
6. sectorallegislation; 
7. ·enforcement of the law and 
8. legal protection (Chapter I.3 and I.4). 
The unity of the national systems of economie law 
4.  In the Community  activities of coordination in 
various fields  of economie  law,  the  cohesion dis-
played  by ·each  national  system  of  economie law 
may not be lost sight of (Chapter II.l). In this re-
spect the following are part1cularly important: 
- the  varying  role  of  older  historical  strata  in 
current law (II.2);  · 
- the considerable extent to which in som 1e  cases 
either the market economy idea or the orienta-
tion by a five-year plan proves to permeate the 
whole economie law of a  country (II.3,  5 and 6 
and the whole of Chapter III); 
- the  greatly  diff.ering  state  organizations  and 
further institutional provisions (Chapter II. 5-
9 and Chapter III.2); 
- the  greatly  differing  importance  of  constitu-
tional rules and differently based general prin-
ciples of law to economie law (Chapter II.5, II.6 
and II.7); 
- the extent and m·anner of participation of man-
agement and labour in economie policy (Chap-
ter II.5-9); 
- the degree of statutory definition of  economie 
policy  and  the importance  of  l'egal  protection 
against the authorities (Chapter II.5-9); 
- the special importance  of the  public sector of 
the economy as an instrument of economie pol-
icy in Italy (Chapter II.7); 
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nomie Planning Office and the great variety of 
forms  of participation  of  management and la-
bour  in  economie  po  licy  in  the  N etherlands 
(Chapter II, 8.3); 
- the influenc·e  of the two  ... P'a,rty  system on eco-
nomie law in the United Kingdom as a prromoter 
of discontinuity (Chapter II.9). 
Besides points of divergence from the national sys-
tems, points of increasing convergence between the 
national systems as  a  whole are noted,  especially 
on the important point of the economie arder pur-
sued, the relation between 'market' and 'plan'. 
Economie order, legal order and institutional order 
5.  Above aU on institutionall grounds, but also hav-
ing regard to the development trends in the Mem-
ber States,  Community  policy should  be  dir~ected 
primarily towards  completion and maintenance of 
the  common market and  coordination  of the ma-
cro-economie policy of the Member States. Never-
theless, this optimal economie arder outlined in the 
Zijlstra  report  for  the  Community  now  deserves 
sorne amplification. The quantification and coordi-
nation of national objectives shou[d now be extend-
ed  to  ai,l  general,  economk and social  objectiv·es 
mentioned  in  the  third  programme  for  medium-
term  economie  po  licy.  Furthermore,  measures  of 
assistance have  now  assumed such  proportions in 
ali Member States that systematic coordination at 
Community  level  will  gradually  have to  acquire 
more weight vis-à-vis the individual appraisal of 
competition-distorting effects. Finally, all Member 
States have now had the experience that 'Global-
steuerung' must also be accompanied by more di-
rect  measures  for  certain  subjects  or  in  certain 
circumstances.  These  measures  will  have  to  be 
coordinated at least broadly, but in many cases also 
in detail at Community le'V'el  (Chapter II.lO.l  and 
liLl). 
6.  The tendency towards greater statutory defini-
tion of economie policy and towards the compila-
tion of five-year plans evident in various M·ember 
States  deserves  to  be  encouraged  in  all  Member 
States from  a  viewpoint of  Community coordina-
tion (Chapter II.10.2  and conclusions 14  and 20  be-
law). 
7. In view of the experiences in the Member States, 
for  the  success  of  the coordination of short- and 
medium-term economie policy special attention will 
have to be paid to the participation of the European 
Parliament and of management and labour (Chap-
ter II.10.2 sub b). 
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8.  Harmonization of  ail  mandatory  implementing 
regulations  of  economie  laws  directed  towards 
short-term adjustment of economie prooesses seems 
out of the question  for  political, institutional and 
pi'1act1ca'l reasons. Policy here wiJ1.1 have to be direct-
ed more towards averan coordination of the prac-
tical ·effects.  Mandatory harmonization  of legisla-
tion WIÏll  be more possib}e and necessaTy with re-
spect to 1a~sting manda  tory implementing regulations 
of national basic laws (Chapter II.l0.2 sub d). 
9.  For the coordination of the more overall and in-
direct national economie measures in the m'edium-
term,  including  measures  of  assistance  and  pro-
gramme contracts, the Community programmes for 
medium-term economie po  licy will increasingly have 
to  form  the  general  fram·ework  (Chapter  II.10.2 
sub d). 
The central economie objectives 
10.  Only in Germany are the central economie ob-
jectives laid dawn by law- in part even constitu-
tionally. Germany, the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom lay somewhat more stress on the objec-
tives of stability. Belgium, France and Italy some-
what more on the objectives of  g,rowth. These differ-
ences in  emphasis on objectives are accompanied 
by different views with regard to the relation be-
tween  short-term  economrc  poltcy  and  medium-
term economie policy. The social objectives of the 
M~ember States that are economically  relevant on 
account of their cali on national incarne run parai-
lei with  regard  to  their nature, as  appears  from 
the third medium-term economie programme. lt is 
argued that the quantification and Community co-
ordination must be extended to these social objec-
tives. Otherwise, bath the attainment of those objec-
tives themselves and the realization of a  monetary 
union and the maintenance of the common market 
are endangered (Chapter III.l). 
Differences in state organization 
11.  Prov~ded that the Member States guarantee that 
autonomous  decentralized  agencies  also  observe 
Community law, the differences in state organiza-
tion between the Member States do not forma hin-
drance to  the necessary coordination of  economie 
policy (Chapter III.2). 
The organization of economie forecasting 
12. The organization of economie forecasting in the 
various Member  States  displays  considerable  dif-
ferences. It is argued that, in view of the experien-ces in the Member States and the Communities, it is 
necessary for  technical  reasons and to strengthen 
the effectiveness  of coordination of the economie 
policy of the Member States to entrust forecasting 
at Community leve! to an independent body. This 
must,  however,  cooperate  closely  with  national 
independent bodies in this field (Chapter 111.3). 
Overall economie policy in the short- and medium-term 
13.  Foliowing  the  relevant  French  ideas  on  this 
matter, it is argued that short-term economie pol-
icy should serve the obj,ectives of medium-term eco-
nomie policy. Short-term economie policy must con-
s1st  in  short-term  adjustm,ent  measures  so  as  to 
safeguard the medium-term  objectives.  There are 
not only economie but also strong legal arguments 
for this (Chapter 111.4.2). 
14.  The preceding ,conclusion means that all Mem-
ber States should introduce medium-term program-
ming. The structure of this, notably a listing of the 
objectives  to  be  quantified,  should under  Article 
235  of the Treaty of Rome be harmoniz,ed in con-
nection  with  conclusion  10.  With  regard  to  the 
quantification itself of the various objectives, con-
siderable national variations may be admitted sub-
ject to the broad  coordination stated under point 
10 of this summary (ibid.). 
15.  In medium-term planning in Germany, France 
and Italy the legislator participates; in Italy, indeed, 
by constitutional  rule.  The  objectives,  procedures 
and legal  nature  of  the  five-year  plans  in  these 
Member  States  display  a  number  of  differences. 
Germany has a  legaliy prescribed five-year plan-
ning of public finance,  but in practice in addition 
informa,} five-year proj,ections for the whole econ-
omy.  The actual situation in the Netherlands and 
the United Kingdom is closest to that in Germany. 
Against  the  background  of  the  situation  in  the 
Member States it is understandable that Communi-
ty coordination of the economie policy of the Mem-
ber States has made the most progress with respect 
to  external economie  policy. lt is  argued that, on 
the strength of what is remarked under 13  and 14 
and in view of the recent developments in Germa-
ny, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, this 
coordination can and must be extended to medium-
term budgetary poUcy.  lt must moreover be per-
formed against the background of more comprehen-
sive medium-term plans (Chapter 111.4.3). 
16.  Short-t·erm progr,amming, with differences be-
tween the two versions, is the furthest developed in 
the Netherlands and Germany, where it has a  sta-
tutory  basis,  particularly  strongly  developed  in 
Germany. However, the other Member States also 
have one-year plans or forecasts.  With the excep-
tion of Italy, ali Member States in addition have a 
short-term economie policy that may clearly be dis-
tinguished from medium-term policy and which is 
directed towards the fundamental short-term equi-
libria.  As  regards  the  instruments  of  short-term 
economie policy, budgetary policy and other overall 
and indirect instruments everywhere occupy a cen-
tral position. Considerable differences relate above 
ali to wage and priee policy.  ln France the whole 
range  of  instruments  of  economie  policy  is  also 
available for short-term economie policy. Commu-
nity  coordination  of  short-term  economie  policy 
may be of a binding nature for the Member States 
under Article 103  of the Treaty of Rome.  Having 
regard to the views on this existing in the various 
Member States, the coordination wilJ. have to relate 
primarily  to  budgetary  policy  and  other  overall 
and indirect instruments. However, a  coordination 
restricted  to  this  would  endanger  the  necessary 
public  services.  For  this  reason  various  legal 
methods are also recommended for getting a  hold 
on  the developm·ent  of  wages  and other incomes 
and their spending, without entering into conflict 
with the fundamental views on this question in the 
Member States (Chapter 111.4.4). 
17.  The most important overali instruments of eco-
nom1c palicy in ali Member States, with the differ-
ences  in  emphasis  stated  in  Chapter  111.4.5,  are 
budgetary policy,  taxation policy,  the policy with 
respect to public investments and monetary policy. 
ln Germany foreign economie and monetary policy 
also plays a big part in maintaining priee stability. 
In the Netherlands there is also an endeavour to ar-
rive at macro-ecenomic progra,mme contrads with 
the central organizations of employers and workers. 
The most  important legal  problems  indkated for 
Community  coordination  relate  to  the  decentra-
lized territorial  authorities, the statutory basis of 
the expenditure policy of  the Member States and 
the statutorily established degree of independence 
of the Central Banks. The report contains  recom-
mendation for solutions to these p:robl,ems. The last-
mentioned problem is of essential importance to the 
functioning of the system of central banks aimed at 
by the Communities (Chapter 111.4.5). 
The public sector of the economy 
18.  In  view  of  the situation  as  described  in  the 
Member States and under Article 90  of the Treaty 
of Rome as interpreted by the Court of Justice, the 
Commission should foliow a  more active policy of 
coordination with respect to the public sector of the 
economy than it has done so far. Nor can this policy 
of  coordination  be  dLrected  ·e~clusively  towards 
countering distortion of competition and other di-
r·ect and indirect infringments of the provisions of 
the Treaty with regard  to the establishment and 
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aspect will have to be to the fore in supervision. In 
exceptional  cases,  however,  the  coordination  can 
and must be directed as  weil towards accordance 
with the objectives of Community coordination of 
the economie policy of the Member States (Chapter 
III.4.6). 
19.  The last important indirect instrument of eco-
nomie policy dealt with in the national reports is 
that of the public markets (marchés publics). Com-
munity policy in this field must continue to be di-
rected as before towards countering discrimination 
on account of nationality. An instrumental use of 
the public markets coordinated in ·exc·eptional situa-
tions will have to respect this principle of non-dis-
crimination (Chapter III.5). 
Measures of assistance 
20. After a summa:ry of the relevant situation in the 
Member States, the following  recommendations in 
particular are made wi  th regard to measures of as-
sistance.  In the first place, from the viewpoint of 
coordination, on account of the discretionary nature 
of the greater part of aid policy, it is of great im-
portance that the Member States lay down certain 
generallines of policy for the application. 
In the second  place,  the supervision by the Com-
mission under Articles 92  and 93  of the Treaty of 
Rome will, it is true, have to be aimed primarily at 
countering distortions of competition. With respect 
to regional measures of assistance and aid measures 
occurring in ali or practically all Member States in 
favour of  certain branches of industry, this coun-
tering of  distortion of  competition will,  however, 
have to be accompanied to an increasing extent by 
rationalization and harmonization of the national 
measures. In the third place the transparency and 
national  and  Community  cohesion  of  aid  policy 
will  have  to  be  furthered  in  the  framework 
of  national  and  Community  indicative  five-year 
plans.  The  Community  itself  will  have  to  use 
the  instrument  of  aid  above  aU  more  strongly 
than up to now in the field of regional policy, but 
in two specified situations also in the field of sec-
tora! policy. With regard to the legal basis of Com-
munity measures of assistance a  compromise is re-
commended between the Belgian,  French and !ta-
lian views on the one hand and the British, German 
and  Dutch views  on  the other on  a  basis of the 
Italian constitutional provisions as explained in the 
Italian report (Chapter III.5). 
Programme contracts 
21.  Reference is made to the new possibilities and 
difficulties  entailed  for  the  Communities  by  the 
instrument of programme oontracts developed above 
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aU  in F.rance  and Belgium.  FTom  the  legal point 
of  view,  Community  supervision  of  programme 
contracts  presents  special  difficulties.  Only  pro-
gramme contracts connected with measures  of as-
sistance can be coordina  ted un  der Articles 92  and 
93  of  the Treaty  of  Rome.  Programme  contracts 
connected with exemptions from priee regulations 
and other generally binding prescriptions may per-
haps have to be coordinated under Article 101. The 
question of the extent to which Article 90 also qual-
ifies for  application deserves  closer study (Chap-
ter III.6). 
Mandatory regulations of economie law. Decentralized 
agencies with mandatory powers 
22.  In addition to the principal central and territo-
dal,ly decentralized general politkal agencies, pub-
lic  representative bodies of business  OT  professio-
nal life play a part in the creation or implementa-
tion of mandatory regulations of economie law. In 
Germany, Italy and the Netherlands the Chambers 
of Commerce and Industry must be mentioned first 
of aU  in this connection. Reference is made to the 
legal  problems that may arise here from  a  view-
point of Community coordination and their possible 
solution.  The  same  is  done  with  regard  to  the 
public - in France ·also  p~rivate - agencies or in-
stitutions that exist for certain sec'bors of trade and 
industry in  France  and  the  N etherlands.  On  the 
strength of the view existing in Germany that the 
responsibilities ofprivate enterprise and the author-
ities must be separated as much as  possible,  that 
country does not have any pa~allels to the forms of 
organization existing in France and the N etherlands 
with  respect  to  individual  secto~s.  On  the  other 
hand,  horiZ~ontally and functionally deconcentrated 
state organiz·ations  with a  great measure of inde-
pendence ('superior fede~al authori'bies') play a much 
more  important  role  in  German  y  than  in  other 
Member States. However, Germany -like Italy-
does  have public organizations for  liberal profes-
sions ·and for crafts with mandatory powers in the 
field of professional discipline. In all these cases too 
simiiar  legal  problems  aris.e  from  a  Community 
viewpoint to  those presented by the Chambers of 
Commerce and Industry in Germany, Italy and the 
Netherlands.  Community  harmonization  of  the 
statutory organizations for individual sectors or oc-
cupations seems from a  Community point of view 
unnecessary  and, in view  of the greatly differing 
national situations, impossible. It seems more fea-
sible  to  aim  at  Community-regulated  private or-
ganizations  in  sectors  with  a  highly  de'V'eloped 
Community policy. These could then, as in France 
(and with respect to qualitative requirements and 
the  auction  system,  in  the  Nethe~lands too),  be called upon to assist in implementation of the pol-
icy. It is therefore understandable that, above ali in 
the  field  of  common  agricultural  policy,  an 
endeavour in this direction canin fact be observed 
(Chapter III.  7  .1). 
23.  With regard to the priee stability to be pursued, 
on the strength of the arguments stated in the report 
the objectives to be attained must be coordinated, 
but not the instruments  to  be used.  In particular 
harmoniz,ation  of  mandatory  priee  ~egulations is 
not necessary.  However, care must be taken that 
national  priee  regulations  applied  do  not conflict 
with mandatory Community law (Chapter III.7.21). 
24.  The coordination of short-term economie policy 
in the field of income development cannot be di-
rected either towards direct mandat<>Tyintervention 
in wage increases.  For indirect possibilities  of in-
fluencing income development, see Chapter III.4.4. 
However, it wi.Jll be possible mandatoriJy to restrict 
the spending of private incomes in favour of public 
services or as part of a  general restriction of ex-
penditure by regulating hire purchase or by fiscal 
or semifiscal  measures. If incompatibilities occur, 
the national mandatory m,easures can and must be 
coordinated mandatorily at Community level under 
Article 103  of  the Treaty of  Rome.  However,  the 
poweiJ"s  of coordination TegaTding  this aspect seem 
incapable of use without a greater !Ï.nfluence of the 
European Parliament and management and labour 
on the establishment of the main outlines of  eco-
nomie policy (Chapter III.7.2.2 and 7.2.4). 
25.  Mandatory regulation of the credit system for 
reasons  of  short-term  economie  policy  is  already 
possible in all Member States. It is  recommended 
that an investigation be carried out to ascertain to 
what extent harmonization of  legislation is neces-
sary for an effeci  tve coordination of the use of this 
important instrument of short-term economie pol-
icy. In any case this will be necessary as regards the 
bodies  authorized  to  apply  it.  In the  interests  of 
Community coordination the Central Bank should 
always have a  minimum of powers of its  own in 
this respect. Mandatory coordination of mandatory 
short-term economie measures ought to be applied 
here too by the Council of Ministers under Article 
103  of the Treaty of Rome. However, efforts must 
be made to have the coordination of the informai 
policy,  which is  more important in practice,  per-
formed by the system of central banks being aimed 
at. Furthermore, coordination of the regulations re-
garding supervision of the conduct of bank business 
for the protection of the public will be necessary 
under Article 57, paragraph 2,  and Article 66 of the 
Treaty of Rome. However, it does not seem neces-
sary with respect to this supervision too to prescribe 
mandatorily that implementation of the legislation 
must be entrusted to  the  Central Banks.  Finally, 
the report deals with the problems of coordination 
ariSing  with  regard  to  regulation  of  competition 
between the banks and with respect to the use made 
of them in ,a  selective credit policy. It is  aTgued 
that in essence the same kind of problems are con-
cerned  here  as  in  competition  policy  in  general 
(Chapter III.7.2.3). 
26.  On the question of legislation for  situations of 
shortage,  preventive coordination  seems  desirable 
with respect to the reserve legislation existing in at 
least four Member States for shortages in emergen-
cies. As the legislation in question usually allows of 
complete  control  of  the  distribution  of  goods,  it 
forms a potential impairment of the free movement 
of  goods  between the Member States. It is advo-
cated that, by consultat1on as referred to in Article 
224  of the Treaty of Rome,  solutions be sought in 
advance  which  assure  the  continued  survival  of 
Community solidarity and interstate trade even in 
emergencies as mentioned in that article. In other 
situations of shortage than those stated in Article 
224,  the Council can exercise regulatory power un-
der Article 103, paragraph 4. Use has also repeated-
lybeen made of this power already (Chapt,er III.7.3). 
27.  Mandatory regulations with regard  to  foreign 
trade and foreign  payments will first of ali not be 
permitted to conflict with the Community regula-
tions in the field of the four freedoms, the harmoni-
zation of legislation (including customs legislation) 
and common commercial policy. As the latter must 
take the place of the foreign commercial policy of 
the Member States, on this  point no  coordination 
problems occur in the sense attached to this in the 
present report. However, the situation is quite dif-
ferent with respect to  coordination of the regula-
tion  on  capital transactions. This will have to  be 
done  within  the  Community  in  close  connection 
with the coordination of the rest of monetary and 
economie policy. This coordination will have to be 
accompanied by a fairly large number of directives 
for  the harmonization of legislation under Article 
100. For this reference may be made to the various 
publications  and proposais  of  the  Commission  in 
connection  with  the  establishment  of  a  common 
capital  market.  Both Article  70  of  the Treaty  of 
Rome and the resolution of March 1971  regarding 
the realization of an economie and monetary union 
also  require  coordination  of  capital  transactions 
with non-member countries. In this connection ex-
change legislation will also have to be harmonized 
in such a way that the system of central banks to be 
set up can coordinate the application. (Chapter III. 
7.4). 
28.  Cartel legislation and its application in the vaT-
ious Member States and the influence of views on 
cartel policy on other aspects of economie law and 
economie policy of the Member States prove to dis-
play great differences. However, it is argued that 
from the material point of view sufficient unity of 
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for competition of the Community treaties, though 
in this ·Oonnection a system of conflict settlement of 
a  procedural kind is advocated. While Community 
medium-term planning must be more strongly de-
veloped than is the case at pr·esent in Germany, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom, the Commu-
nity will, as a  counterpart, have to follow a  rela-
tively stringent anti-cartel and anti-monopoly pol-
icy. This policy will have to be gradually extended 
to the most important national forms of cartel too. 
In ad  di  ti  on to more general arguments, economie, 
institutional and legal considerations applying spe-
cifically to the Communities favour  such  a  policy 
(Chapter III.7.5). 
29.  The legislation of the Member States with re-
gard  to  physical  planning  likewise  proves to  dis-
play great differences. It is recommended that the 
coordination  between  physical  planning,  regional 
economie policy and protection of the environment 
be strengthened in all Member States and that in 
this  connection a  closer study be made of British 
and French experience in this field.  The expecta-
tion is further voiced that the three aspects of eco-
nomie  po  licy  men  tioned  will increasingly le  ad  in 
interrelation  to  licensing  systems.  These  may  in 
particular limit the freedom of choice of location. 
From a Community point of view there would seem 
in principle to  be no objection to such a  develop-
ment (Chapter III.7.6.1). 
30.  Licensing  syst~ems for  foreign  investments for 
reasons of general industrial pol:Lcy or sectoral pol-
icy exist solely in France and Italy. From a  Com-
munity point of view a  harmonization of policy on 
this point vis-à-vis non-member countries does not 
seem urgent. Primarily it  is  important  to  ensure 
that the same possibilities of establishment in the 
various Member States exist for the subjects of the 
various Member States and that a  common capital 
market is created (Chapter III.7.6.2). 
31.  Quantitative  restrictions  of  domestic  invest-
ments, prove to occur only exceptionally and even 
then not in all Member States. In practice they are 
always connected with a  more comprehensive sec-
tora! policy for the branch of industry in question. 
From a Community viewpoint too it will be possible 
to aim at them only in such a framework and even 
then only most exceptionally. In sectors with pure-
ly local markets quantitative restrictions on estab-
lishment  present  problems  from  a  Community 
viewpoint mainly in  connection with the right of 
establishment (Chapter III.7.6.3). 
32.  Qualitative  establishment requirements play a 
much  bigger  part  in  most  Member  States  than 
quantitative  restrictions  on  establishment.  The 
principles of freedom to conduct a business valid in 
Germany and France have led in those countries to 
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a  greater  reticence  than  in  Belgium  and  the 
Netherlands in this respect. However, this German-
French reticence is  less  valid with  respect to  the 
application of non-economie  criteria of  public or-
der.  In  Belgium,  the Netherlands  and  Italy  it is 
precisely economie crit·eria that play a  bigger part. 
In its turn, the situation in the United Kingdom is 
more like that in Germany and France. The distinc-
tion between countries where establishment legis-
lation is based primarily on considerations of pub-
lic  order and  countries  wher.e  it  proceeds  prim-
arHy from economie objectives sometimes proves to 
be connected with principles of law that were al-
ready  laid  down  in the nineteenth  century.  The 
distinction  has  important  consequences  from  the 
point of  view of scope,  technique  and systematic 
arrang.ement  of  the  legislation.  The  distinction, 
based on fun  dam  en  tal diff-erences of opinion, forms 
an obstacle difficult  to surmount for coordination 
of the right of establishment as prescribed in Arti-
cle 57  of the Treaty of Rome. It is therefore recom-
mended that the pragmatic approach of the Com-
mis1sion and Council be continued, a number of con-
crete suggestions being made (Chapter III.  7  .6.4). 
33.  In view of Article 222  of the Treaty of Rome, 
extensive ha-rmonization of the concession systems 
for natural resources ·existing in the Member States 
is not possible. However, in this field of legislation 
too  the principle of non-discrimination should be 
respected.  For this  purpose suitable directives on 
the procedures to be followed can be promulgated 
(Chapter III.7.6.5). 
34. Harmonization of regulations on specifie aspects 
of market behaviour that leave the principal possi-
billities  of  competition  intact  does  not-seem  very 
urgent  as  a  rule.  Chapter  III.7.7.  deals with the 
situation in the Member States regarding this fairly 
extensive field of legislation and the resultant pro-
blems for the Community. A number of recommen-
dations are also  made on the priord.ties  to be ob-
served in harmonization proposais. 
35.  With regard to  protection  of the  environment 
the Community wi:ll  above all have to assume re-
spon:sibiUty for the principles of aUocation of costs 
and the harmonization of regulations with respect 
to  marketable  products.  With  respect to technical 
regulations for industrial and other permanent in-
stallations, a broad Community coordination of the 
criteria to be applied seems necessary, but not an 
extensive harmonization of the implementing regu-
lations. Insofar as no external pollution effects oc-
cur in other Member States, it seems sounder for the 
Member Stat·es to gear thcir measures to the differ-
ing degrees or air, water and soil pollution exist-
ing in the different territories of the Community. 
Reference may be made to the Commission's pro-
posais for this.  A  number of comments are added for the eonnection with physical planning and re-
gional policy. Mention is  again made of the need 
for good coordination of lieensing systems operating 
side by stde (Chapter III.7.8.1). 
36.  The  various  legal  problems  arising  with  the 
necessary harmonization of commodity legislation, 
based on considerations of public order, are discus-
sed in Chapter III.7.8.2. 
37.  A  coherent sectoral  policy with mandatory re-
gulations occurs in the Member States solely in the 
sectors  of  agriculture,  transport and energy.  The 
sections in the national reports. on sectoral policy 
seem  to  confirm  that outside  these  three  sectors 
mandatory regulations do not as a rule forman es-
sential instrument for  sectoral policy.  Much more 
important for this are the instruments of indicative 
planning,  aid and programme  eonb"~acts.  In prin-
ciple these instrum,ents can also be applied at Com-
munity leve!. However, sectoral policy at Commu-
nity leve!- especially in the case of strongly in-
tergovernmental procedures- encounters particu-
lar difficulties proceeding from conflicting interests 
of the Member States. Coordination of the develop-
ment of the various sectors will therefors have be 
left to the market as a rule. 
Apart  from  a  few  exceptions,  the  policy  of  the 
Community institutions will thus have to be aimed 
primarhl.y  at  ~countering dtstortion of competition. 
However, the  Commission  will to  a  gradually in-
creasing extent have to counter distortion of com-
petition by coordination and rationalization rather 
than by abolition of measures of assistance (Chap-
ter III.8). 
38.  Finally,  attention is devoted to the important 
matters of coordination in the field of application of 
sanctions  and  legal  protection  (Chapter III.9  and 
10). 
2.  Principal recommendations 
1. The most important conclusion from the study is 
that the shaping of medium-term macro-economie 
policy of the Member States must be harmonized 
overall  and that  Community  coordination  of this 
policy  must  be  strengthened.  This  harmonization 
and reinforced  coordination of medium-term eeo-
nomï.c po1icy :form the necessary basis :tor an effec-
tive short-term economie policy and for the neces-
sary cohesion between the various aspects  of the 
economie policy ,of the Communities. 
2.  An  effective  Community  short-term  economie 
policy will, on the strength of the situation encoun-
tered in the Member States, have to make use in 
the main of overall and indirect instruments. Har-
monization  of mandatory regulations  in this con-
nection is not possible and not necessary with re-
gard to control of wages and priees. Harmonization 
or  coordination  of  legislation  is  necessary  with 
respect  to  the  powers  of  the  central  banks,  the 
legislation  on  the  credit  system  and  the  capital 
market in  general,  and it may  also  be  necessary 
with respect to mandatory restrictive measures re-
lating to the most important categories of expendi-
ture of national income. Short-term economie pol-
icy will have to be aimed at ensuring the fundamen-
tal equilibria of Article 104 of the Treaty of Rome 
by  measures  of  adjustment  in  such  a  way  that 
attainment  of  the  medium-term  objectives is not 
endangered.  The  effecti  veness  of the measures to 
be taken should be guaranteed by comparing them 
with  the fo:r:ecasts  of an  independent Community 
planning office. 
3.  It emerges from the situation in most Member 
States that neither the  necessary  coordination  of 
the medium-term economie policy nor an effective 
coordination of short-term economie policy has any 
chance  of  success  without  greater  powers  being 
granted to  the European Parliament and without 
greater participation by management  and  labour. 
Greater co-responsibility of  employers and work-
ers for the economie policy of the Communities is 
also  necessary  because  a  mandatory  short-term 
incomes policy does not form a  real alternative, to 
judge by the situation encountered in most Member 
States. 
4.  In addition to overall instruments like budgetary 
policy, fiscal policy and monetary policy, measures 
of  assistance  and  in  sorne cases programme  con-
tracts form the most important instruments of na-
tional economie poltcy. The importance of these in-
struments has increased to such an extent that in 
Community policy a shift in emphasis from ,exclu-
sively  individual  appraisal  against  the  require-
ments of undistorted competition to coordination of 
measures of aid  with  objectives  along  the  same 
Unes is needed. At the same time greater transpar-
ency, system and rationality of nationai aid policy 
must be pursued. Within the framework of a  par-
tial extension of medium-term ·economie policy  to 
regional objectives and a number of sectors, an aid 
policy for the Community itself should be further 
developed.  By attaching  conditions  to  Community 
aid measures, these can be made a highly effective 
instrument of coordination of  regional policy and 
industrial  policy.  In certain  cases  conditions  can 
best  be  attached  under  a  programme  contract. 
Similar conclusions apply with regard to the instru-
mental  use that is sometimes made  of the public 
sector of economie life. 
5. As part of medium-term economie policy a better 
interrelation of regional policy,  physical planning 
and protection of the  environment should also be 
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tion  of legislation  is  necessary  to  only  a  limited 
extent. 
6.  Harmonization of mandatory regulations of eco-
nomie law is mainly necessary with respect to last-
ing regulations. Apart from what has been men-
tioned in the second and fifth recommendation, the 
principal  aim  of  this  is  to  guarantee  the  proper 
functioning  of the common market. The most im-
portant areas of economie legislation that have to 
be  harmonized  for  this  reason  are  establishment 
legislation, the regulations with respect to the ca-
pital market and the legislation giving rise to the 
technical  and  administflative  obstacles  to  trade. 
However, also of great importance is the preventive 
coordination  of  the  application  of  the  legislation 
existing in many Member States for extraordinary 
situations of shortage.  In establishment legislation 
onŒy qualitative :requirements for carrying on a busi-
ness qualify for harmonization for the time being 
and, on account of the fundamental differences of 
opinion in the Member States,  this harmonization 
too will have to be aimed mofle  at a  broad coordi-
nation of the effects than at a  detailed harmoniza-
tion of the regulations  themselves.  In most  other 
fields  of  economie  legislation checking  that man-
datory provisions of Community law ·are being ob-
served is more important than harmonization. 
7.  From a viewpoint of a  rational division of work 
between the Communities and the Member States, 
it  is  advisable  that  Member States  with  a  weak 
cartel  legislation  strengthen  this  and  base  it  on 
principles  similar  to  those  on  which  Community 
law is  based.  As  the necessary further reinforce-
ment  and  extension  of  the  common  competition 
policy can also be achieved on the strength of the 
Community treaties themselves, mandatory harmo-
nization of national cartel legislation is not neces-
sary, however.  The national legislation that binds 
the freedom  of  competition  on  certain aspects  to 
rules does not contain any essential restrictions of 
the possibilities of competition on the common mar-
ket. Consequently, harmonization of these rules on 
competition too  is not very urgent,  though it will 
be needed on a few points in due course. 
8. Thus the Communities need both a strengthening 
of the above ali macro-economie  and indirect ad-
justment of  the  economie  process  and  a  further 
reinforcement  of  the  integrating  function  of  the 
common mark1et itself. Conflicts between these two 
main aspects of Community policy must be avoided. 
Thus in principle measures of short-term economie 
policy  may  not  impa:ir  the  maintenance  of  free 
movement between the Member States. 
9.  The report contains no conclusions with regard 
to  the  common  or harmonized  legal  instruments 
which the main protagonists on the common marke~ 
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may  require.  Instances  of  these  instruments  are 
company  law,  patent  and  trademark  law,  bank-
ruptcy law and a Community legal basis for collec-
tive agreements. There seems to be no doubt that 
reinforcement of medium-term economie poUcy and 
completion of the establishment of a common mar-
ket will cause the need for common regulations in 
these fields of law too to grow. On account of the 
fundamental legal views that play a  role here, the 
necessary legal development in these fields too will 
often not be possible unless the powers of the Euro-
pean  Parliament  are  strengthened  and  manage-
ment and labour play a  greater part. However, in 
many Member States these fields of law are not re-
garded as forming part of economie law and the re-
ports  therefore contain  insufficient points of con-
tact for concrete recommendations in these fields. 
The  same  applies  to  taxation  legislation,  which 
cornes up for dis·cussion only to the extent that it is 
made to serve economie policy more directly. 
10.  In view of the situation in the Member States, 
there seems at present to be no cause for manda-
tory regulations of sectoral policy outside the sec-
tors of agriculture, transport and energy. For insti-
tutional reasons alone great reticence must be ob-
served from the Community point of view with re-
gard to the development of a sectoral policy outside 
the three sectors mentioned.  Insofar as necessary, 
the instruments of forecasting, indicative planning, 
measures  of  assistance  and  programme  contracts 
will have to be given priority ov·er  mandatory re-
gulations. 
11. Harmonization of legislation cannot be achieved 
without  equivalent  guarantees  for  legal  enforce-
ment and protection in the Member States. 
12.  The  aoove  recommendations  have  been  con-
fined  to  ess·en tials.  N  um·erous  detailled  suggestions 
from the preceding chapters have not been discus-
sed.  Moreover, the national situations summarized 
in these preceding chapters and the argumentation 
given there are more important than  the content 
of the recommendations themselves. The reader is 
therefore  recommended  in  conclusion  to base  his 
point of view primarily on the preceding chapters 
and the places referred to in the national reports. 
3.  Concluding remarks 
At the conclusion of this report it is again stressed 
th  at the report rel  a tes only to the first and second 
stage of the economie and monetary union and even 
then more to the coordination of national economie 
and monetary policy than to the creation of a corn-
mon  economie  and  monetary policy.  This restric-
tion of the report is caused by the way in which the 
problem is envisaged. For it is a matter of the place of the economie law of  the Member States in the 
first  and  second  stage  of  the  economie  and 
monetary union pursued. In these first two stages 
it will as a rule only be a question of coordination 
of the economie policy of the Member States. The 
absence of a specification of the objectives for the 
final  phase  made  it premature  to  advise  on  the 
extent to which an autonomous Community policy 
(whether or not with decentralized implementation) 
should in the long run take the place of coordina-
tion of national policy. 
This approach to the problem seems in accordance 
with the path followed by the Community so far. 
However, at the end of this report the rapporteur 
wishes to express his doubts whether, in the light 
experience since 1972,  this path may be described 
as  reaUstic  in every respect.  Coordination of eco-
nomie (and social) policy is certairuy necessary for 
the proper functioning  of a  monetary union.  One 
need only think of the need for a  coordinated con-
trol of inflatwn, of the need for a  policy aimed at 
balanced development of employment in aU parts of 
the Community and of other subjects dealt with in 
this report. W:ithout such a coordination of economie 
policy  a  monetary  union  will  not  prove  viable. 
However, the question is wh  ether the desired par-
ali  elis  rn  between  economie  and  monetary  union 
cannot better be achieved  if coordination of eco-
nom1c policy is coupled as a condition to immediate 
transfer of exchange rate policy to the Community 
institutions or at least to a clearer return to a corn-
mon monetary discipline than was achieved up to 
mid.  1973.  For this  purpose  changes  in exchange 
rates  could be subjected at the beginning  of  the 
second stage to the approval and not just the advice 
of  the Council.  The  Council  could attach  binding 
conditions with regard to the economie policy to be 
followed  to approval of a  change in exchange rate 
and  also  to  mutual  assistance  under  Article  108 
of the Treaty of Rome and in the framework of the 
European  Fund for  monetary  cooperation.  In the 
course of the second stage the Council ought to ac-
quire the sole right, on the strength of proposais by 
the Commission  and the Monetary  Committee,  to 
decide on changes of exchange rates without a pro-
posai having been submitted to it to that effect by 
the Member States concerned. However, this right 
ought not to be granted to the Council (under Arti-
cle 235  of the Treaty of Rome) without the permis-
sion of the European P.arliament and without a de-
cision being taken at the same time on a number of 
essential instruments of social and economie policy. 
These might include the founding  of  a  European 
regional fund that allows of sufficiently large ca-
pital transfers within the Community to make the 
graduai attainment of  a  monetary union with in-
variable exchange rates acceptable. 
The  rapporteur became  particularly  convinced  of 
the need for such a shift of emphasis in the simul-
taneous pursuit of an economie and monetary union 
during  his  participation  in  an  interdisciplinary 
working party at Bielefeld University. 
Although in that working party's report the need 
for coordination of economie policy was not stres-
s·ed  sufficiently  in  his  opinion,  he  takes  the  lib-
erty of referring to the Bielefeld report1  for a fur-
ther substantiation of the proposed shift in empha-
sis. 
1  Ziele und Methoden der europ~iischen Integration, pub-
lished by H. von der Groeben andE. J. Mestmaecker, 
Athenaumverlag 1972. See in particular p.  113  et seq. 
and for alternative solutions for irrevocable first deci-
sions  in the direction of  a monetary union  p.  124  et 
seq. 
71 APPENDIX 
Extract from the 'Point of view of the Federal Government with respect 
to the 1971 Annual Report of the Federal Cartels Office' 
The increasing public criticism to which the market economy is exposed may be largely ex-
plained by the uncontrolled concentration process. As the cartel authorities stilllack powers 
of intervention in this field,  the false impression is created that the favouring of certain 
group interests is inherent in the system governing competition. In this sense the amended 
Cartels Law is a touchstone for the extent to which political forces is the Federal German 
Republic are prepared to maintain the market economy and competition for the future too. 
Recently,  increased  efforts  to  replace  competition  in  highly  concentrated  branches  of 
industry by collective planning of investments,  quantities  supplied  and  priees  have been 
observed. Corresponding cartel plans have been submitted both to the Commission of the 
European Communities and to the Federal Minister for Economies and Finance ('Minister-
kartell', Article 8 of the Law Prohibiting Restraints of Competition). The reasons for this 
are certain difficulties that have arisen in anumber of not unimportantbranches of industry. 
Characteristic of these difHculties aTe falling priees as a  result of overcapacity. The firms 
in question speak of a danger to their existence and thu:s to employment too. 1t ·fs  also said 
that itwould be a 'wasteofnationa!l.assets' if existing productâ.onpl!ants had to be shutdown. 
In such  cases  collective  planning often  merely has the appearance of rational problem-
solving. lt  is true that the economie cycle and- in certain branches of industry- also the 
increasing size of production plants make considerable demands on planning the utilization 
of capacity. Nevertheless, decision-making with regard to investment, which is one of the 
most important means of competition, must remain  under  the  control  of  the  individuaJ 
firms so as to prevent the market economy from degenerating into a system in which the 
individual markets are increasingly controlled not by competition but by groups of interests 
organired in cartels. Private enterprise would increasin~ly lose its function. The disadvan·-
tages of such a system of collective planning for efficiency, liberalism, readiness to pr.ogress 
and productivity or our economy are obvious. 
Experience teaches that overcapacities are mostly not attributable to short-term economie 
and technological difficulties of independent investment planning, but in the final analysis 
are based on the oligopolistic structure of these branches of industry. Disproportionately 
large profits during a  boom incite firms to invest heavily and moreover attract new in-
vestors. The next downward tum of the economy is then all the more difficult to endure. 
Even perfect market regulations cannot eliminate this harmful situation. Though the firms 
involved would secure their profits, at the same time the market control mechanism would 
be thrown completely out of gear. Consequently, caution is called for in the use of exceptions 
to cartel legislation like Article 8 of the Law Prohibiting Restraints of Competition. And 
even if the licensing authority has a say in the implementation of the cartel, e. g. via suit-
able conditions, this cannat replace control by competition. 
Mistakes in planning would have even more serious effects,  since  they would affect all 
firms in the branch of industry concemed. The firms would no longer be obliged under 
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the pressure of competition to make cost-saving technical progress. Customers and consu-
mers would have to bear the resultant disadvantages in the form of ex-cessive cartel priees, 
while  a  few  firms,  by excluding  competition, would aquire a  'guarantee of profit'. This 
would lead to a  distribution of income favouring the firms in the cartel, with for instance 
additional  competitive disadvantages for  small  firms  which  would  be  struggling  hard 
enough without that. 
Nor are such cartels a suitable means of maintaining employment, for they do not increase 
the volume of sales and so do not increase the utilization  of capacity either. Experience 
shows that lay-offs need hardly be feared when the difficulties are based on temporary 
fluctuations in demand or when production is highly capital-intensive. It can happen that 
ove.I'Icapacity is used as a  re~ason for closing down older and unprofitable plants. But such 
closures, which are due anyway, should not be a ground for deciding to permit investment, 
quota-fixing or priee cartels. 
In exceptional cases,  in which technological demands  exceed  the investment capacity  of 
individual  firms,  there  may  be  a  national  need for  joint investment planning.  To  this 
extent  clear  and  concrete  guidelines  must be developed by which  departures from the 
principles of market economy are limited to the absolute  minimum. In such exceptional 
cases it must also be ensured that the controlling function normally fulfilled by competition 
is temporarily exercised as far as possible by the authorities. The working party on compe-
tition policy in the Federal Ministry of Economies and Finance will soon be concerning it-
self with this set of problems; the results of its work will also be important to the German 
contribution to the development of an industrial policy in the EEC. 
Apart  from  these  closely  defined  exceptions,  economie policy must counter tendencies 
towards collective planning with respect to investments, quantities supplied and priees. If 
the causes lie in the fact that certain branches of industry are already highly concentrated, 
they can hardly be eliminated again. This is ali more reason for protecting any competition 
still existing or possible in these fields. The task of a forward-looking economie policy must 
moreover  be to  prevent as  much  as  possible  the creation  and spread of  uncompetitive 
industrial structures. If the reinforced process of concentration continues to have free play, 
the problems described will occur to an ever-greater extent and in ever-wider fields. The 
introduction of merger control is therefore ~an urgent necessity from this point of view too. 
The OECD  Council recently pointed out again  in  a  recommendation of  26  January 1972 
that an effective competition policy is an important factor for optimal growth and a stable 
priee level;  measures for  strengthening competition  exert pressure  on  costs,  priees  and 
profits and are therefore a weapon in the struggle against inflation. The Council has conse-
quently advised al1l  Member States to intensüy their competition policy  (Report  of Acti-
vities, p. 36). 
Likewise, the Board of Experts for Assessmen t of Overall Economie Trends devoted a large 
part of its last annual report to competition policy and commented that, the higher the 
degree of concentration of the economy, the more difficult it is to achieve stability of priee 
levels without endangering full employment (Paper VI/2487, p. 123 ff.; Report of Activities, 
p.  10).  In  the  Community  diagnoses  of  27  April  1972  drawn  up  by the  Association  of 
German Economie Research Institutes, it is stated that the result of every steering of the 
trade cycle  depends  not !east on  the  functioning  of  competition.  In particular  merger 
control  and  stricter regulations  regarding  cartels are essential  if the  regulation  of  the 
market is not to be endangered (p.  13). 
In its attitude towards the report of activities of the Federal Cartels Office for  1970  the 
Federal Government had already drawn attention to this connection and stressed that cy-
clical tendencies towards priee increases continue more easily and quickly on monopolistic 
or oligopolistic markets than on markets with a competitive structure, which in tum could 
have a highly negative effect on the general cyclical climate (Paper VI/2380, p.  3). 
Meanwhile experience also suggests that, the less the competitive structure of the markets, 
the less effective national short-term economie policy is. Comparisons between the position 
with respect to competition policy and the results of short-term economie policy in various 
countries  lead to  the  conclusion  that a  series of short-term economie  measures become blunted when they encounter markets characterized  by dominant  positions  or any other 
form  of  excessive  economie  power.  Thus firms not actively engaging in competition can 
raise their priees even when pressure has been  exerted  on  priees  by  a  national  policy 
aimed at limiting demand. If such firms are expecting a  drop in sales,  they increase their 
priees and thus their profit per item, so as not to have to accept any loss of overall profit. 
This priee po1icy is the result of a market situation in which supply and demand are no 
longer subject to the control of competition. 
Such structural obstacles  to  the efforts to limit priee development were a  partial reason 
for the fact that a number of Western countries  recently made more frequent use  of the 
means of direct priee controls and priee freeze. This is often regarded as a consequence of 
the ever-decreasing workability of the market economy concept. If  in the Federal German 
Republic the aim of stable priees and full employment  is  to  be  further  pursued  without 
such 'dirigiste' intervention, the protection and encouragement of efficient competition will 
for this reason too become increasingly important tasks of economie policy. 
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